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1197 
Reconceptualizing the Role of 
Intellectual Property Rights in 
Shaping Industry Structure 
Peter Lee* 
Technological and creative industries are critical to economic and social 
welfare, and the forces that shape such industries are important subjects of legal 
and policy examination. These industries depend on patents and copyrights, 
and scholars have long debated whether exclusive rights promote industry 
consolidation (by shoring up barriers to entry) or fragmentation (by promoting 
entry of new firms). Much hangs in the balance, for the structure of these IP-
intensive industries can determine the amount, variety, and quality of drugs, 
food, software, movies, music, and books available to society. This Article 
reconceptualizes the role of patents and copyrights in shaping industry 
structure by examining empirical profiles of six IP-intensive industries: 
biopharmaceuticals; agricultural biotechnology, seeds, and agrochemicals; 
software; film production and distribution; music recording; and book 
publishing. It reveals that exclusive rights play multiple roles in influencing 
industry structure, and it distinguishes their effects along two 
underappreciated dimensions. First, it distinguishes the effects of exclusive 
rights at different times, arguing that patents and copyrights contribute to the 
initial entry of new firms, particularly in young fields, but that over time 
exclusive rights facilitate industry concentration by erecting barriers to entry 
and serving as assets that incumbents seek to amass in mergers and 
acquisitions. Second, it distinguishes along the value chain within any given 
industry, arguing that exclusive rights most prominently promote entry in 
“upstream” creative functions—from creating biologic compounds to producing 
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movies—while tending to contribute to concentration in downstream functions 
focused on commercialization, such as marketing and distributing drugs and 
movies. As a corollary, this Article shows that exclusive rights play multiple 
roles in shaping industry structure, from directly enabling entry or exclusion to 
subtly influencing firm behavior in ways that advance fragmentation or 
concentration. This Article provides legal and policy decisionmakers with a 
more robust understanding of how patents and copyrights contribute in myriad 
ways to both fragmentation and concentration, depending on context. Drawing 
on these insights, it explores potential interventions from antitrust law and 
reforms to intellectual property law—including conditioning the acquisition of 
exclusive rights on the size and market position of a rights holder—to ensure 
robust competition and innovation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The story of pioneering biotechnology firm Genentech illustrates 
the complex ways in which intellectual property rights impact the 
structure of innovative industries. In the 1970s, scientist Herbert Boyer 
and venture capitalist Robert Swanson founded Genentech,1 a biotech 
firm that applies genetic engineering to develop therapeutic 
compounds. Genentech submitted its first patent application to the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) on July 5, 
1979,2 and soon followed with dozens more.3 Patents were critical to the 
viability of the young startup; according to Genentech itself, “The 
company’s pursuit of patent protection for its scientific inventions 
ensured the company’s future and made possible the development of the 
biotech industry itself.”4 Patents thus promoted market entry by 
Genentech (and other startups) in the nascent biotechnology industry. 
Fast-forward thirty years, and patents played a key role in biotech 
industry consolidation. In 2009, Roche, a global pharmaceutical firm, 
completed a $46.8 billion acquisition of Genentech, thus “end[ing] the 
independent existence of what is widely considered the world’s oldest 
and most successful biotechnology company.”5 Among other factors, 
Roche sought greater access to Genentech’s intellectual property6 and 
to maintain exclusive rights to Genentech’s portfolio of drug candidates 
after a contract between the companies was set to expire.7 Roche was 
also motivated to acquire Genentech (and its promising drug pipeline) 
 
 1. Jeannette Colyvas et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Academic Health Centers, in 
ECONOMICS, LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: SEEKING STRATEGIES FOR RESEARCH AND 
TEACHING IN A DEVELOPING FIELD 155, 160 (Ove Granstand ed., 2003). Stanley Cohen of Stanford 
University and Herbert Boyer of the University of California, San Francisco, developed the 
pioneering techniques of recombinant DNA technology, commonly known as genetic engineering. 
See generally Stanley N. Cohen et al., Construction of Biologically Functional Bacterial Plasmids 
In Vitro, 70 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3240 (1973); Sally Smith Hughes, Making Dollars Out of DNA: 
The First Major Patent in Biotechnology and the Commercialization of Molecular Biology, 1974–
1980, 92 ISIS 541, 541–42 (2001). 
 2. Rory J. O’Connor, Patent, then Publish, GENENTECH (July 21, 2016), 
https://www.gene.com/stories/patent-then-publish [https://perma.cc/63N8-ZSHS]; U.S. Patent No. 
4,342,832 (filed July 5, 1979). 
 3. O’Connor, supra note 2. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Andrew Pollack, Roche Agrees to Buy Genentech for $46.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/13/business/worldbusiness/13drugs.html [https://perma. 
cc/V846-YEPY]. Roche had already owned a majority of Genentech since 1990. Id. 
 6. See Bringing a Successful Partnership to the Next Level, ROCHE 11 (July 21, 2008), 
https://www.roche.com/dam/jcr:95eaddc3-8392-4509-97af-ffd2b2f09db0/en/irp080721b.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z8CV-H7WY] (listing the “sharing of IP” as a “key objective[ ] of combining 
Genentech and Roche”). 
 7. Taskin Ahmed, Roche Gets Genentech for US$46.8 B, PHARMADEALS REV., March 2009, 
at 11, 11. 
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because of a “patent cliff” of upcoming patent expirations on its own 
products.8 A similar patent cliff threatened other major pharmaceutical 
companies as well and helped spur significant acquisitions by Pfizer 
and Merck that same year.9 Whereas Genentech’s creation reflects the 
role of patents in promoting market entry and fragmentation, 
Genentech’s acquisition by incumbent Roche reveals how the drive to 
obtain, maintain, and exploit patents can promote industry 
consolidation. 
Technological and creative industries are critical to economic 
and social welfare, and the forces that shape such industries are 
important subjects of legal and policy examination. These industries 
depend on patents and copyrights, and scholars have long debated the 
impact of exclusive rights on industry structure. On the one hand, 
scholars have argued that intellectual property rights promote industry 
concentration by creating barriers to entry and enabling rights holders 
to grow large by internalizing the benefits of innovation.10 Empirical 
evidence certainly reveals a relatively high—though varying—degree of 
concentration in industries that commercialize intellectual property. 
For instance, in 2012 (the most recent year for which census data are 
available) the top four pharmaceutical companies accounted for 31.2 
percent of the total value of shipments in the United States.11 
Additionally, in 2018 the Big Six major film studios—Warner Bros., 
Paramount, 20th Century Fox, Universal, Buena Vista (Disney), and 
Sony/Columbia—accounted for 83.7 percent of North American box 
office revenues.12 On the other hand, more recent scholarship has 
argued that patents and copyrights promote industry fragmentation by 
facilitating new startup formation and market entry.13 Certainly, 
patents play a critical role in forming new biotechnology and software 
companies, and copyrights help screenwriters, composers, recording 
artists, authors, studios, and publishers enter creative industries.14 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Pollack, supra note 5. 
 10. See infra Part I. 
 11. See Manufacturing: Subject Series: Concentration Ratios: Share of Value of Shipments 
Accounted for by the 4, 8, 20, and 50 Largest Companies for Industries: 2012, U.S. CENSUS, AM. 
FACTFINDER (Aug. 18, 2015), https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/product 
view.xhtml [https://perma.cc/WV4C-YLJN].  
 12. Combined Market Share of the “Big Six” Major Film Studios in North America from 2000 
to 2018, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/187261/combined-market-share-of-major-
film-studios-in-north-america (last visited Feb. 9, 2019) [https://perma.cc/8YC3-6LUP]; see also 
Studio Market Share, BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/studio (last visited Feb. 9, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/DN9U-6K6S] (reporting market shares of movie distributors). 
 13. See infra Part I. 
 14. See CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, SEED GIANTS VS. U.S. FARMERS 5 (Debbie 
Barker ed., 2013) [hereinafter SEED GIANTS] (noting the importance of patent rights to the entry 
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This Article enters the debate by more precisely delineating the myriad 
roles of intellectual property rights in shaping industry structure.  
To do so, this Article analyzes empirical and historical accounts 
of industry structure in six economically significant, IP-intensive fields: 
biopharmaceuticals; agricultural biotechnology, seeds, and 
agrochemicals; software; motion picture production and distribution; 
music recording; and book publishing.15 Of course, no single article 
could comprehensively survey each of these disparate fields. While each 
industry is highly idiosyncratic and warrants extended analysis on its 
own, these profiles reveal common patterns regarding the impact of 
patents and copyrights on industry structure. Much hangs in the 
balance, for the structure of these IP-intensive industries can determine 
the amount, variety, and quality of drugs, food, software, movies, music, 
and books available to society.  
Drawing on this empirical and historical examination, this 
Article argues that patents and copyrights play multiple roles in 
advancing both fragmentation and concentration, depending on 
context.16 This Article introduces two novel distinctions to more 
accurately characterize the influence of intellectual property rights on 
industry structure. First, it introduces the dimension of time, arguing 
that patents and copyrights promote initial entry by new firms (and 
thus industry fragmentation) but that over time exclusive rights 
contribute to industry concentration by erecting barriers to entry and 
serving as assets that incumbents seek to amass in mergers and 
acquisitions. In short, intellectual property rights contribute to initial 
entry and subsequent concentration. For example, patent rights were 
critical to the formation of agricultural biotechnology startups that 
genetically engineer new plant traits and to the entry of large chemical 
companies like Monsanto into the agricultural field.17 Over time, 
 
of chemical companies in the agricultural biotechnology industry); Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents 
Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961 (2005) (arguing that patents 
promote startup formation and market entry in the software industry); cf. Molly Shaffer Van 
Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1540 (2005) (arguing that 
copyright provides a mechanism to finance creativity even for low-income parties). 
 15. In identifying these industries as “IP-intensive,” this Article adopts the analysis of the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text. 
 16. While this Article focuses on patents and copyrights, it fully acknowledges that other 
intellectual property rights, particularly trademarks, also impact industry structure. See, e.g., Two 
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775 (1992) (noting that requiring secondary meaning 
to protect unregistered trade dress would disadvantage new entrants and reduce competition). 
This Article focuses on patents and copyrights due to space limitations and because of their similar 
constitutional and conceptual origins. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) (noting the “historic kinship between patent law and copyright law”). It 
reserves extended analysis of the impact of trademarks on industry structure for a future inquiry. 
 17. See infra Section II.A.2. 
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however, Monsanto and other large conglomerates utilized patents to 
block entry and promote consolidation.18 
Second, this Article introduces the dimension of the value chain, 
differentiating “upstream” creative endeavors, such as creating a 
biologic compound or producing a film, from “downstream” commercial 
endeavors within the same industry, such as further developing that 
biologic compound into a commercial drug or marketing and 
distributing that film. It argues that patents and copyrights most 
prominently promote entry in upstream creation while tending to 
inhibit entry and contribute to concentration in downstream 
commercialization. In short, intellectual property rights contribute to 
upstream fragmentation and downstream concentration. For example, 
copyrights promote the entry of upstream creative talent such as 
screenwriters into the movie industry, but large incumbents like Disney 
leverage massive copyright portfolios that raise barriers to entry in the 
downstream marketing and distribution of films.19 This Article provides 
legal and policy decisionmakers with a more robust understanding of 
how patents and copyrights contribute to both fragmentation and 
concentration, depending on context.20 
In so doing, it is important to clarify and cabin this Article’s 
causal claims regarding the role of exclusive rights in shaping industry 
structure. The theoretical debate on the impact of exclusive rights on 
industry structure focuses on patents and copyrights as direct causes of 
either fragmentation or concentration.21 And it is certainly the case that 
exclusive rights can directly impact industry structure, such as when 
copyright enhances incentives for new composers to enter the music 
industry22 or when patent thickets in the mature agricultural 
 
 18. See infra Section II.A.2. 
 19. See infra Section II.B.1. 
 20. Although this Article refers to both “consolidation” and “concentration,” it is important to 
acknowledge that commentators sometimes differentiate these terms. Consolidation refers to 
shifting production to larger and fewer firms while concentration refers to the extent to which a 
small number of firms dominates most sales in an industry. See, e.g., James M. MacDonald, 
Consolidation, Concentration, and Competition in the Food System, FED. RES. BANK KAN. CITY 
ECON. REV., Special Issue 2017, at 85, 85, https://www.kansascityfed.org/~/media/files/publicat/ 
econrev/econrevarchive/2017/si17macdonald.pdf [https://perma.cc/P78W-EEVV]; DENNIS A. 
SHIELDS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41224, CONSOLIDATION AND CONCENTRATION IN THE U.S. 
DAIRY INDUSTRY (Apr. 27, 2010), http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/ 
R41224.pdf [https://perma.cc/VE6P-TA6X]. While technically distinct, these phenomena often 
overlap, as consolidation of an industry into larger firms often results in a reduction in the number 
of firms. Additionally, as this Article uses the term, “consolidation” is somewhat more capacious 
in that it encompasses both vertical integration and horizontal integration, both of which result in 
shifting production to fewer and larger firms. 
 21. See infra Part I. 
 22. See infra Section II.B.2. 
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biotechnology industry block new entrants.23 But the correlation of a 
particular configuration of exclusive rights with a particular industry 
structure does not necessarily imply causation. For instance, if other 
factors—such as high fixed costs or economies of scale—drive 
concentration in the movie industry, then the accumulation of large 
copyright estates by incumbents may not be a cause so much as a 
reflection of industry concentration.  
However, one of the contributions of this Article is to highlight 
how exclusive rights play both direct and indirect roles in facilitating 
fragmentation or concentration. For example, in some cases, patents 
and copyrights contribute to concentration merely by serving as 
valuable assets that incumbents seek to amass to enhance their 
competitive position. For instance, incumbents’ drive to accumulate 
copyrighted assets has contributed to significant merger and 
acquisition activity in the film production and distribution industry. In 
such cases, exclusive rights are not the “cause” of industry 
concentration per se, but they play important roles in motivating and 
enabling such concentration. Importantly, the exclusivity inherent in 
copyright is critical to this dynamic; if creative assets were not protected 
by copyrights, studios would have significantly less incentive to 
accumulate them in mergers and acquisitions. Additionally, the mere 
aggregation of intellectual property rights can confer cost advantages 
on incumbents (and cost disadvantages on potential entrants) that 
indirectly shape industry structure. More broadly, this Article 
highlights that the roles of exclusive rights in influencing industry 
structure can be rather complicated. In some cases, both the presence 
and absence of strong intellectual property rights can contribute to 
concentration. For instance, strong patents and copyrights increase 
barriers to entry and concentration in the biopharmaceutical24 and 
music industries,25 but the absence of intellectual property rights 
(though expiration or piracy) also promotes concentration by motivating 
mergers and acquisitions among competitors.26 Of course, it is not 
surprising that businesses use and respond to exclusive rights in ways 
to achieve their competitive objectives. It is striking, however, that 
instruments designed to promote technical and creative progress27 are 
often amassed and deployed in ways that promote industry 
concentration, which may undermine that policy goal.  
 
 23. See infra Section II.A.2. 
 24. See infra Section II.A.1. 
 25. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 26. See infra Sections II.A.1, II.B.2. 
 27. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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Before proceeding, a few caveats are in order to delineate this 
Article’s arguments and objectives. First, this Article reveals a general 
pattern of intellectual property rights contributing to initial and 
upstream fragmentation as well as subsequent and downstream 
concentration in a variety of industries, but exceptions to this pattern 
certainly exist. In some young fields, for instance, intellectual property 
rights facilitate entry by a few initial firms, which then immediately 
assert exclusive rights to deter other potential entrants.28 Second, while 
this Article draws on empirical evidence to reconceptualize the 
relationship of intellectual property rights to industry structure, this 
theoretical framework raises a host of empirical questions that invite 
further examination. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I reviews the prevailing 
theoretical literature on intellectual property rights and industry 
structure, exploring arguments that exclusive rights promote both 
industry concentration and fragmentation. Part II provides empirical 
profiles of structural evolution in six IP-intensive industries: 
biopharmaceuticals; agricultural biotechnology, seeds, and 
agrochemicals; software; film production and distribution; music 
production; and book publishing. These accounts, which delve into the 
histories of these fields, highlight the role of exclusive rights in helping 
to shape industry structure, but they also reveal a host of important 
non-IP factors that influence industry structure as well. Part III draws 
on these accounts to argue that exclusive rights tend to promote initial 
firm entry but that over time, exclusive rights contribute significantly 
to industry concentration. It also argues that patents and copyrights 
most prominently promote fragmentation in upstream creative fields 
but that they tend to contribute to concentration in downstream fields 
focused on commercialization. It also observes that exclusive rights play 
multiple roles in shaping industry structure, from directly enabling 
fragmentation or concentration to indirectly motivating and facilitating 
such activity. Part IV explores several implications of these findings. It 
examines how antitrust law can address problematic concentration in 
IP-intensive industries and proposes reforms to intellectual property 
law that would condition the cost of obtaining and enforcing exclusive 
rights on an entity’s size and market position. 
 
 28. See infra Section II.A.2 (discussing the initial entry of chemical companies into the 
nascent agricultural biotechnology industry and these companies’ use of intellectual property 
rights to block entry by others); infra Section II.B.1 (discussing the role of patents in facilitating 
both entry and an initial oligopoly in the film industry).  
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I. PREVAILING ACCOUNTS OF THE IMPACT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS ON INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
In conventional accounts, intellectual property rights promote 
innovation by providing incentives to create and develop new 
technological and expressive works.29 Within a traditional economic 
lens, patents and copyrights solve a public goods problem in the 
underproduction of nonrival, nonexcludable goods, such as 
pharmaceuticals and movies.30 Exclusive rights prevent free riding and 
provide several related incentives, such as incentives to create, disclose, 
and commercialize intangible works.31 More recently, scholars have 
moved beyond this classic incentives focus by examining intellectual 
property rights’ indirect impact on innovation by shaping industry 
structure.32 Within this view, intellectual property rights can promote 
innovation not only by providing various incentives but also by 
facilitating forms of industrial organization that are more innovative 
than would be feasible absent those rights. Commentators have 
suggested that the most important economic impact of intellectual 
property rights is not on price but rather on industry structure.33 
In previous work, I built on this latter line of scholarship to 
explore the relationship between patents and vertical integration. Such 
integration arises when upstream and downstream parties in a common 
value chain (such as suppliers of auto bodies and manufacturers of 
automobiles) integrate under common ownership.34 Drawing on the 
 
 29. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024–28 (1989) (describing various incentives afforded 
by patents); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. 
L. REV. 989, 994 (1997) (“In a private market economy, individuals will not invest in invention or 
creation unless the expected return from doing so exceeds the cost of doing so.”). There are, of 
course, several noneconomic theories justifying patents and copyrights. See Lemley, supra, at 993 
nn.12–13 (surveying noneconomic theories).  
 30. See Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based Regulation in 
Patent Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 900 (2009) (“As is well-recognized, the technical knowledge 
inherent in an invention is a public good, which is nonrival . . . and nonexcludable.”). 
 31. See Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 1024–40 (surveying the various ways in which “patent 
monopolies function to promote progress”). Throughout this Article, I will use the term 
“innovation” in its vernacular sense to encompass innovative activity in general, which spans 
invention, development, and commercialization. Where appropriate, I will use “innovation” in a 
more technical sense to denote the process of developing and commercializing an existing invention 
or creative work. 
 32. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization, 84 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 785, 787 (2011) (adopting an “approach that examines how patents influence innovation 
behavior by influencing organizational behavior”). 
 33. E.g., Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 123, 123 (2006). 
 34. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher 
Body—General Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 199 (1988). 
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theory of the firm,35 a wide literature contends that intellectual 
property rights, primarily patents, promote vertical disintegration. For 
instance, Ashish Arora and Rob Merges have argued that patents 
promote the entry of small, upstream, research-intensive firms (such as 
biotech firms) that produce patented assets, which they then license to 
larger downstream entities (such as pharmaceutical companies) for 
commercialization.36 Along similar lines, Jonathan Barnett has argued 
that intellectual property rights have enabled the semiconductor 
industry to disaggregate between upstream “fabless” design firms and 
downstream foundries, which then in-license those designs to 
manufacture chips.37 A corollary to these descriptive claims is the 
normative claim that vertically disintegrated supply chains are more 
efficient than vertically integrated analogues because disintegration 
exploits the disproportionately innovative nature of small firms and 
gains from specialization and trade.38 In other work, I have shown that 
contrary to these accounts, patent-intensive industries exhibit a high 
degree of vertical integration.39 Among other considerations, the 
difficulties of transferring patent-related tacit knowledge, the desire to 
acquire not just innovative assets but also innovative people, and 
strategic factors all push patent-intensive industries toward vertical 
integration.40 While vertical integration may be the most efficient 
method of transferring and commercializing technology in certain 
situations, it raises significant normative concerns related to 
undermining specialization, decreasing independent sources of 
innovation, and raising barriers to entry.41 
This Article draws upon and extends that prior work along two 
dimensions. First, it expands its examination of industry structure 
beyond vertical integration to include horizontal concentration as well. 
Horizontal concentration is orthogonal to vertical integration and 
focuses on the number and size of competitors in a field; the fewer the 
 
 35. See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 36. Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm 
Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451, 454 (2004). 
 37. Barnett, supra note 32, at 792–93. 
 38. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Three Quasi-Fallacies in the Conventional Understanding of 
Intellectual Property, 12 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 13–14 (2016) (arguing that innovators could lose 
out by “adopting over-integrated organizational forms and foregoing transactions with third 
parties that have comparative advantages in supplying some of the capital inputs required to reach 
market”); see also KAUSHIK SUNDER RAJAN, BIOCAPITAL: THE CONSTITUTION OF POSTGENOMIC LIFE 
23 (2006) (noting the nimble managerial structures of small biotech firms). 
 39. See generally Peter Lee, Innovation and the Firm: A New Synthesis, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1431 
(2018) (examining vertical integration in biopharmaceuticals, agricultural biotechnology, 
information technology, and university-industry technology transfer). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1489–93. 
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competitors, the higher the degree of concentration.42 This Article 
argues that intellectual property rights contribute to both upstream 
entry (and thus fragmentation) and downstream concentration. Second, 
this Article extends beyond patent-intensive industries to include 
copyright-intensive industries as well. Patents and copyrights 
contribute to both initial, upstream entry and subsequent, downstream 
concentration in industries that produce patented technologies, such as 
biopharmaceuticals, genetically modified seeds, and software, as well 
as industries that produce creative content, such as motion pictures, 
music, and books.43 
This Article’s examination of the relationship between 
intellectual property rights and industry concentration intersects with 
a long-standing normative debate over what form of industrial 
organization best promotes innovation.44 Starting in the early twentieth 
century, political economist Joseph Schumpeter argued that large 
enterprises contribute most significantly to innovation and increases in 
standards of living.45 He famously contended that significant size and 
some measure of monopoly power helped firms achieve successful 
innovation,46 which in turn reinforced firm size and market power.47 
 
 42. Cf. Dal Yong Jin, Transforming the Global Film Industries: Horizontal Integration and 
Vertical Concentration amid Neoliberal Globalization, 74 INT’L COMM. GAZETTE 405, 407 (2012) 
(describing horizontal integration in the media context as “the combination of two or more 
companies across the same level of production and distribution”). 
 43. This Article acknowledges that there is not always a clear distinction between horizontal 
and vertical integration. For example, when a downstream pharmaceutical firm purchases an 
upstream biotech firm holding valuable biologics patents, such an acquisition is properly 
understood as vertical integration. See Lee, supra note 39, at 1455–66 (arguing that “tacit 
knowledge, human capital, and strategic considerations” motivate vertical integration in this 
context). If the biotech firm possesses or is developing the ability to perform downstream 
development, clinical trials, marketing, and distribution, however, then it may qualify as a 
potential competitor of the pharmaceutical company. In that instance, the acquisition of that 
biotech firm could be characterized as either vertical integration, horizontal integration, or both. 
 44. See Richard J. Gilbert & Hillary Greene, Merging Innovation into Antitrust Agency 
Enforcement of the Clayton Act, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1919, 1924 (2015) (discussing the respective 
views of Schumpeter and Arrow); see also Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How 
Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 577–79 (2007) (same). 
 45. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82 (1942): 
As soon as we go into details and inquire into the individual items in which progress 
was most conspicuous, the trail leads not to the doors of those firms that work under 
conditions of comparatively free competition but precisely to the doors of the large 
concerns . . . and a shocking suspicion dawns upon us that big business may have had 
more to do with creating that standard of life than with keeping it down. 
 46. See Spencer Weber Waller & Matthew Sag, Promoting Innovation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2223, 
2226 (2015). 
 47. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 45, at 82; see also James F. Oehmke & Anwar Naseem, 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As), Market Structure and Inventive Activity in the Agricultural 
Biotechnology Industry, 14 J. AG. & FOOD INDUS. ORG. 19, 20 (2016) (“Schumpeter hypothesized 
that higher levels of innovative activity are more likely to occur in industries that are 
concentrated . . . .”). 
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Taking a very different view, economist Kenneth Arrow influentially 
argued that competitive markets more reliably generate innovation 
than those subject to monopoly power.48 Similarly, Robert Merges and 
Richard Nelson have drawn from historical examples to argue that 
“multiple and competitive sources of invention are socially preferable to 
a structure where there is only one or a few sources.”49 Viewed from 
either normative perspective, much is at stake in determining whether 
intellectual property rights promote industrial concentration or 
fragmentation.  
Prevailing theories exhibit significant tension concerning the 
relationship between intellectual property rights and industry 
concentration. On the one hand, a wide literature argues that 
intellectual property rights promote industry concentration. Economist 
Harold Demsetz observes that intellectual property rights reward 
superior innovation and can contribute to monopoly power.50 Patents 
and copyrights allow firms to internalize the rewards of technological 
and creative innovation, thus contributing to endogenous growth. 
Furthermore, such rewards provide capital and leverage to allow 
industry players to acquire other companies. In addition to enabling 
industry incumbents to gain market share, patents and copyrights, by 
definition, also create barriers to entry that hinder competition.51 For 
example, Xerox aggressively asserted its patents on plain paper copying 
technology to prevent market entry by firms like IBM and Litton, 
thereby shoring up its monopoly.52 Contemporary pharmaceutical firms 
employ several patent strategies—including blanketing, fencing, 
surrounding, and flooding—to hinder or exclude potential 
competitors.53 Beyond one or a few intellectual property rights, broad 
thickets of exclusive rights throughout an industry can also deter entry 
by new firms.54 Ultimately, intellectual property rights can confer 
 
 48. KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING 144, 156–57 (1971); see 
David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in Antitrust Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
729, 732 (2001) (describing the contrasting views of Schumpeter and Arrow). 
 49. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 908 (1990). 
 50. Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J.L. & ECON. 
1, 3 (1973). 
 51. See Ian M. Cockburn & Megan J. MacGarvie, Entry and Patenting in the Software 
Industry, 57 MGMT. SCI. 915, 915 (2011) (finding that patent holdings in certain software markets 
negatively affect rates of entry into those markets). 
 52. Timothy F. Bresnahan, Post-Entry Competition in the Plain Paper Copier Market, 75 AM. 
ECON. REV. 15, 16 (1985). 
 53. Carlos Maria Correa, Ownership of Knowledge: The Role of Patents in Pharmaceutical 
R&D, 82 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 784, 785 (2004). 
 54. Cf. Cockburn & MacGarvie, supra note 51, at 919 (noting that a proliferation of exclusive 
rights can hinder entry in the software industry). 
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market power,55 raise barriers to entry, and increase industry 
concentration.56  
On the other hand, a significant strand of scholarship posits that 
strong intellectual property rights facilitate market entry and thus 
industry fragmentation.57 One instantiation of this phenomenon posits 
that intellectual property rights, primarily patents, promote vertical 
disintegration. As noted earlier, Ashish Arora and Rob Merges have 
argued that patents promote the entry of small, upstream biotech firms 
that license exclusive rights to downstream pharmaceutical companies, 
thus promoting vertical disintegration.58 Empirical analysis of the 
semiconductor industry suggests that stronger patent rights promoted 
entry by specialized upstream design firms.59 In this fashion, 
intellectual property rights can facilitate vertical disintegration—a 
form of fragmentation—in innovative industries. 
More broadly, scholars have argued that intellectual property 
rights promote startup formation and market entry, thus facilitating 
horizontal fragmentation as well. Small firms and independent 
inventors rely heavily on patents,60 which are critical to forming new 
ventures.61 As Jonathan Barnett observed, “Contrary to natural 
intuitions, a market with stronger patents will sometimes induce 
greater entry . . . than a market with weaker or no patents by reducing 
the minimum size of the market into which entry can be feasibly 
attempted.”62 Ronald Mann argues that patents are particularly 
 
 55. See, e.g., id. at 915 (focusing on patents as a significant barrier to entry in many fields). 
 56. See id. (collecting accounts from the electric lamp, glass processing, and photocopying 
industries). 
 57. On a related note, some commentators observe that the ability of patents to block 
competitors is surprisingly weak in many industries, thus undercutting the notion that patents 
promote industry concentration. See, e.g., Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from 
Industrial Research and Development, 3 BROOKING PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 818 (1987); Edwin 
Mansfield et al., Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study, 91 ECON. J. 907, 917 (1981); 
Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why 
U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
7552, 2000). 
 58. Arora & Merges, supra note 36, at 454. 
 59. Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An 
Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 
101, 119–21 (2001). 
 60. Barnett, supra note 32, at 788; see Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology 
Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1255, 1290 fig.1, 1290 n.110, 1290–94 (2009) (“Our results, for all biotechnology 
companies combined, underscore that a firm’s technological focus strongly influences startup 
executives’ view of the importance of different appropriability strategies. For this group of firms, 
patenting is ranked as the most important means of capturing competitive advantage.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Graham et al., supra note 60, at 1288; Bronwyn H. Hall, Exploring the Patent 
Explosion, 30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 35 (2004). 
 62. Barnett, supra note 32, at 817. 
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valuable for mature software startups and have promoted entry and 
fragmentation in the software industry.63 Indeed, firms that have 
applied for patents are more than twice as likely to enter the software 
market compared to similarly situated firms that have not.64 Along 
similar lines, the business strategy literature has traditionally 
characterized “patents as indicators of entrants’ technological 
capabilities, knowledge assets, or innovation success, rather than as 
barriers to entry.”65 
Although not always framed in these terms, copyright 
scholarship has also shown that exclusive rights on expressive works 
can promote market entry and industry fragmentation. The low 
threshold for protection and absence of a formal application process 
render obtaining a copyright extremely easy.66 Screenwriters, 
composers, recording artists, and authors obtain copyright protection 
simply upon fixing their original expression in a tangible medium of 
expression,67 and exclusive rights greatly facilitate their entry into 
cultural industries. For these and other reasons, “[c]opyright creates a 
mechanism that can finance creativity and dissemination even by those 
who are not independently wealthy.”68 Along these lines, Justin Hughes 
and Rob Merges analyzed data from performing rights societies and 
concluded that songwriters received at least $4.1 billion in copyright 
royalties from 2010 to 2014,69 which suggests that exclusive rights 
provide meaningful income to multitudes of independent composers. 
Though not framed in the language of industrial organization, these 
observations undergird a vision of copyright as promoting upstream 
market entry and industry fragmentation for many creative 
professionals. 
A variant of the fragmentation theory, elaborated most 
thoroughly in the copyright context, posits that intellectual property 
rights promote market entry by facilitating product differentiation. 
Drawing on the theory of monopolistic competition,70 Christopher Yoo 
 
 63. Mann, supra note 14, at 967–68, 985. 
 64. Cockburn & MacGarvie, supra note 51, at 915–16. 
 65. Id. at 916. 
 66. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46, 364 (1991) 
(holding that works that are independently created and that demonstrate a modicum of creativity 
satisfy the originality threshold for copyright protection). 
 67. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which 
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.”). 
 68. Van Houweling, supra note 14, at 1540. 
 69. Justin Hughes & Robert P. Merges, Copyright and Distributive Justice, 92 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 513, 532–33 (2016).  
 70. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 45, at 79. 
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argues that copyrights facilitate the entry of heterogeneous expressive 
works to compete against existing works.71 Repudiating the typical 
incentives-access tradeoff in copyright, Yoo argues that strengthening 
copyright protection can increase both incentives to create and access 
to existing creations by allowing greater competition between imperfect 
substitutes.72 Such competition has the salutary effect of driving down 
prices and expanding consumer choice.73 In copyright fields as well, 
intellectual property rights can promote market entry and decrease 
concentration. 
In sum, there seems to be colorable theory (and some empirical 
evidence) suggesting that intellectual property rights promote both 
industry concentration and fragmentation. This Article adds 
granularity to this debate on several dimensions. First, it distinguishes 
between contexts more likely to tip toward one form of industrial 
organization than the other. Regarding time, it contends that 
intellectual property rights contribute significantly to the initial entry 
of new entities and the subsequent consolidation of IP-intensive 
industries. Regarding the value chain, it argues that exclusive rights 
most prominently promote upstream entry and downstream 
concentration. Second, this Article reveals that beyond directly 
impacting industry structure, exclusive rights also play more subtle 
supporting roles in encouraging and facilitating either fragmentation 
or concentration. To explore these dynamics, this Article examines how 
IP-based companies wield patents and copyrights in a variety of 
innovative fields.  
II. STRUCTURAL EVOLUTION IN SIX IP-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES 
This Part offers a descriptive account of industry structure—and 
highlights the role of patents and copyrights in contributing to such 
structure—in six IP-intensive fields: biopharmaceuticals; agricultural 
biotechnology, seeds, and agrochemicals; software; movie production 
and distribution; music recording; and book publishing. In selecting 
these industries, this Article follows the quantitative and qualitative 
analyses of the USPTO, which in 2016 identified eighty-one 
 
 71. See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 
221, 236 (2004); see also Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright 
Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33, 39 (2004) (providing an example of copyright enabling excessive 
entry in the market for cookbooks); SCHUMPETER, supra note 45, at 99 (positing that “anyone is a 
monopolist who sells anything that is not in every respect, wrapping and location and service 
included, exactly like what other people sell”). 
 72. Yoo, supra note 71, at 221. 
 73. Id. at 221–22. 
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IP-intensive industries.74 To identify patent-intensive industries, the 
USPTO calculated the ratio of total patents from 2009 to 2013 in each 
North American Industry Classification System (“NAICS”) industry to 
the average number of employees in that industry; those with a higher-
than-average ratio of patents to workers were deemed patent-
intensive.75 Alternatively, the USPTO identified copyright-intensive 
industries as those “primarily responsible for the creation or production 
of copyrighted materials.”76 The USPTO analysis characterizes all six 
industries in this Article (or close analogues) as IP-intensive industries. 
On the patent side, the USPTO classifies pharmaceuticals and medicine 
as a patent-intensive industry.77 While agricultural biotechnology, 
seeds, and agrochemicals does not appear on the list, this industry is 
represented by a closely related segment: pesticides, fertilizers, and 
other agricultural chemicals.78 Software publishing appears as a 
copyright-intensive industry,79 though the fact that the USPTO’s patent 
analysis only covers manufacturing industries may explain why 
software does not also appear as a patent-intensive industry.80 The 
USPTO classifies motion picture and video production; sound recording; 
and newspaper, periodical, book, and directory publishing as copyright-
intensive industries.81 While certainly not capturing all IP-intensive 
industries, this Article explores a broad cross-section of some of the 
most prominent and economically important patent- and copyright-
intensive fields. 
As these empirical profiles reveal, patents and copyrights 
contribute to both fragmentation and concentration within IP-intensive 
 
 74. JUSTIN ANTONIPILLAI ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: 2016 
UPDATE 1 (2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/IPandtheUSEconomySept 
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NK4-RT49]. The USPTO analysis included industries that intensively 
use patents, copyrights, and trademarks, but this Article focuses on patent- and copyright-
intensive industries. 
 75. Id. at 32. This analysis is limited to manufacturing industries because the concordance 
between patent fields and the NAICS upon which it relies is limited to manufacturing fields. Id. 
at 7. As such, it excludes software publishing. See id. at 29 fig.10 (excluding software publishing 
from chart depicting exports of IP-intensive service-providing industries). 
 76. Id. at 9; see GUIDE ON SURVEYING THE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF THE COPYRIGHT 
INDUSTRIES, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. 51 (2003) (defining “core copyright industries” as 
those “wholly engaged in creation, production and manufacture, performance, broadcasting, 
communication and exhibition, or distribution and sale of works and other protected subject 
matter”). 
 77. ANTONIPILLAI ET AL., supra note 74, at 33 tbl.A-1. 
 78. Id. at 48 tbl.A-10. 
 79. Id. at 50 tbl.A-10. 
 80. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.  
 81. ANTONIPILLAI ET AL., supra note 74, at 47–50 tbl.A-9. Utilizing a different metric focused 
on revenues, “motion picture and video industries” and “sound recording industries” are in the top 
four industries when ranked by IP-related revenue intensity. Id. at 24, 25 tbl.1. 
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industries at different times and in different locations on the value 
chain. In particular, they reveal the common role of patents and 
copyrights across many fields in promoting initial industry formation 
and firm entry as well as concentration once an industry has matured. 
Furthermore, they illustrate the role of patents and copyrights in 
promoting market entry and fragmentation in upstream functions 
focused on creating intellectual assets and concentration in 
downstream functions focused on further developing and 
commercializing those assets. 
The argument of this Article is not that patents and copyrights 
are the sole or even necessarily the most important forces determining 
the structure of IP-intensive industries.82 They do, however, play a 
variety of important roles, and this Article seeks to delineate those roles 
more precisely. Accordingly, this Article provides holistic profiles of IP-
intensive industries that reveal myriad other, non-IP factors that also 
influence industry structure. In so doing, it aims to situate the effects 
of patents and copyrights within the broader context of economic and 
strategic forces that impact fragmentation and concentration. 
Obviously, each of these industries (and industry segments) is unique, 
highly complex, and warrants extended analysis. However, the 
necessarily brief profiles that follow reveal a kind of depth that only 
breadth can offer, as they illustrate some common patterns (as well as 
idiosyncratic differences) among these industries.  
In describing structural trends, this Part will refer to a common 
measure of industry concentration: the proportion of market share 
controlled by the top four firms in a given industry. Industrial 
economists characterize a market as no longer competitive when four 
or fewer firms control forty to fifty percent of the market.83 In such 
situations, dominant firms can signal their intention to raise prices, and 
other leading competitors will often follow suit.84 The broader narrative 
profiles presented in this Part provide context for these statistics, for 
they illustrate that calculating industry concentration is both an art 
and a science. Much depends on how one defines the relevant industry 
in question. For example, the software industry as a whole does not 
appear to be highly concentrated, but individual segments (such as 
operating systems or security software) tend to be dominated by one or 
 
 82. See Peter Lee, Concentration Drivers in the Commercialization of Intellectual Property 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (exploring the forces that determine the structure 
of industries that commercialize intellectual property and concluding that these forces tend to 
promote concentration). 
 83. F.M. SCHERER & D. ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 57–94 (3d ed. 1990). 
 84. Id. 
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a few large players.85 Situating these statistics within historical 
narratives provides valuable context for understanding the forces that 
shape IP-intensive industries.  
A. Patent-Intensive Industries 
This Section examines the impact of patents on the structure of 
three technology-based industries: biopharmaceuticals; agricultural 
biotechnology, seeds, and agrochemicals; and software. These 
industries are, of course, quite different. But in each of them, patents 
promote the entry of new firms, particularly in industrial segments that 
are young and positioned toward the upstream end of the value chain 
focused on creating new technology. For instance, patents facilitate the 
formation of new medical and agricultural biotechnology firms, which 
apply recombinant DNA technology to develop new drugs and plant 
traits. In the software industry, which features a more fragmented 
structure, patents similarly promote the entry and viability of new 
startups. While patents play an important role in firm entry, they also 
play significant roles in industry concentration, especially as wielded 
by older, downstream firms focused on commercialization. In 
biopharmaceuticals, the drive to obtain patented assets has motivated 
significant vertical and horizontal acquisitions by downstream 
pharmaceutical companies that commercialize drugs. Similarly, in the 
agricultural biotechnology industry, downstream commercializers like 
Monsanto have acquired upstream biotech firms for their patented 
assets and asserted broad patent portfolios that deter entry by new 
competitors. Mature segments of the software industry focused on 
commercialization often exhibit broad patent thickets that raise the 
cost of entry. Although far from an ironclad rule, a general pattern 
emerges wherein patents contribute to early, upstream entry—and 
thus fragmentation—as well as subsequent, downstream 
concentration. 
1. Biopharmaceuticals 
In biopharmaceuticals, patents have contributed to both initial 
firm entry, particularly in upstream, research-intensive fields, and 
 
 85. Expansive notions of substitutability and competition can also broaden the effective size 
of an industry, thus tending to lower perceived concentration. If, for instance, books compete with 
movies and television for consumers’ attention and dollars, then the proper context for analyzing 
concentration may be the “media” industry rather than “book publishing” more narrowly. See 
Albert N. Greco, The Impact of Horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions on Corporate Concentration 
in the U.S. Book Publishing Industry: 1989-1994, 12 J. MEDIA ECON. 165, 177 (1999). 
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later industry consolidation, particularly in downstream fields focused 
on commercialization. To understand these dynamics, it is first 
necessary to distinguish two related segments in this industry: 
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. The biotechnology industry arose 
in the 1970s from scientific advances in manipulating biological 
material, such as recombinant DNA technology and monoclonal 
antibodies.86 Many new biotechnology firms were university startups, 
and they traditionally operated independently of large pharmaceutical 
companies.87 Biotechnology firms produce biologic drugs or drug 
precursors based on biological material; biologic drugs tend to be much 
larger and more complex than the traditional small-molecule drugs 
produced by pharmaceutical companies.88 Such biologic drugs are 
upstream assets that require further downstream development and 
clinical testing before they are ready for market. 
Notably, patents have been critical to biotech firm formation and 
market entry,89 thus contributing to fragmentation in this segment.90 
To help illustrate the impact of intellectual property rights on industry 
structure, it would be useful to consider an industry that was relatively 
concentrated prior to the availability of exclusive rights but then 
became more fragmented upon the introduction of such rights. While it 
is difficult to isolate the impact of exclusive rights from other factors, 
the history of the biotechnology industry offers just such a natural 
experiment. The basic techniques for recombinant DNA technology 
have been available since the publication of Cohen and Boyer’s seminal 
work in 1973.91 At the time, the biotech industry was rather small and 
concentrated, with 105 biotechnology companies founded prior to 1980 
in the nine largest biotechnology centers in the United States.92 
However, firm entry and industry fragmentation increased 
substantially after 1980, a year in which several developments, 
 
 86. Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The 
Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 815 (2001). 
 87. Lee, supra note 39, at 1456–57, 1467 (“In the 1970s and 1980s, the biotechnology industry 
functioned relatively independently of the pharmaceutical industry.”). 
 88. Ashish Kumar Kakkar, Patent Cliff Mitigation Strategies: Giving New Life to 
Blockbusters, 25 EXPERT OPINION ON THERAPEUTIC PATENTS 1353, 1353 (2015). 
 89. Iain M. Cockburn, The Changing Structure of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 23 HEALTH 
AFF. 10, 15 (2004). 
 90. See id. at 13 (“Many smaller firms have disappeared as leading players have consolidated, 
while vigorous biotechnology-based competitors have entered the industry.”). 
 91. See Cohen et al., supra note 1. 
 92. See JOSEPH CORTRIGHT & HEIKE MAYER, SIGNS OF LIFE: THE GROWTH OF 
BIOTECHNOLOGY CENTERS IN THE U.S. 29 tbl.15 (2002) (listing number of companies per city). 
According to this report, the nine largest biotechnology centers are Boston, San Francisco, San 
Diego, Raleigh, Seattle, New York, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C., and their 
surrounding metropolitan areas. See id. (listing cities and surrounding areas). 
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including the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, expanded patenting in biotechnology.93 According to 
Genentech’s general counsel, the Court’s decision, which broadly 
interpreted patentable subject matter in the life sciences,94 “made 
biotech patents possible,”95 and without that decision, “the industry 
would never have gotten started.”96 Similarly, another commentator 
has observed that “[w]ithout patent rights in inventions in areas such 
as isolation and purification of proteins, DNA sequences, monoclonal 
antibodies, knockout and transgenic organisms, gene expression 
systems, and so on . . . many biotech companies would never have been 
founded.”97 
 The Court’s decision in Chakrabarty helped contribute to the 
“issuance of thousands of patents” and “the formation of hundreds of 
new companies.”98 Coincidentally, the Cohen-Boyer patent on 
recombinant DNA technology was also issued in 1980, and patents were 
helpful to early biotech firms for attracting investors to fund research 
and development.99 According to one cofounder of a biotech company, 
“all the early patents were viewed as positive, because if you couldn’t 
protect this intellectual property, then people were not going to invest 
in the field.”100 Notably, the number of biotechnology firms founded in 
the nine largest biotechnology centers increased from 105 prior to 
 
 93. 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (“[T]he patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly 
different characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for significant 
utility. His discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject 
matter under § 101.”). Additionally, patent rights expanded with enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act, 
which allowed and encouraged recipients of federal funds (including universities) to take title to 
patents arising from publicly funded research. See Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2012); Peter 
Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 64–65 (2013) (summarizing the passage of the Act 
and its effects). 
 94. 447 U.S. at 308–10. 
 95. O’Connor, supra note 2; see OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 209 (1991), https://ota.fas.org/reports/9110.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TGF-YR53] (“The 
decision also provided great stimulus for the economic development of biotechnology processes and 
products in the 1980’s.”). 
 96. O’Connor, supra note 2 (quoting Sean Johnston, general counsel of Genentech). 
 97. Cockburn, supra note 89, at 15; see also F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules 
for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 725 (2001) (“[S]ince the changes in 
applicable patent law beginning around 1980 . . . the U.S. biotechnology community has enjoyed 
particularly rapid and large advances in technology and overall prosperity . . . .”); Heather Hamme 
Ramirez, Defending the Privatization of Research Tools: An Examination of the Tragedy of the 
Anticommons in Biotechnology Research and Development, 53 EMORY L.J. 359, 372 (2004) (“Since 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty and the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act 
in 1980, the biotechnology industry has experienced rapid growth and considerable prosperity.”). 
 98. Douglas Robinson & Nina Medlock, Diamond v. Chakrabarty: A Retrospective on 25 Years 
of Biotech Patents, 17 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 12, 12 (2005). 
 99. Hughes, supra note 1, at 572. 
 100. Id. (quoting Edward E. Penhoet). 
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1980101 to 350 between 1981 and 1990.102 According to the Office of 
Technology Assessment, the period from 1980 to 1984 (immediately 
following Chakrabarty) represented a “boom era” for the founding of 
dedicated biotechnology companies.103 While other factors—such as 
increased federal funding, commercial hype, the availability of venture 
capital funding, and scientific advances—surely contributed to the 
entry of biotechnology firms in the 1980s,104 the influence of patents 
loomed large. Patents continue to play an important role for biotech 
startups; in a 2008 survey, biotech startup executives ranked patents 
as the most important means of obtaining a competitive advantage 
relative to other mechanisms, such as first-mover advantage and 
secrecy.105 
In contradistinction to biotechnology, the pharmaceutical 
industry is several centuries old, and many current players evolved 
from nineteenth-century dye and chemical firms or apothecaries.106 
Notably, patents played a critical role in the initial formation of the 
modern pharmaceutical industry. For example, after passage of the 
German Patent Law in 1877, German dye and chemical companies such 
as Bayer and Hoechst began investing heavily in research and academic 
collaborations,107 thus setting the stage for pharmaceutical 
development.108 Pharmaceutical companies have historically applied 
traditional chemistry techniques to produce small-molecule drugs,109 
and they have typically combined such upstream discovery with 
downstream commercialization. Since the twentieth century, large 
vertically integrated companies that combine research, development, 
clinical trials, marketing, and distribution have dominated the 
 
 101. CORTRIGHT & MAYER, supra note 92, at 29 tbl.15. 
 102. Id. 
 103. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 95, at 5. 
 104. See id. at 3. 
 105. Graham et al., supra note 60, at 1290–91. 
 106. Am. Chem. Soc’y, Emergence of Pharmaceutical Science and Industry: 1870-1930, 
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS (June 20, 2005), https://cen.acs.org/articles/83/i25/emergence-
pharmaceutical-science-industry-1870.html [https://perma.cc/C69H-YPQS]. 
 107. Ulrich Marsch, Strategies for Success: Research Organization in German Chemical 
Companies and IG Farben Until 1936, 12 HIST. & TECH. 23, 27–28 (1994). 
 108. Further illustrating a theme of this Article, as the German dye and chemical industry 
matured, “German companies used patents systematically to exclude competitors and preserve 
their market position.” Ashish Arora, Patents, Licensing, and Market Structure in the Chemical 
Industry, 26 RES. POL’Y 391, 392 (1997). 
 109. See RAJAN, supra note 38, at 22; William S. Comanor & F.M. Scherer, Mergers and 
Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 106, 111 (2013); see also Walter 
W. Powell, Inter-organizational Collaboration in the Biotechnology Industry, 152 J. INSTITUTIONAL 
& THEORETICAL ECON. 197, 203 (1996); Nicole Fisher & Scott Liebman, Are M&A Replacing R&D 
in Pharma?, FORBES (Apr. 22, 2015, 6:14 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicolefisher/2015/04/ 
22/are-ma-replacing-rd-in-pharma/#3d0f051a21d0 [https://perma.cc/2K8D-MG5L].  
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pharmaceutical industry.110 Due to the significant cost and uncertainty 
of drug development, patents are essential to encouraging investments 
in research and development and to the formation and ongoing 
profitability of pharmaceutical companies.111 
While patents have been critical to forming biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies, thereby promoting industry fragmentation, 
they have also contributed to industry consolidation. First, as I have 
detailed in other work,112 there has been significant vertical integration 
between upstream biotechnology firms and downstream 
pharmaceutical companies. Historically, many biotech firms licensed 
patented biologics to downstream pharmaceutical companies for 
further development and commercialization, a vertically integrated 
organizational form that still prevails today.113 More recently, however, 
there has been a significant trend toward vertical integration in which 
large downstream pharmaceutical companies have acquired promising 
upstream biotech firms (and their patents), thus increasing industry 
consolidation.114 This is evident in a spate of vertical mergers and 
acquisitions in which pharmaceutical companies have brought 
upstream, research-intensive biotech firms “in house.” Among other 
factors, the ability of biotech patents to confer exclusive rights over a 
technology while not necessarily disclosing enough knowledge to 
practice it commercially has led pharmaceutical companies to vertically 
integrate by acquiring biotech firms rather than simply license their 
patents.115 For example, Roche’s 2009 acquisition of Genentech was 
 
 110. See Cockburn, supra note 89, at 13; Toby E. Stuart et al., Vertical Alliance Networks: The 
Case of University–Biotechnology–Pharmaceutical Alliance Chains, 36 RES. POL’Y 477, 477–78 
(2007). 
 111. See Richard E. Caves et al., Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S. 
Pharmaceutical Industry, BROOKINGS PAPERS: MICROECONOMICS, 1991, at 1, 1–2 (“The research-
oriented sector of the [pharmaceutical] industry relies heavily on the patent system.”); Richard A. 
Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in America, ATLANTIC (July 12, 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-there-are-too-many-patents-in-
america/259725 [https://perma.cc/NA4Z-X2JJ] (describing pharmaceuticals as the “poster child” of 
the patent system); Merck & Co., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2017), 
http://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReports/PDF/NYSE_MRK_2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/89NZ-ZUXZ] (“The Company is dependent on its patent rights, and if its patent 
rights are invalidated or circumvented, its business would be adversely affected.”). 
 112. See Lee, supra note 39, at 1455–66.  
 113. See Mark G. Edwards, Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical Commercialization Alliances: 
Their Structure and Implications for University Technology Transfer Offices, in 2 INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST 
PRACTICES 1227, 1228 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds., 2007), http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/ 
resources/Publications/links/ipHandbook Volume 2.pdf [https://perma.cc/AH8L-JEWT]; Gary P. 
Pisano, The Governance of Innovation: Vertical Integration and Collaborative Arrangements in the 
Biotechnology Industry, 20 RES. POL’Y 237, 240 (1991). 
 114. See Lee, supra note 39, at 1457–66. 
 115. See id. at 1455–66. 
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motivated in significant part to realize greater product coordination 
between an “upstream” biotech company (Genentech) and a 
“downstream” pharmaceutical company (Roche).116 In this manner, 
pharmaceutical companies can combine upstream discovery 
capabilities with their own expertise in downstream clinical trials, 
marketing, and distribution.  
More broadly, the desire to acquire productive patented assets 
and related innovative capacity has contributed to concentration in the 
pharmaceutical industry. The industry has experienced a decline in 
scientific productivity; in the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
the pharmaceutical industry’s output essentially flat lined.117 Between 
1970 and 2010, the number of FDA-approved new molecular entities 
increased only slightly even though inflation-adjusted research and 
development (“R&D”) expenditures had grown sevenfold.118 Given the 
paucity of new innovations, companies have turned to mergers and 
acquisitions to acquire promising (patented) drugs to replenish 
faltering pipelines. For instance, Pfizer’s $60 billion acquisition of 
Pharmacia in 2002 was motivated in part to obtain Pharmacia’s 
blockbuster arthritis drug, Celebrex.119 Similarly, Merck’s $41.1 billion 
acquisition of rival drug maker Schering-Plough in 2009 was motivated 
in significant part to obtain Schering-Plough’s lucrative Nasonex 
allergy spray and its pipeline of promising biologic drugs.120 Beyond 
acquiring actual products in development, companies also seek to 
extend innovative capacity by acquiring firms holding strategic patent 
portfolios. In the pharmaceutical arena, acquiring such firms (and their 
patents) eases subsequent in-house innovation121 and facilitates 
branching out into related fields.122 In this context, while it is debatable 
whether patents are a direct “cause” of industry concentration, the drive 
 
 116. See Pollack, supra note 5. 
 117. From Vision to Decision: Pharma 2020, PWC 5 (2012), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/ 
pharma-life-sciences/pharma2020/assets/pwc-pharma-success-strategies.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2 
UG-ZPC7] [hereinafter PWC, Vision to Decision]; see Fabio Pammolli et al., The Productivity Crisis 
in Pharmaceutical R&D, 10 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 428, 428 (2011) (reporting 
empirical evidence of “a long-term decline in the productivity of research and development 
(R&D)”). 
 118. Comanor & Scherer, supra note 109, at 106. But see Cockburn, supra note 89, at 11 
(observing that the quality of new molecular entities may be increasing over time, thus suggesting 
a higher degree of innovation than low numbers suggest). 
 119. Robert Frank & Scott Hensley, Pfizer to Buy Pharmacia for $60 Billion in Stock,  
WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2002, 11:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1026684057282753560 
[https://perma.cc/3HDD-LFP8]. 
 120. Natasha Singer, Merck to Buy Schering-Plough for $41.1 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/business/10drug.html [https://perma.cc/6AGH-WDJK]. 
 121. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33 
(2005). 
 122. See id. at 38–39. 
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to acquire patented assets has contributed to considerable merger and 
acquisition activity.  
The drive to obtain productive patents and increase innovative 
capacity has intensified in light of the “patent cliff” of recent and 
upcoming patent expirations, thus spurring significant merger and 
acquisition activity.123 From 2013 to 2018, global pharmaceutical 
companies were at risk of losing $200 billion in sales because of patent 
expirations and generic competition.124 Patent expirations on Lipitor 
and other key drugs caused Pfizer’s revenues to decrease by 21.6 
percent in 2012,125 and the expiration of Bristol-Myers Squibb’s patents 
on Plavix and Avapro caused similar revenue declines.126 Seeking new 
drugs to fill their pipelines, pharmaceutical companies have engaged in 
both vertical acquisitions of upstream biotech firms and horizontal 
acquisitions of established competitors with promising assets. 
These factors have contributed to significant industry 
consolidation. As far back as the late 1990s, the pharmaceutical 
industry experienced a spate of mergers and acquisitions.127 Since 1994, 
Pfizer has spent more than $219 billion on large-scale takeovers.128 In 
1999 alone, Pfizer acquired Warner-Lambert,129 Sanofi merged with 
Synthelabo to create Sanofi-Synthelabo,130 and Rhone-Poulenc S.A. 
merged with Hoechst A.G. to create Aventis.131 (Sanofi-Synthelabo later 
 
 123. Myoung Cha & Theresa Lorriman, Why Pharma Megamergers Work, MCKINSEY & 
COMPANY (Feb. 2014), http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-prod 
ucts/our-insights/why-pharma-megamergers-work [https://perma.cc/4JUT-5AXU] (“Megamergers 
have played a key role in shaping the global pharmaceutical landscape.”); see Comanor & Scherer, 
supra note 109, at 106. But see David Davidovic, The History of Bio-Pharma Industry M&As, 
Lessons Learned and Trends to Watch, PM360 (May 23, 2014), https://www.pm360online.com/the-
history-of-bio-pharma-industry-mas-lessons-learned-and-trends-to-watch [https://perma.cc/V4LM 
-TF9X] (arguing that the pharmaceutical industry is extremely fragmented with the largest 
companies having ten percent of market share or less). 
 124. See Anna Son, M&A Focus: Biotechnology, IBISWORLD 2 (May 2013), 
[https://perma.cc/8GNB-P6K7]; see also PWC, From Vision to Decision, supra note 117, at 6 
(estimating that generics will eliminate $148 billion in pharmaceutical profits from 2012 to 2018). 
 125. Son, supra note 124, at 2. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Rai, supra note 86, at 818. 
 128. Chris Lo, Pharma Mergers: Big Business, Bad Science?, PHARMACEUTICAL TECH. (Jan. 6, 
2015), https://www.pharmaceutical-technology.com/features/featurepharma-mergers-big-business 
-bad-science-4467897 [https://perma.cc/EZ2C-SZPN]. 
 129. Cha & Lorriman, supra note 123. 
 130. See Business Digest, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/03/ 
business/business-digest-248800.html [https://perma.cc/G8ZE-MHWG]. 
 131. See David J. Morrow, International Business; Rhone-Poulenc and Hoechst Agree on Start 
of a Merger, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/02/business/ 
international-business-rhone-poulenc-and-hoechst-agree-on-start-of-a-merger.html 
[https://perma.cc/4XN2-EKKA]. 
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acquired Aventis in 2004, thus producing Sanofi-Aventis.132) 
Megamergers continued through the 2000s. For example, in 2007 
Schering-Plough bought Organon Biosciences.133 In 2009, Pfizer 
acquired Wyeth Laboratories,134 Merck acquired Schering-Plough,135 
and Roche acquired Genentech.136 In 2014, Actavis acquired Forest 
Laboratories and Allergan.137 According to one commentator, “During 
the last 30 plus years we have seen a major consolidation in the 
industry through mergers and acquisitions.”138 Such merger and 
acquisition activity has demonstrably impacted industry structure, 
with a relatively large set of companies developing upstream drug 
precursors and a relatively narrow band of companies commercializing 
drugs.139 While many factors have contributed to such consolidation, the 
desire to acquire productive patented assets and innovative capacity 
(especially in light of patent expirations) has been significant. 
In addition to playing important roles in mergers and 
acquisitions, patents also promote concentration by excluding potential 
new entrants. The exclusionary effects of patents deter entry of not only 
rival products but also rival producers. At the micro level, patents on 
individual drugs serve as a barrier to entry for rival, copycat 
therapeutics.140 Furthermore, pharmaceutical companies engage in 
“evergreening” in which they attempt to extend the effective period of 
exclusivity of existing patents by patenting minor variations.141 At a 
macro level, patents can exclude not just individual products but also 
entire companies from entering a market. Pharmaceutical research, 
development, regulatory approval, marketing, and distribution are 
 
 132. Anita Raghavan et al., Sanofi to Swallow Aventis in a Deal Set at $65 Billion, WALL ST. 
J. (Apr. 26, 2004), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB108291923112092711 [https://perma.cc/MP5L-
TYLS]. 
 133. Julia Werdigier, Schering-Plough Agrees to Buy Akzo Nobel’s Organon Biosciences Unit, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/12/business/worldbusiness/12iht-
drug.4885575.html [https://perma.cc/L7KQ-TYLV]. 
 134. Comanor & Scherer, supra note 109, at 106. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Cha & Lorriman, supra note 123.  
 137. EY, FIREPOWER INDEX AND GROWTH GAP REPORT 2015, at 2 (Jan. 2015), 
https://www.ey.com/us/en/industries/life-sciences/ey-firepower-and-growth-gap-report-2015 
[https://perma.cc/R7W8-G7AJ]. 
 138. Davidovic, supra note 123. 
 139. Fisher & Liebman, supra note 109. 
 140. Notably, the benefits of patent protection extend beyond the term of protection because 
the goodwill developed by a branded drug continues to exert some exclusionary force even after 
the term expires. Caves et al., supra note 111, at 10–11. 
 141. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 345, 354 (2007). 
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extremely expensive,142 and these high fixed costs represent a 
significant barrier to entry for potential new competitors. Established 
pharmaceutical companies sustain these massive expenses through 
patent-protected revenue streams, thus giving them a significant 
advantage that most newcomers lack. In addition to being very 
expensive, pharmaceutical development is very risky.143 Established 
pharmaceutical companies spread risk over many candidates by 
leveraging significant patent portfolios. Large patent estates allow 
established industry players to overcome the cost and risk of 
pharmaceutical development and commercialization, thus inhibiting 
entry by potential competitors. 
The role of patents in inhibiting entry in mature, downstream 
pharmaceutical markets is particularly visible in the context of generic 
competition. Almost by definition, patents on drugs delay entry of 
generic competitors in pharmaceutical markets. Within the complicated 
statutory framework governing generic drugs,144 brand companies 
“expend tremendous energy blocking generic entry by any means 
possible, with some companies using ever more clever and complicated 
strategies.”145 Brand companies have long engaged in so-called “reverse 
payment settlements” in which they pay generic manufacturers to 
settle challenges to the brand company’s patents, thereby avoiding 
patent invalidation and delaying generic entry.146 
In sum, patents were critical to forming the biotechnology 
industry and played an important role in spurring upstream, research-
intensive firms to enter the field. However, as the biopharmaceutical 
industry has matured, downstream pharmaceutical firms focused on 
commercializing drugs have sought to amass patents and related 
innovative capacity through both vertical and horizontal mergers, thus 
promoting industry concentration. Additionally, the broad patent 
portfolios held by these incumbents raise barriers to entry, which 
further contribute to concentration. 
 
 142. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates 
of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 21 (2016) (estimating the cost to bring an FDA-approved 
drug to market at $2.9 billion). But see Aaron E. Carroll, $2.6 Billion to Develop a Drug? New 
Estimate Makes Questionable Assumptions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/11/19/upshot/calculating-the-real-costs-of-developing-a-new-drug.html [https://perma.cc/356 
R-B5S7] (critiquing the DiMasi et al. analysis). 
 143. See DiMasi et al., supra note 142, at 23 (estimating that 11.8 percent of drugs entering 
clinical trials, a relatively late stage of development, will ultimately obtain regulatory approval). 
 144. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 
Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.). 
 145. Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation of Generic 
Pharmaceutical Delay, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499, 503 (2016). 
 146. Id. 
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2. Agricultural Biotechnology, Seeds, and Agrochemicals 
Patents have also played important roles in initial and upstream 
entry as well as downstream and subsequent consolidation in the 
agricultural biotechnology, seed, and agrochemical industry. Modern 
agriculture technologies encompass a range of related businesses 
spanning (1) biotechnology, which utilizes genetic engineering to 
produce new plant traits, such as herbicide resistance or pest 
resistance; (2) seeds, which may incorporate genetically engineered 
traits; and (3) agrochemicals, such as herbicides and pesticides, which 
may be designed for use with specific engineered traits. Patents have 
facilitated the entry of upstream agricultural biotech startups and 
enticed chemical companies to enter the agricultural field, thus 
promoting fragmentation. Over the decades, however, mergers and 
acquisitions focused on amassing patents and the emergence of a broad 
patent thicket have contributed to a concentrated industry dominated 
by a Big Four: BASF, Bayer, DowDuPont, and Syngenta.147  
Patents promoted the entry of both upstream biotechnology 
startups and large chemical companies into the agricultural industry. 
Agricultural biotechnology grew out of university startups in the 1980s, 
and during its early years featured numerous small, research-intensive 
firms.148 As with medical biotech firms, patents played a crucial role in 
the proliferation of agricultural biotech startups. Certain asexually 
propagating plants have been eligible for exclusive rights since the 1930 
Plant Patent Act,149 and in 1970 Congress expanded patentability with 
the Plant Variety Protection Act (“PVPA”), which protected certain 
sexually reproducing plants.150 Up until the late twentieth century, it 
was generally understood that plants were not patentable outside of 
those specialized regimes.151 But a series of court decisions expansively 
 
 147. Dow and DuPont merged in 2017. DowDuPont Merger Successfully Completed, DOW 
(Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.dow.com/en-us/news/press-releases/dowdupont-merger-successfully-
completed [https://perma.cc/B5AA-WH52]. Additionally, Bayer recently completed its purchase of 
Monsanto. Bayer Closes Monsanto Acquisition, MONSANTO (June 7, 2018), https://monsanto.com/ 
news-releases/bayer-closes-monsanto-acquisition [https://perma.cc/54JC-HH77]. In the span of 
two years, what had previously been a Big Six became a Big Four. 
 148. See Brett D. Begemann, Competitive Strategies of Biotechnology Firms: Implications for 
U.S. Agriculture, 29 J. AGRIC. & APPLIED ECON. 117, 117–18 (1997). 
 149. Plant Patent Act of 1930, 35 U.S.C. §§ 61–164 (2012). 
 150. Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2583 (2012). Certificates of Protection 
granted under the PVPA confer exclusive rights but with important exceptions, namely that 
farmers are allowed to save protected seeds for replanting and researchers may conduct research 
on patented varieties without a license. These exceptions do not apply to utility patent protection 
of plants and seeds. 
 151. KEITH AOKI, SEED WARS 29 (2008). 
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interpreting patentable subject matter152 and specifically extending 
utility patent protection to plants153 spurred a dramatic increase in 
plant patenting.154 This change in patenting contributed to the 
formation and entry of numerous agricultural biotechnology firms. 
According to Brian Wright and Philip Pardey, “Agricultural 
biotechnology startups proliferated in the 1980s and 1990s in the USA, 
financed by venture capitalists, often built around patented innovations 
produced by scientists in their laboratories, and licensed exclusively to 
the startup.”155  
In addition to facilitating the formation of agricultural biotech 
startups, patents also promoted entry by large chemical companies into 
the agricultural industry. The roots of today’s global agriculture 
conglomerates lie in the chemicals industry, which in the 1970s 
featured over thirty major firms but by 2001 had consolidated into a Big 
Six.156 Commentators observe that enactment of the PVPA in 1970 
significantly spurred the entry of large chemical companies into the 
agricultural sphere, as the availability of exclusive rights “promised to 
increase returns from plant research and attracted R&D-minded 
multinationals.”157 The decade that followed enactment of the PVPA 
saw a “dizzying array of mergers and acquisitions” by large corporations 
like Ciba-Geigy, Pfizer, and Monsanto, which purchased numerous 
small seed firms.158 A 1980 amendment that added six crops originally 
excluded from the PVPA further enhanced the value of these 
acquisitions.159 Subsequent court decisions expanding the patent 
eligibility of plants further spurred large chemical companies to enter 
the seed industry.160 Focusing on a different area of the value chain, the 
expansion of intellectual property rights also spurred growth in the 
 
 152. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).  
 153. See, e.g., J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 534 U.S. 124 (2001); Ex Parte Hibberd, 
227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24, 1985); see also AOKI, supra note 151, at 41–49 
(discussing several cases expanding the patent eligibility of plants). 
 154. SEED GIANTS, supra note 14, at 5. In the fifteen years following Ex Parte Hibberd, the 
USPTO issued approximately 1,800 utility patents covering various aspects of plant germplasm. 
J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 596. 
 155. Brian D. Wright & Philip G. Pardey, The Evolving Rights to Intellectual Property 
Protection in the Agricultural Biosciences, 2 INT’L J. TECH. & GLOBALIZATION 12, 20 (2006). 
 156. Philip H. Howard, Intellectual Property and Consolidation in the Seed Industry, 55 CROP 
SCI. 2489, 2491 (2015). The Big Six was comprised of BASF, Bayer, Dow, DuPont, Monsanto, and 
Syngenta. 
 157. Nicholas Kalaitzandonakes et al., A Worrisome Crop?, REGULATION, Winter 2010, at 20, 
21. 
 158. AOKI, supra note 151, at 37. 
 159. See Pub. L. 96-574, 94 Stat. 3352, Dec. 22, 1980 (repealing Section 144, which had 
exempted okra, celery, peppers, tomatoes, carrots, and cucumbers from the PVPA); AOKI, supra 
note 151, at 39. 
 160. Howard, supra note 156, at 2490. 
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seed industry. A 1980 survey of seed companies reported an increase in 
the number of research programs and research expenditures on 
nonhybrid crops after the PVPA was enacted in 1970.161 
The industry began to consolidate as it matured, and intellectual 
property rights played several roles in advancing consolidation. As I 
have described elsewhere, large chemical companies began acquiring 
upstream agricultural biotechnology firms that could genetically 
engineer new traits.162 These chemical companies sought to obtain the 
biotech firms’ patented assets as well as their related tacit knowledge 
concerning genetic engineering.163 Commentators suggest that the 
desire to avoid high transaction costs associated with aggregating 
multiple intellectual assets played a key role in mergers and 
acquisitions, including acquisitions of biotech startups by large 
incumbents.164 In addition to acquiring agricultural biotechnology 
firms, large conglomerates also acquired seed companies that possessed 
high-quality germplasm into which they could insert genetically 
engineered traits.165 Acquiring smaller plant-breeding operations was 
an efficient means of obtaining intellectual property and know-how and 
was “much simpler than replication or ‘inventing around’ it.”166 
Ultimately, these large conglomerates sought to integrate agricultural 
biotechnology and high-quality germplasm with their own chemical 
expertise to develop agrochemicals for use with genetically modified 
seeds.167 Accordingly, as the agricultural biotechnology industry shifted 
toward commercialization and product development, it consolidated 
into fewer vertically integrated actors.168 The mid-1980s to the early 
2000s saw intensive merger and acquisition activity.169 According to 
 
 161. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 95, at 110. 
 162. Lee, supra note 39, at 1467–69. 
 163. Id. at 1470. 
 164. Gregory D. Graff et al., Agricultural Biotechnology’s Complementary Intellectual Assets, 
85 REV. ECON. & STATS. 349, 349 (2003). 
 165. Id.; see also Begemann, supra note 148, at 120 (quoting a Monsanto executive as saying, 
“We believe that we need to couple our technology with superior germplasm to develop the very 
best hybrids.”); Wright & Pardey, supra note 155, at 21–22. 
 166. JOHN L. KING, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CONCENTRATION AND TECHNOLOGY IN 
AGRICULTURAL INPUT INDUSTRIES 7 (2001), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/John_King15/ 
publication/23516824_Concentration_and_Tehnology_in_Agricultural_Input_Industries/links/0c9
6051ddba4f06fa4000000/Concentration-and-Technology-in-Agricultural-Input-Industries.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B4XQ-LJ3R]. 
 167. Begemann, supra note 148, at 122 (“Three years ago, the seed and agricultural chemical 
industries were viewed as two separate industries. Now, . . . the seed industry and chemical 
industry are merging because of herbicide-resistant and insect-resistant traits in seed.”). 
 168. Id. at 118. 
 169. William Lesser, Intellectual Property Rights and Concentration in Agricultural 
Biotechnology, 1 J. AGROBIOTECHNOLOGY MGMT. & ECON. 56, 56 (1998); Diana L. Moss, 
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Keith Aoki, in the decade following 1985, when Ex Parte Hibberd was 
decided, “the U.S. seed industry accelerated its transformation into a 
concentrated industrial landscape dominated by multinational 
agrichemical corporations.”170  
Throughout the 1990s and beyond, control of seed markets and 
ownership of seed patents were both highly concentrated. 
Concentration in the corn, cotton, and soybean seed markets grew 
throughout the decade.171 Between 1995 and 1998, large multinational 
corporations purchased or entered into joint ventures with 
approximately sixty-eight seed companies.172 By 1998, Monsanto 
controlled fifteen percent of the U.S. corn seed market, and Pioneer-
HiBred (which DuPont subsequently acquired) controlled thirty-nine 
percent.173 Monsanto and Pioneer-HiBred controlled twenty-four and 
seventeen percent, respectively, of the purchased soybean seed 
market.174 In the cottonseed market, Delta & Pine Land and Stoneville 
(both of which Monsanto subsequently acquired), controlled seventy-
one and sixteen percent of the market, respectively.175 Concentration in 
R&D-intensive input industries (including chemicals, crop seed and 
traits, and animal genetics) rose significantly from 1994 to 2009.176 
During that period, the ratio of the agricultural chemicals market 
controlled by four firms grew from 28.5 to 53 percent.177 Concentration 
in patent ownership paralleled concentration in market shares. In the 
mid- to late 1990s, the top four firms in each field held forty-one percent 
of corn patents, fifty-three percent of soybean patents, seventy-seven 
percent of tomato patents, and thirty-eight percent of patents covering 
Bt technology, which enhances resistance to certain insects.178 By 2011, 
 
Competition, Intellectual Property Rights, and Transgenic Seed, 58 S.D. L. REV. 543, 548 (2013); 
Oehmke & Naseem, supra note 47, at 19. 
 170. AOKI, supra note 151, at 59. 
 171. David E. Schimmelpfennig et al., The Impact of Seed Industry Concentration on 
Innovation: A Study of US Biotech Market Leaders, 30 AG. ECON. 157, 159 (2004). 
 172. KING, supra note 166, at 6. 
 173. Murray Fulton & Konstantinos Giannakas, Agricultural Biotechnology and Industry 
Structure, 4 J. AGROBIOTECHNOLOGY MGMT. & ECON. 137, 138 (2001). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. KEITH O. FUGLIE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RESEARCH INVESTMENTS AND MARKET 
STRUCTURE IN THE FOOD PROCESSING, AGRICULTURAL INPUT, AND BIOFUEL INDUSTRIES 
WORLDWIDE 14–15 (2011), https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=44954 
[https://perma.cc/9BRA-C89H]. 
 177. Keith Fuglie et al., Rising Concentration in Agricultural Input Industries Influences New 
Farm Technologies, USDA (Dec. 3, 2012), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2012/december/ 
rising-concentration-in-agricultural-input-industries-influences-new-technologies [https://perma. 
cc/39E2-DPGZ]. 
 178. Fulton & Giannakas, supra note 173, at 138. 
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the top ten companies accounted for seventy-five percent of all U.S. 
patent applications in the industry.179 
Such patent concentration both entrenches established players 
and hinders potential new entrants. While the large conglomerates 
cross-license patents among themselves,180 the complex intellectual 
property landscape deters entry by new competitors.181 For instance, 
germplasm is often covered by many intellectual property rights,182 and 
“[f]inancing and managing the quest for freedom to operate in the 
necessary inputs and processes (for example, genes, promoters, 
markers, and transformation technology) has been a real challenge, 
especially for smaller firms.”183 Monsanto (which Bayer recently 
acquired) deserves special mention as a dominant player that has 
leveraged market strength and patent holdings in a highly concentrated 
industry.184 Monsanto provides Bt and Roundup Ready genes for corn, 
soybeans, and cotton to its own subsidiaries as well as Pioneer and other 
competitors.185 From the late 1990s to the 2000s, Monsanto acquired 
almost forty companies, spanning agricultural biotechnology firms that 
genetically engineer traits and seed companies that cultivate 
germplasm needed to breed new varieties.186 From 2005 to 2009, 
Monsanto spent $4.81 billion to acquire seed firms.187 As of 2009, 
Monsanto’s patented traits appeared in fifty percent of all interfirm 
stacks.188 Monsanto’s dominant interfirm stacks have almost achieved 
the status of an industry standard around which other companies must 
develop their technologies and seeds, thus further entrenching 
Monsanto’s position.189 Prior to its recent acquisition by Bayer, 
Monsanto controlled nearly twenty-seven percent of global commercial 
seed sales.190  
 
 179. PIET SCHENKELAARS ET AL., DRIVERS OF CONSOLIDATION IN THE SEED INDUSTRY AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES FOR INNOVATION 21 (2011), https://www.lisconsult.nl/files/docs/consolidation_ 
seed_industry.pdf [https://perma.cc/GL3Q-6Q48]. 
 180. Howard, supra note 156, at 2492. 
 181. Kalaitzandonakes et al., supra note 157, at 20. 
 182. Wright & Pardey, supra note 155, at 21. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See Lina Khan, How Monsanto Outfoxed the Obama Administration, SALON (Mar. 15, 
2013), https://www.salon.com/2013/03/15/how_did_monsanto_outfox_the_obama_administration 
[https://perma.cc/FNN6-N235] (describing Monsanto’s “multibillion-dollar spree to buy up seed 
companies”). 
 185. Schimmelpfennig et al., supra note 171, at 159. 
 186. Diana L. Moss & Robert Taylor, Short End of the Stick: The Plight of Growers and 
Consumers in Concentrated Agricultural Supply Chains, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 337, 362 (2014). 
 187. SEED GIANTS, supra note 14, at 17 (“The company spent $4.81 billion within a five-year 
span (2005-2009) to acquire numerous seed firms, an average of $963 million annually.”). 
 188. Moss, supra note 169, at 554–55. 
 189. Id. at 555–56. 
 190. SEED GIANTS, supra note 14, at 6. 
Lee_ PAGE (Do Not Delete) 5/31/2019 2:12 PM 
1228 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:4:1197 
Although different from the biopharmaceutical industry in 
many respects, the agricultural biotechnology, seed, and agrochemical 
industry has seen patents play a similar role in shaping its structure. 
Patents were critical to the entry of upstream, research-intensive 
agricultural biotechnology firms as well as the initial entry of chemical 
companies into the agricultural field. Once there, however, large 
agricultural conglomerates acquired smaller firms in part for their 
intellectual property and wielded patents to exclude potential entrants, 
thus contributing to significant industry concentration. 
3. Software 
Turning to an industry with a very different structure, 
intellectual property rights have also contributed to both fragmentation 
and concentration in the software industry. Software is an interesting 
context in which to consider industry dynamics because it is 
characterized as a highly fragmented industry with relatively low 
barriers to entry.191 As a preliminary issue, it is important to define the 
boundaries of the software industry. While companies in all industries 
use (and sometimes develop and patent) software,192 this Section 
focuses on companies that develop software as their core business.193 
This industry exhibits significant heterogeneity, as many established 
software firms also produce hardware, and firms vary considerably in 
the types of software developed and customers served.194 While 
intellectual property rights have been associated with initial and 
upstream market entry, they have also contributed to subsequent and 
downstream concentration in the software industry. 
 
 191. Robert P. Merges, Patents, Entry and Growth in the Software Industry 2–6  
(2006) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=926204 
[https://perma.cc/9VVU-GKYP]. 
 192. PWC, GLOBAL 100 SOFTWARE LEADERS: DIGITAL INTELLIGENCE CONQUERS 11 (2016), 
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/technology/publications/global-software-100-leaders/assets/global-
100-software-leaders-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/RGE9-HFYD] [hereinafter PWC, DIGITAL 
INTELLIGENCE] (“Companies like Boeing and General Electric (GE) beg the question: what defines 
a software company?”). 
 193. See John R. Allison et al., Software Patents, Incumbents, and Entry, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1579, 
1579 (2007) (noting that manufacturing firms outside the software industry must often employ 
software developers to ensure that devices run effectively); Martin Campbell-Kelly & Daniel D. 
Garcia-Swartz, From Products to Services: The Software Industry in the Internet Era, 81 BUS. HIST. 
REV. 735, 763 (2007) (“There has never been a universally accepted definition of what constitutes 
a software company . . . .”); Mann, supra note 14, at 965 (differentiating companies that develop 
and patent software from “firms that receive substantial revenues from the sale of software 
products or services”). 
 194. Allison et al., supra note 193, at 1580; see id. at 1605 tbl.4 (identifying thirty-six types of 
firms in the software sector). 
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Characterizing the role of intellectual property rights in 
promoting initial entry in the software industry is challenging. For 
much of its early history, the software industry grew rather robustly 
without explicit protection from copyrights and patents. In the 1950s, 
an oligopoly of mainframe suppliers dominated the U.S. computer 
industry, and these suppliers typically bundled software with 
hardware.195 Over time, a distinct industry focused on developing 
software emerged, and by 1965 there were an estimated forty to fifty 
major software contractors that produced complex programs for large 
corporate clients196 and multitudes of smaller contractors that provided 
custom software to smaller companies.197 This segment faced low 
barriers to entry, and by 1967 there were about 2,800 software-
contracting firms in the U.S.198 Following IBM’s 1968 decision to 
unbundle hardware and software, the “package” software industry 
accelerated dramatically.199 This segment, however, had relatively few 
startups because market entry required a fully developed product, 
which was rather expensive.200 With the advent of the personal 
computer in the late 1970s, entry into the software industry exploded 
again; between 1975 and 1981, several thousand new software 
companies emerged, after which the industry experienced a period of 
consolidation.201  
More recently, intellectual property rights have played a more 
important role in shoring up firm entry in the software industry. 
Notably, in its influential 1978 report, the National Commission on 
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”) 
recommended recognizing copyright protection for computer programs 
in part to promote the entry of independent software firms.202 Such 
firms could not rely on bundling software with hardware to appropriate 
revenues from their innovations, thus increasing the perceived need to 
protect software itself. Congress adopted CONTU’s recommendation 
and in 1980 amended the copyright statute to include computer 
 
 195. Campbell-Kelly & Garcia-Swartz, supra note 193, at 80. 
 196. Id. at 81, 84. 
 197. Id. at 81, 85. 
 198. Id. at 85. 
 199. Id. at 88. 
 200. Id. at 90. 
 201. Id. at 94. 
 202. Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted 
Works, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 53, 57–59 (1981) [hereinafter CONTU Report] (reproducing the 1978 
report). But see id. at 100 (reporting the dissenting views of Commissioner Hersey, who argued 
that copyright would benefit large software companies and promote economic concentration). 
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programs within copyrightable subject matter.203 CONTU’s 
recommendation and Congress’s enactment suggest that, at least in the 
view of policymakers, copyright helped promote the entry of new firms. 
However, software was not subject to widespread patent protection 
until the 1980s and beyond.204 Anecdotal and some empirical evidence 
indicate robust entry before patenting of software became common, 
partly because of the availability of copyright protection.205 The growth 
of the early software industry in the absence of meaningful patent 
protection casts some doubt on the role of patents in promoting entry. 
Focusing on a more recent period, however, scholars have 
argued that patents play an important role in promoting market entry 
and fragmentation in the software industry. As noted, in the early 
decades of the software industry, some companies relied on copyright to 
protect software. However, the narrowing of copyright protection,206 
expansion of patent protection for software,207 and diffusion of personal 
computers and the internet contributed to a significant increase in 
software patenting in the 1990s.208 Ronald Mann has influentially 
argued that patents promote market entry by new software ventures,209 
concluding that “[t]he effects of patents are much more likely to benefit 
small firms and contribute to industry fragmentation than to benefit 
large firms and contribute to industry concentration.”210 While the 
earliest-stage startups may not have the resources and motivation to 
obtain patents, later-stage startups benefit substantially from exclusive 
 
 203. Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for 
Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 666 n.9.  
 204. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981) (holding that an industrial process 
utilizing a mathematical equation was patentable subject matter); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (articulating an expansive 
conception of patentable subject matter). 
 205. See Martin Campbell-Kelly, Development and Structure of the International Software 
Industry, 1950-1990, 24 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 73, 78 (1995) (noting the dearth of empirical data 
about the software industry from 1950 to 1980); see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 
(1972) (“It is noted that the creation of programs has undergone substantial and satisfactory 
growth in the absence of patent protection and that copyright protection for programs is presently 
available.” (quoting THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, “TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS 
OF . . . USEFUL ARTS” IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY 14 (1966))). 
 206. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 819 (1st Cir. 1995) (denying 
copyright protection to a menu command hierarchy as a method of operation); Comput. Assocs. 
Int’l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 711–12 (2d Cir. 1992) (narrowing the copyrightability of broad 
structural elements of software programs). 
 207. See, e.g., Diamond, 450 U.S. 175 (holding that a manufacturing process employing a 
mathematical algorithm constitutes patentable subject matter).  
 208. Allison et al., supra note 193, at 1589–90. 
 209. Id. at 1580. 
 210. Mann, supra note 14, at 967–68; see id. at 986 (“Contrary to the perception that patents 
tilt the playing field in favor of large incumbent firms to the disadvantage of small firms, patents 
in this context afford a unique opportunity to the small startup.”). 
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rights.211 Patents allow startups to innovate with less competition, 
achieve “licensing equilibrium” with other companies, and signal their 
managerial and technical competence to the market.212 Venture 
capitalists may consider a startup’s patents (or patent applications) in 
assessing its management and market potential.213  
To be fair, the role of patents in promoting entry of software 
startups is contested. Empirical research finds that although sixty-
three percent of venture-backed software and internet startups held 
more than four patents and patent applications,214 software 
entrepreneurs do not regard patents as an important mechanism for 
appropriating the value of innovation.215 Furthermore, patents play a 
less important role in obtaining financing for software startups 
compared to other fields, such as biotechnology.216 Nonetheless, Mann’s 
analysis concludes that patents play an important role in facilitating 
market entry for venture-backed firms, thus promoting industry 
fragmentation. This is particularly important given that relatively 
small firms have historically generated many of the most important 
software innovations.217 
While Mann’s analysis suggests a fragmented software industry 
comprised of many small players, actual industry dynamics are more 
complex. Again, the dimensions of time and the value chain are 
illuminating. The software industry is comprised of many different 
segments, and a familiar pattern is for young segments to feature many 
new entrants and then consolidate into fewer larger players as they 
mature.218 For example, while the internet created a tremendous influx 
of capital (and firm entry),219 after the dot-com bubble crashed, the 
market weeded out weaker companies and reconsolidated.220 Regarding 
the value chain, the upstream function of producing code requires 
relatively little capital (as does starting a software firm),221 suggesting 
easy entry and fragmentation in these fields. Downstream functions 
 
 211. Id. at 985. 
 212. Id. at 985–90. 
 213. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1505–
06 (2001); cf. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 637 (2002).  
 214. Graham et al., supra note 60, at 1281. 
 215. Id. at 1292. 
 216. Id. at 1308. 
 217. Mann, supra note 14, at 973. 
 218. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 11 
(2013) (noting this pattern and applying it to the software industry of the 1980s and 1990s). 
 219. SANDRA A. SLAUGHTER, A PROFILE OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY: EMERGENCE, 
ASCENDANCE, RISKS, AND REWARDS 53 (2014). 
 220. Id.; Mann, supra note 14, at 969. 
 221. SLAUGHTER, supra note 219, at 72; CONTU Report, supra note 202, at 79. 
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such as marketing and distributing software, however, involve 
significant infrastructure and resources, and “[s]oftware firms 
producing mature products . . . usually form an oligopoly market where 
there are a few well-established software firms such as Microsoft, SAP, 
and Oracle that dominate the market.”222  
While there is some debate concerning the importance of patents 
to the entry of software startups, there is wider consensus that patents 
have created barriers to entry and contributed to subsequent industry 
concentration. As Michele Boldrin and David Levine observe, “It is only 
after the initial stage of rampant growth ends that mature industries 
turn toward the legal protection of patents, usually because their 
internal growth potential diminishes and they become more 
concentrated.”223 As segments mature, all companies have an incentive 
to acquire patents, which can produce a patent thicket.224 Empirical 
research has revealed that segments within the software industry with 
the highest rates of patenting have fewer firms (i.e., are more 
concentrated) than those with moderate or low rates of patenting.225 
This finding suggests that mature segments will tend to have a “smaller 
number of firms with greater average rates of patenting.”226  
Empirical research by Ian Cockburn and Megan MacGarvie 
reveals that from 1990 to 2004, a ten percent increase in the number of 
patents reduced entry by three to eight percent.227 Furthermore, 
segments with the fewest patents per incumbent had the sharpest 
increase in entry, and those with the most had the smallest increase in 
entry.228 These findings led the authors to conclude that “[p]atent 
thickets, at least as measured here, thus appear to substantially raise 
entry costs.”229 Empirical research also shows that startups in markets 
with more patents faced longer delays in obtaining venture financing 
compared to markets with fewer patents.230 Along similar lines, an 
influential 2003 report by the Federal Trade Commission cites several 
 
 222. SLAUGHTER, supra note 219, at 72; CONTU Report, supra note 202, at 79. 
 223. Boldrin & Levine, supra note 218, at 3. 
 224. Cockburn & MacGarvie, supra note 51, at 915–16; Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent 
Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE 
ECONOMY 119, 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001). But see Mann, supra note 14, at 1004 (drawing 
on interview evidence to disclaim the existence of a detrimental patent thicket in the software 
industry). 
 225. Allison et al., supra note 193, at 1606. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Cockburn & MacGarvie, supra note 51, at 915. 
 228. Id. at 920. 
 229. Id. at 931. 
 230. Iain M. Cockburn & Megan J. MacGarvie, Patents, Thickets, and the Financing of Early-
Stage Firms: Evidence from the Software Industry, 18 J. ECON. MGMT. STRAT. 729, 729 (2009). 
Lee_ PAGE (Do Not Delete) 5/31/2019 2:12 PM 
2019] RECONCEPTUALIZING THE ROLE OF IP 1233 
commentators who cautioned that patents raise entry costs in the 
software industry.231 
In addition to constraining entry over time, patent thickets are 
most likely to inhibit entry in downstream segments of the software 
industry. Such thickets create “a dense web of overlapping intellectual 
property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to 
actually commercialize new technology.”232 Due to the accumulation of 
exclusive rights as one moves from upstream to downstream 
technologies along a value chain, patent thickets are likely to be 
thickest and most pernicious for downstream firms attempting to 
commercialize a technology,233 such as a complex software suite.234 Put 
differently, the cumulative effect of even small “patent taxes” along a 
value chain can be quite large for downstream firms, thus imperiling 
commercialization.235 Thickets can serve as a formidable barrier to 
entry, leading companies to “avoid the mine field altogether” or “lose 
their corporate legs.”236 
Ironically, incumbents have sought to overcome the perils of 
thickets by acquiring more patents, thus exacerbating thickets and 
heightening barriers to entry. Large software companies typically 
accumulate significant numbers of defensive patents and engage in 
massive cross-licensing with each other to clear patent thickets.237 
Empirical research reveals that the increasing share of software 
patents held by software firms is driven by the activity of a few large 
industry players.238 This result places small firms and potential new 
entrants at a disadvantage, for they lack the resources to amass large 
patent portfolios to leverage against industry incumbents. Thus, for a 
variety of reasons, “the acquisition of large patent portfolios by 
incumbents creates huge barriers to entry.”239 At the far end of the 
spectrum, the proliferation of patents also undergirds the emergence of 
patent assertion entities, known colloquially as patent trolls, which 
accumulate large patent portfolios, do not manufacture technologies, 
 
 231. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION 
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 51 (2003). 
 232. Shapiro, supra note 224, at 120. 
 233. See id. at 124 (“[T]he complements problem is at its worst when the downstream firms 
using the various inputs truly require each input to make their products.”). 
 234. Cf. id. at 144. 
 235. Id. at 125. 
 236. Id. at 126. 
 237. Id. at 129; see also Mann, supra note 14, at 996; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 231, at 
52. 
 238. James Bessen, A Generation of Software Patents, 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 241, 256 
(2012). 
 239. Id.; Boldrin & Levine, supra note 218, at 8. 
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and generate revenues by threatening to sue other companies for 
infringement.240 Even operating companies like Texas Instruments 
have mined their patent portfolios to assert exclusive rights against 
potential infringers,241 thus heightening barriers to entry. 
In addition to creating barriers to entry, patents also promote 
consolidation in the software industry by driving mergers and 
acquisitions. Even Mann, who emphasizes the role of patents in 
promoting software industry fragmentation, acknowledges that patents 
can sometimes promote industry consolidation. For large companies, 
the cost of potentially infringing another company’s patent may weigh 
against in-house development and toward simply buying the company 
(and its patents).242 Put differently, “one tried and true method of 
settling a [patent] dispute is for the companies involved simply to 
merge.”243 In broader strokes, the software industry continues to 
undergo Schumpeterian processes of “creative destruction” in which 
firms abandon old technologies for new ones.244 This process often 
entails large incumbents acquiring small startups and their patents.245 
For instance, the emergence of cloud computing has led large 
incumbents to acquire cloud-based companies, such as Oracle’s recent 
purchase of Responsys and SAP’s recent acquisition of Concur 
Technologies.246 
Patents have also contributed to industry consolidation by 
protecting standards. Certain segments of the software industry are 
subject to network externalities, which arise when the value of a good 
or service increases as more people use it, such as when additional users 
join a telephone network.247 Network markets tend to move toward 
standardization248 and frequently operate as “winner take all” contests 
that eventually tip toward a standard that dominates the market.249 
While standards themselves can contribute to industry concentration 
by rendering competing platforms obsolete, this effect is heightened 
when standards are subject to exclusive rights. As Julie Cohen and 
Mark Lemley observed in an influential article, “The nexus among 
intellectual property rights, compatibility, and network effects is quite 
 
 240. See Mann, supra note 14, at 1023 (describing patent trolls). 
 241. Shapiro, supra note 224, at 121. 
 242. Mann, supra note 14, at 994. 
 243. Shapiro, supra note 224, at 143. 
 244. Campbell-Kelly & Garcia-Swartz, supra note 193, at 755. 
 245. Id. 
 246. PWC, DIGITAL INTELLIGENCE, supra note 192, at 14. 
 247. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 93, 94 (1994) (describing “network effects” or “network externalities”). 
 248. Id. at 105. 
 249. Id. at 111. 
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strong. To the extent that intellectual property rights confer ownership 
interests in a strong network standard, they may create durable market 
power in network markets.”250 Similarly, Carl Shapiro observes that 
“once a standard is picked, any patents (or copyrights) necessary to 
comply with that standard become truly essential.”251 Such benefits 
often flow to first movers whose intellectual property protects the 
industry standard, thus rendering such protection “extra-
concentrated.”252 Patents on standards can thus contribute to 
concentration in the software industry,253 where, for example, 
interoperability standards have led to Microsoft Windows enjoying a 
ninety percent market share in operating systems.254 In this field, 
network effects “tend to give the leading players a competitive edge and 
monopoly over pricing power, which imposes a significant barrier to 
competition.”255  
Ultimately, patents play important roles in both initial, 
upstream entry and subsequent, downstream concentration in the 
software industry. Robert Merges observes that “[p]atents have not 
killed the software industry; they have not led to a slowdown in entry; 
and they do not appear to have had much if any effect on industry 
structure.”256 While this may describe the net effects of patents, 
exclusive rights promote entry and consolidation at different times and 
at different points in the value chain. Patents most saliently promote 
entry early in a segment’s evolution and for startups transitioning from 
the earliest stages of formation to commercialization. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the value of patents in promoting entry seems to be 
highest where patents (and their exclusionary effects) are already 
prevalent, which may explain why patents were not necessary for entry 
in the early decades of the software industry before patenting became 
 
 250. Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 
89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 22 (2001); see also Joseph Farrell, Arguments for Weaker Intellectual Property 
Protection in Network Industries, 3 STANDARDVIEW 46, 47 (1995) (“[I]ntellectual property 
protection is often especially powerful in network markets, since a de facto standard can control a 
market, so the legal protection is leveraged and confers stronger effective protection than in other 
markets.”). 
 251. Shapiro, supra note 224, at 136. 
 252. Farrell, supra note 250, at 47. 
 253. Anne Shields, Overview: The Software Industry Landscape, MKT. REALIST (July 4, 2014), 
http://marketrealist.com/2014/07/overview-software-industry-landscape [https://perma.cc/N7CS-
FMEX]; see Merges, supra note 191, at 5 (observing that proprietary “backbones” in the software 
industry give rise to network effects). 
 254. Shields, supra note 253. 
 255. Id.; see also SLAUGHTER, supra note 219, at 70 (“Switching costs and network externalities 
can cause the market to tip to a single dominant vendor or technology for a particular software 
genre.”). 
 256. Merges, supra note 191, at 4–5. 
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widespread. As software segments mature, they tend to become more 
concentrated. Patents contribute to such consolidation by erecting 
barriers to entry and serving as valuable assets that incumbents seek 
to obtain in mergers and acquisitions. In addition to promoting initial 
entry and subsequent concentration, patents promote entry by 
upstream startups focused on writing new programs and facilitate 
concentration in large, downstream incumbents that commercialize 
products. Indeed, the software industry experiences significant merger 
and acquisition activity,257 and according to the 2012 census, the top 
four software publishers accounted for 41.4 percent of total revenues.258 
While the software industry may appear fragmented overall, individual 
companies dominate particular segments, such as Microsoft in 
operating systems, SAP in enterprise applications, and Symantec in 
security.259 For such segments, “patents, high switching costs, and the 
concentration of the software market create significant barriers [to 
entry].”260 
B. Copyright-Intensive Industries 
Shifting from technological to creative fields, copyrights (and 
patents) have also contributed to initial, upstream entry and 
subsequent, downstream concentration in film production and 
distribution, music recording, and publishing. Of course, these 
industries have very different histories, trajectories, and internal 
dynamics, and many forces beyond intellectual property rights help 
shape their structure. For example, the music industry is the most 
concentrated, due in significant part to pressure from digital content 
distribution. Notwithstanding their differences, in each of these 
industries, copyrights contribute to the entry of upstream creators such 
as screenwriters, composers, recording artists, and authors. The 
business of commercializing copyrighted content, however, falls to film 
studios and distributors, record labels, and publishing houses further 
downstream in the value chain, and these entities have wielded and 
 
 257. SLAUGHTER, supra note 219, at 53. 
 258. Establishment & Firm Size: Summary Statistics by Receipts Size of Establishments for 
the U.S.: 2012, U.S. CENSUS, AM. FACTFINDER (Jan. 8, 2016), https://factfinder.census.gov/ 
faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml [https://perma.cc/QGC8-JUJU]. This category 
covers NAICS industry code 511210, “software publishers.” Id.  
 259. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 219, at 57–58 tbl.3.1 (ranking the top thirty software 
suppliers of 2012). However, Microsoft alone accounts for seventeen percent of the worldwide 
software market. Id. at 59. 
 260. Anne Shields, Overview: Understanding the Software Industry Cost Structure, MKT. 
REALIST (July 4, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://marketrealist.com/2014/07/overview-understanding-
software-industry-cost-structure [https://perma.cc/UV92-5U9A].  
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aggregated copyrights in ways that promote industry concentration. 
Furthermore, these profiles reveal that copyrights play different roles 
than patents in advancing various forms of industrial organization. For 
instance, while patent thickets in agricultural biotechnology and 
software can directly block the creation of technologies by potential new 
entrants, large copyright estates do not directly block the creation of 
rival expressions, but they confer significant cost advantages to 
incumbents, thus deterring new entrants.  
1. Film Production and Distribution 
Intellectual property rights contribute to both early and 
upstream market entry as well as subsequent and downstream 
concentration in film production and distribution.261 Ironically, patents 
played a critical role in the initial formation and subsequent 
concentration of the movie industry. Thomas Edison patented 
foundational motion picture camera technology, and early industry 
participants formed the Motion Picture Patents Company (“MPPC”) in 
1909.262 Patents facilitated development of the film industry, and the 
MPPC soon leveraged its patents to attempt to monopolize that 
industry.263 According to Barak Orbach, “To prevent entry into its 
market, the Trust established a complex nexus of licenses and 
agreements that restricted transactions among machine 
manufacturers, film producers, distributors, and exhibitors only to 
licensed agents.”264 The MPPC created a subsidiary, the General Film 
Company, which sought “to block entry of non-licensed 
independents.”265 Filmmakers began to flock to Hollywood in part to 
evade patent infringement claims brought by these companies, which 
were based on the east coast.266 Notably, antitrust and patent 
challenges helped weaken the MPPC and the General Film Company, 
 
 261. See Jin, supra note 42, at 406 (describing the long-standing but recently intensifying 
trend toward global media consolidation). 
 262. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); Mark A. 
Lemley, A New Balance Between IP and Antitrust, 13 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 237, 252 (2007); Barak 
Y. Orbach, Antitrust and Pricing in the Motion Picture Industry, 21 YALE J. REG. 317, 331–32 
(2004); Peter Edidin, La-La Land: The Origins, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2005), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/21/weekinreview/lala-land-the-origins.html [https://perma.cc/ 
N73A-7RAE].  
 263. Edidin, supra note 262. 
 264. Orbach, supra note 262, at 332. 
 265. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY 54 (2004); 
Orbach, supra note 262, at 332–33. 
 266. LESSIG, supra note 265, at 53; Edidin, supra note 262. 
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which contributed to increased entry by independent producers and 
exhibitors.267  
The classical era, from the 1920s to the 1940s, featured a “studio 
system” in which vertically integrated studios combined movie 
production, distribution, and exhibition in one corporate entity.268 In 
addition to being vertically integrated, the film industry was also 
horizontally concentrated, comprised of the so-called Big Eight studios: 
the Big Five studios (MGM, Warner Bros., 20th Century Fox, 
Paramount, and RKO) and the Little Three “majors” (Universal, 
Columbia, and United Artists).269 The Big Eight controlled Hollywood 
as a “mature oligopoly”270 and flourished during the Depression and 
World War II, when national crises helped shield the industry from 
government scrutiny.271 This system produced the Golden Age of 
Hollywood, in which big stars were often bound by long-term contracts 
to particular studios (thus approximating vertical integration), which 
contributed to each studio’s distinctive style and success.272 In this 
fashion, “[u]p to the 1940s, the Hollywood movie industry was 
dominated by hierarchical and vertically integrated organizations.”273 
Following World War II, legal and cultural developments led to 
vertical disintegration in various parts of the value chain, particularly 
in upstream film production. The Supreme Court’s 1948 antitrust 
decision in United States v. Paramount Pictures required the Big Five 
studios to end collusive behavior and sell their theater chains, thus 
separating production and distribution from exhibition.274 
Furthermore, courts ordered the end of contracts that had “essentially 
 
 267. Orbach, supra note 262, at 334–35. 
 268. RICHARD E. CAVES, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES 88 (2000); Tom Schatz, The Studio System and 
Conglomerate Hollywood, in THE CONTEMPORARY HOLLYWOOD FILM INDUSTRY 13, 14–15 (Paul 
McDonald & Janet Wasko eds., 2008); James Talbott, Editorial, Will Mega-Media Mergers Destroy 
Hollywood and Democracy?, 18 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 9, 9 (2000). 
 269. Schatz, supra note 268, at 15; see also DAVID HESMONDHALGH, THE CULTURAL 
INDUSTRIES 61–62 (2d ed. 2007); Joseph Lampel & Jamal Shamsie, Capabilities in Motion: New 
Organizational Forms and the Reshaping of the Hollywood Movie Industry, 40 J. MGMT. STUD. 
2189, 2193 (2003) (noting the ascendance of essentially eight studios around Hollywood by the late 
1920s). 
 270. Schatz, supra note 268, at 15. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id.; see also Jin, supra note 42, at 407–08; John M. Kernochan, Ownership and Control of 
Intellectual Property Rights in Motion Pictures and Audiovisual Works: Contractual and Practical 
Aspects, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 379, 406 (1996). 
 273. Lampel & Shamsie, supra note 269, at 2190. 
 274. 334 U.S. 131, 175 (1948); see CAVES, supra note 268, at 93; Jin, supra note 42, at 414; 
Talbott, supra note 268, at 9–10.  
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turned stars into indentured servants,”275 thus freeing upstream 
creative talent from the formerly vertically integrated studios. Another 
important postwar development was the ascendance of television, 
which rapidly replaced film as the primary mass media consumption 
good.276 Studios began making fewer films of higher quality to 
differentiate movies from television,277 and it became less economical 
for studios to own large production facilities and bind actors to long-
term contracts. The studios adopted the business model of United 
Artists, becoming financiers and distributors of motion pictures rather 
than producing them entirely in-house themselves.278 The resulting 
“spot production” reflected vertical disintegration in upstream movie 
production.279 In this model, independent producers approached studios 
with proposals that the studios could decide to “green light,” thus 
providing capital and access to limited production facilities in exchange 
for downstream distribution rights.280 This vertically disintegrated 
structure featuring spot production continued through the 1950s,281 and 
by the mid-1960s, eighty percent of films were developed outside of the 
major studios.282 Ultimately, the classical studio model was replaced by 
a contemporary structure featuring vertically disintegrated, 
knowledge-intensive firms utilizing networks to aggregate resources to 
produce movies.283 
Within this fragmented model of film production, copyright 
played and continues to play an important role in promoting upstream 
market entry. The classical studio system featured vertically integrated 
organizations that directly employed writers, directors, and actors or 
bound them to long-term contracts.284 With the shift to spot production, 
studios became “hubs” that assembled a diverse cohort of creative talent 
for each movie.285 In the contemporary model, studios or producers turn 
to the market to find creative professionals, and copyright facilitates 
market entry for many of these professionals.286 For instance, authors 
 
 275. Neal Gabler, Opinion, Revenge of the Studio System, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 1995), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/22/opinion/revenge-of-the-studio-system.html [https://perma. 
cc/32GV-4VJM]. 
 276. Schatz, supra note 268, at 16. 
 277. CAVES, supra note 268, at 93–94. 
 278. Schatz, supra note 268, at 16. 
 279. CAVES, supra note 268, at 92. 
 280. Schatz, supra note 268, at 16; see also HESMONDHALGH, supra note 269, at 151. 
 281. Lampel & Shamsie, supra note 269, at 2196–98. 
 282. DAVID COOK, A HISTORY OF NARRATIVE FILM 534 (1990). 
 283. Lampel & Shamsie, supra note 269, at 2190. 
 284. See id. at 2196. 
 285. Id. at 2197. 
 286. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICE § 808.4 
(3d ed. 2014) (rev. Sept. 29, 2017) (describing numerous elements of motion picture authorship). 
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wielding copyrights sell film rights (based on the exclusive right to 
prepare derivative works) to producers,287 who then leverage this 
copyrighted asset to obtain financing and production deals with 
studios.288 Screenwriters write scripts with no formal agreement (“on 
spec”) and seek to sell them to producers;289 in so doing, they rely on 
copyright to prevent uncompensated appropriation by prospective 
purchasers. Similarly, composers and lyricists contributing to a 
soundtrack album rely on copyright to obtain public performance 
royalties,290 thus heightening their incentive to contribute to film 
production. Composers and lyricists of preexisting musical works (and 
their publishers) receive even higher compensation for their 
copyrighted works,291 thus encouraging their market entry. The entry-
promoting function of copyrights is less significant for composers and 
screenwriters hired ex ante to produce content for a film relative to 
those leveraging copyrights on existing content to be incorporated into 
a film.292 Even for the former, though, copyright can heighten 
incentives. Creative individuals exchange copyrights not only for 
immediate compensation but also for “residuals” based on repeated uses 
of a work, which can be substantial.293 In short, copyright facilitated 
and continues to facilitate market entry by a wide array of creative 
professionals contributing to upstream film production. 
Copyright not only encourages entry by creative professionals, it 
also resolves potential coordination problems with team production of 
movies.294 For an assemblage of contracting parties to produce a film 
effectively, control must be centralized in one or a few 
decisionmakers.295 Copyright facilitates market entry by creative 
professionals, but negotiating the full panoply of copyright rights—
including rights of reproduction, distribution, derivative work 
production, and public performance and display—with each contributor 
would entail prohibitively high transaction costs and create 
opportunities for strategic holdup.296 To overcome coordination 
 
 287. Kernochan, supra note 272, at 412–13; see id. at 427 (detailing a large number of rights 
that authors typically convey when a producer options or purchases a book for production into a 
movie). 
 288. Id. at 392. 
 289. Id. at 403. 
 290. Id. at 410. 
 291. Id. at 411. 
 292. My thanks to Jennifer Rothman for this observation. 
 293. Kernochan, supra note 272, at 440–41. 
 294. See Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 13 (2004) 
(explaining the applicability of the work made for hire doctrine to motion picture production). 
 295. Kernochan, supra note 272, at 383. 
 296. Burk, supra note 294, at 13. 
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problems, producers and studios typically employ contracts invoking 
copyright law provisions “stipulating that all creative contributions to 
a film are ‘works for hire.’ ”297 This designation renders either the 
producer or studio both the owner of the creative contributions and 
their legal author. Even directors are typically characterized as 
“workers for hire,” while the producer or studio assumes the legal status 
of author.298 Additionally, the high bar to be considered a coauthor of a 
joint work also prevents multiple ownership claims on motion pictures 
by creative contributors.299 Centralizing authorship (and associated 
rights) in a single author allows for the most efficient production of a 
motion picture, which utilizes numerous independently copyrightable 
contributions.300 Copyright thus encourages entry by a wide range of 
upstream creative professionals by both granting them rights with 
which to transact in the marketplace and aggregating those rights to 
facilitate centralized coordination. 
While the film industry features broad entry by upstream 
creative professionals, numerous factors have driven significant 
consolidation in the downstream commercialization of motion pictures. 
The first wave of “conglomeration” proceeded in the 1960s and 1970s, 
when large, diversified conglomerates bought film production studios 
and libraries of old films.301 Furthermore, while vertically disintegrated 
spot production has continued, the 1970s saw a shift in the prevailing 
business models in the film industry. During that period, the success of 
movies like Jaws heralded the New Hollywood era, which embraced big-
budget, widely advertised blockbusters.302 Studios sought to leverage 
blockbusters such as Star Wars and Indiana Jones into broad licensing 
and merchandizing deals spanning video games, theme park rides, and 
other tie-ins.303 The film and television industry continued to evolve and 
consolidate in the 1980s by embracing “synergy” or “tight 
diversification.”304 The Reagan administration’s media deregulation 
policies relaxed both ownership restrictions and antitrust 
 
 297. Kernochan, supra note 272, at 384. 
 298. Id. at 416; see, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting 
that Warner Bros. was the legal author of the film Malcolm X and that director Spike Lee was a 
worker for hire).  
 299. See Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1230–36. 
 300. As Justin Hughes argues, actors are also authors under U.S. copyright law and make 
copyrightable contributions to films and other audiovisual works. Justin Hughes, Actors as 
Authors in American Copyright Law, 51 CONN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2019). 
 301. HESMONDHALGH, supra note 269, at 60. 
 302. ARTHUR DE VANY, HOLLYWOOD ECONOMICS: HOW EXTREME UNCERTAINTY SHAPES THE 
FILM INDUSTRY 122 (2004). 
 303. Schatz, supra note 268, at 20–21. 
 304. Id. at 22. 
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enforcement,305 thus creating an environment conducive to 
consolidation. While upstream film production remained vertically 
disintegrated, studios embraced vertical integration in downstream 
distribution and exhibition by acquiring multiple pipelines to deliver 
content, including satellite, cable, broadcast, and print.306 Throughout 
the 1990s, the eight members of the Motion Picture Association of 
America (Disney, Columbia, Paramount, MGM/UA, Universal, Orion, 
Warner Bros., and 20th Century Fox), each of which coordinates movie 
production and distribution, together generated ninety-three percent of 
the domestic theatrical box office gross.307  
By the 1990s, “synergy and tight diversification met the larger 
forces of globalization, digitization, and U.S. media deregulation.”308 
New Hollywood flowed into Conglomerate Hollywood, which is 
dominated by a small number of global, integrated entertainment 
companies with holdings in movies, television, cable, music, publishing, 
and other content industries.309 Paradoxically, Conglomerate 
Hollywood has even absorbed the “indie” film industry, with several 
large media companies acquiring formerly independent studios, as 
illustrated in Disney’s acquisition of Miramax in 1993 and Turner 
Broadcasting’s acquisition of New Line Cinema in 1994.310 Starting in 
the mid-1990s, the film industry underwent an unprecedented wave of 
global mergers and acquisitions.311 By the early 2000s, Conglomerate 
Hollywood was dominated by an oligopoly of six companies: News Corp., 
Sony, Time Warner, Viacom, Disney, and General Electric.312 These 
conglomerates combined “movies, broadcast television, cable television, 
video, foreign video, foreign television, merchandise, theme parks, 
soundtrack albums, [and] books.”313 Commenting on this period, Tom 
Schatz observed, “The new rulers of Hollywood [are] . . . not the movie 
studios, but their parent companies, the media giants like Viacom 
(owner of Paramount Pictures), Sony (Columbia), Time Warner 
 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. at 23; see also Jin, supra note 42, at 408 (observing that vertical integration has long 
been a hallmark of the film industry). 
 307. Talbott, supra note 268, at 10. 
 308. Schatz, supra note 268, at 25. 
 309. Id. at 27. 
 310. Id. at 29; see also James Lyons, Book Review, 56 SCREEN 282, 284 (2015) (reviewing ALISA 
PERREN, INDIE, INC.: MIRAMAX AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF HOLLYWOOD IN THE 1990S (2012), 
and YANNIS TZIOUMAKIS, HOLLYWOOD’S INDIES: CLASSICS DIVISIONS, SPECIALTY LABELS AND THE 
AMERICAN FILM MARKET (2012)) (discussing Tzioumakis’ argument that the Miramax takeover 
marks the end of the “second wave of specialty divisions”). 
 311. Jin, supra note 42, at 408. 
 312. Schatz, supra note 268, at 27. 
 313. Gabler, supra note 275. 
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(Warner Bros.), and News Corp (20th Century Fox).”314 Disney’s muscle 
is even more evident in its recently approved proposal to buy most of 
the assets of rival 21st Century Fox (including significant portions of 
20th Century Fox, the major movie studio),315 which would effectively 
shrink the Big Six to a Big Five. Interestingly, internet distributors 
have also pursued vertical integration, with Netflix, Hulu, and Amazon 
transitioning from distributing other studios’ content to producing 
original content themselves.316 
While myriad factors have contributed to downstream 
concentration in the financing, marketing, and distribution of movies, 
copyright has played a notable supporting role. Given significant 
uncertainty in the success of films,317 large incumbents develop broad 
portfolios of copyrighted properties and rely on a few successes to 
subsidize many failures. This places smaller firms at a disadvantage in 
movie financing and production since they are “unable to spread risk 
across a repertoire.”318 While in this context copyright is not a 
proximate “cause” of concentration per se, exclusive rights are critical 
to a portfolio strategy that allows large firms to manage risk more 
effectively than small ones.  
Studios amass large libraries of not only finished content but 
also copyrighted scripts and options on books that may never be 
produced into actual movies.319 Exclusive rights on these creative 
prospects hinder attempts by potential new competitors to enter the 
field of film production. According to one observer, “[T]here are still 
vaults of enormous stacks of creative work in Hollywood (some 
undoubtedly of real value) to which the underlying authors or 
scriptwriters or other artistic participants can never make claim and of 
which they are not free to make any derivative use.”320 Writing in 1996, 
 
 314. Schatz, supra note 268, at 14. 
 315. See Brooks Barnes, Disney Makes $52.4 Billion Deal for 21st Century Fox in Big Bet on 
Streaming, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/business/dealbook/ 
disney-fox-deal.html [https://perma.cc/KQ3K-THGV] (“[T]he Walt Disney Company . . . reached a 
deal to buy most of 21st Century Fox . . . in an all-stock transaction valued at roughly $52.4 
billion.”); Edmund Lee & Cecilia Kang, Justice Dept. Approves Disney’s Purchase of Fox Assets, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/business/media/disney-fox-
antitrust-comcast.html [https://perma.cc/C9JY-BY5A] (“The Department of Justice approved the 
Walt Disney Company’s $71 billion bid for the entertainment assets of 21st Century Fox.”). 
 316. See Andrew Dodson, Analysis: Netflix Trails Hulu, Amazon, and Several Cable Networks 
in Quality of Original Shows, STREAMING OBSERVER (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.streaming 
observer.com/best-original-shows [https://perma.cc/3LAK-MRJM] (discussing recent trends in 
original content production). 
 317. DE VANY, supra note 302, at 26, 71. 
 318. HESMONDHALGH, supra note 269, at 20. 
 319. Kernochan, supra note 272, at 430. 
 320. Id. 
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Neil Netanel observed that sectors featuring high levels of firm 
concentration, including multimedia conglomerates, were “absorbing a 
greater and greater share of the copyright marketplace.”321 
Copyright also contributes to concentration in the downstream 
distribution of content through traditional channels such as television 
and DVDs. Due to vertical integration, all major film studios are now 
part of broad conglomerates possessing multiple distribution outlets, 
such as DVDs, broadcast television, and cable television.322 Distribution 
of libraries of copyrighted content creates significant revenue streams 
for major studios.323 Additionally, huge copyright estates controlled by 
global entertainment conglomerates raise costs for potential new 
distributors. As Jonathan Barnett observed, “[S]ome of the most 
vigorous articulations of the too much property thesis are advanced 
with respect to the entertainment and other content-dependent 
industries, where there is a reasonable case that the most dominant 
firms have rich copyright estates that necessitate little recourse to 
outside sources for creative inputs.”324 As far back as the 1990s, Disney, 
which owns a significant back catalogue of films and recordings as well 
as television and other distribution networks, embraced the “nature of 
the new cultural industries; that combining ownership of content and 
distribution was the way forward.”325  
Potential new distributors are at a decided disadvantage when 
they lack films to distribute. Such new entrants would find it difficult 
to complete with, for example, Warner Bros., a Big Six studio that 
maintains a library of over 8,600 feature films.326 Here, again, copyright 
plays an important supporting role in shoring up barriers to entry. 
Given the exclusivity inherent in copyright, vast libraries are 
inaccessible to new entrants without licensing fees. According to one 
observer, “In the highly industrialized countries like the United States, 
a relatively small number of giant private entities control imagery 
 
 321. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 
333 (1996). 
 322. Nicholas Rapp & Aric Jenkins, Chart: These 6 Companies Control Much of U.S. Media, 
FORTUNE (July 24, 2018), http://fortune.com/longform/media-company-ownership-consolidation 
[https://perma.cc/R9LV-NWBR].  
 323. See, e.g., The Walt Disney Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 36 (Sept. 29, 2018) 
(reporting revenues of $1.75 billion for home entertainment and $3.9 billion in television and 
subscription video on demand in the year ending September 2018).  
 324. Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation 
Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 438 (2009). 
 325. HESMONDHALGH, supra note 269, at 143. 
 326. Company Overview, WARNER BROS., https://www.warnerbros.com/studio/about/company-
overview (last visited April 2, 2019) [https://perma.cc/SCW3-CA8C]. 
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through intellectual property laws.”327 The prospect of marrying 
distribution pipelines (such as cable and internet access) to copyrighted 
content helped motivate the recent Comcast-NBC Universal and AT&T-
Time Warner mergers.328 Such control has led commentators to 
question whether potential new distributors should have mandatory 
access to copyrighted works and whether exclusive rights create input 
or vertical foreclosure.329  
Significantly, new entrants in digital distribution like Netflix, 
Hulu, and Amazon are the exception that proves the rule. While 
numerous factors, including copyright protection on existing libraries of 
content, have helped deter the entry of traditional film distributors, 
streaming services have made significant inroads. The need to license 
copyrighted content from major studios, however, has imposed 
significant operational and financial burdens on streaming services, 
particularly in light of plans by several studios to create their own 
proprietary streaming services and stop licensing to outside digital 
distributors.330 Partly in response, Netflix and others have invested 
considerably in original programming, leading to a flourishing of new 
content.331 But the copyright estates of the large studios still impose 
significant costs on these new entrants, which currently rely 
substantially on licensing content from the majors.332 
Major studios have also lobbied to reform copyright law to shore 
up barriers to entry and their own market power. For instance, Disney 
aggressively lobbied for the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 
 
 327. Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 
43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 99 (1993). 
 328. See Tim Arango & Brian Stelter, Comcast Receives Approval for NBC Universal Merger, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/19/business/media/19comcast.html 
[https://perma.cc/65U9-SRJ2] (“The combination of Comcast’s cable and Internet systems and 
NBC Universal’s channels will create a media powerhouse.”); Cecilia Kang et al., AT&T Wins 
Approval for $85.4 Billion Time Warner Deal in Defeat for Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/12/business/dealbook/att-time-warner-ruling-antitrust-
case.html [https://perma.cc/2S3C-YMXJ] (“The merger [between AT&T and Time Warner] would 
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 329. Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 
ANTITRUST BULL. 423, 427–28 (2002). 
 330. See Sarah Witten, Netflix Can Compete as Disney, Warner Bros., Enter the Streaming 
Space, But It Won’t Be Cheap, CNBC (Feb. 21, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/ 
21/hurdles-netflix-faces-as-disney-warner-bros-enter-the-streaming-space.html [https://perma.cc/ 
BCK2-T4U3] (noting plans by Disney, Warner Bros., and Comcast to remove their movies from 
Netflix and create their own streaming services). 
 331. See, e.g., id. 
 332. Cf. Todd Spangler, Netflix Licensed Content Generates 80% of U.S. Viewing, Study Finds, 
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of 1998—dubbed the “Mickey Mouse Protection Act.”333 The Act 
extended the copyright term for an additional twenty years, thus 
postponing the time when key copyrighted content, including 
“Steamboat Willie” (more commonly known as Mickey Mouse334), would 
fall into the public domain.335 According to Robert Merges, obtaining 
this copyright extension “was the Walt Disney Company’s ‘highest 
priority’ in the 1998 legislative session of Congress.”336 Congress 
enacted the legislation, which later withstood a constitutional 
challenge,337 thus providing “a major victory for long-standing copyright 
holders such as Walt Disney, AOL Time Warner and other major 
companies in the entertainment industry.”338 Among other effects, 
extending copyright protection for existing content enhanced barriers 
to entry for potential content distributors and increased the market 
power of incumbents. 
Additionally, copyright undergirds the aggregation of creative 
content via mergers and acquisitions by the major players, which 
further drives industry consolidation. Disney has utilized this strategy 
to significant effect by acquiring Pixar, Lucasfilm, and Marvel—and 
their valuable copyrighted content, from Toy Story to Star Wars to The 
Avengers—thus becoming “Hollywood’s runaway leader.”339 Similarly, 
Disney’s recent acquisition of most of the assets of 21st Century Fox 
arose in part from a desire to obtain key copyrighted content from the 
latter’s studio division, 20th Century Fox. In particular, Disney sought 
the rights to 20th Century Fox’s Avatar, the highest grossing movie of 
 
 333. See Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1065 (2001) 
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24, 2006), https://www.thewaltdisneycompany.com/disney-to-acquire-pixar [https://perma.cc/ 
LH9Q-QGS6]. 
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all time ($2.7 billion).340 Additionally, Disney sought Fox’s valuable X-
Men franchise, which Fox obtained from Marvel before the latter 
company was purchased by Disney.341 Copyright plays a crucial role in 
these mergers and acquisitions, for it confers the exclusive right to 
exploit not only these existing properties but also derivative works 
going forward.  
While copyright encourages widespread participation by 
upstream creators, it and other factors play significant roles in 
facilitating concentration in the downstream commercialization of 
motion pictures.342 According to the 2012 census, the top four firms in 
“motion picture and video production” accounted for 46.4 percent of all 
revenues.343 Turning to “motion picture and video distribution,” the top 
four firms accounted for 38.3 percent of total revenues.344 In 2018, the 
Big Six studios—Buena Vista (Disney), Warner Bros., Universal, 
Sony/Columbia, 20th Century Fox, and Paramount—accounted for 83.7 
percent of North American box office revenues.345 Consolidation 
“remains the most basic impulse of the media business,”346 as 
illustrated in AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner347 and Disney’s 
acquisition of various assets of 21st Century Fox,348 both of which 
occurred in 2018. 
 
 340. Ben Fritz, Disney Deal for Fox Would End Era of the ‘Big Six’ Studios, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 
11, 2017, 6:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/disney-deal-for-fox-would-end-era-of-the-big-six-
studios-1512907201 [https://perma.cc/D6V2-WXT8]. 
 341. Id. 
 342. See Dan Sullivan & Yuening Jiang, Media Convergence and the Impact of the Internet on 
the M&A Activity of Large Media Companies, 7 J. MEDIA BUS. STUD. 21, 23 (2010) (“[T]echnological 
changes have led to blurring the boundaries between various media industries and also have 
promoted many companies to expand their footprint to other sectors previously regarded as 
irrelevant.”). 
 343. Establishment & Firm Size: Concentration by Largest Firms for the U.S.: 2012, U.S. 
CENSUS, AM. FACTFINDER (Jan. 8, 2016), https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ 
ECN/2012_US/51SSSZ6/0100000US/naics~512110 [https://perma.cc/K9D3-FJGK]. This category 
corresponds to NAICS industry code 512110. Id. 
 344. See Establishment & Firm Size: Concentration by Largest Firms for the U.S.: 2012, U.S. 
CENSUS, AM. FACTFINDER (Jan. 8, 2016), https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/ 
pages/productview.xhtml [https://perma.cc/E2WM-BELR]. This category corresponds to NAICS 
industry code 512120. Id. 
 345. See sources cited supra note 12. 
 346. Michael Wolff, Disney-Discovery? Fox-Viacom? Michael Wolff Predicts M&A Mania and a 
New Wave of Consolidation, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Apr. 9, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.hollywood 
reporter.com/news/disney-discovery-fox-viacom-michael-786744 [https://perma.cc/4MK9-3G28].  
 347. See Edmund Lee & Cecilia Kang, AT&T Closes Acquisition of Time Warner, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/business/media/att-time-warner-
injunction.html [https://perma.cc/L696-MHEU] (“AT&T . . . completed its $85.4 billion acquisition 
of Time Warner.”). 
 348. See Lee & Kang, supra note 315 (reporting the Department of Justice’s approval of 
Disney’s bid to acquire 21st Century Fox). 
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2. Music Recording 
In a similar fashion, intellectual property rights have 
contributed to fragmentation and concentration at various times and 
points along the value chain in the music industry.349 Copyrights were 
critical to the initial entry of industry actors and subsequent 
consolidation. Musical compositions—e.g., sheet music—have been 
expressly copyrightable in the United States since 1831.350 In the late 
nineteenth century, prior to the widespread adoption of sound 
recording, “sheet music was the primary vehicle for disseminating 
popular music,”351 and music publishers controlled the industry.352 The 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw a wide diffusion of 
publishing houses.353 However, these companies began to consolidate in 
the area of New York City known as “Tin Pan Alley.”354 Such 
consolidation “centralized control of an industry that had been spread 
throughout major cities across the United States” 355 and led to a highly 
successful, formulaic, and homogeneous style of popular music.356 For a 
significant period, sheet music sales generated substantial revenues for 
music publishers.357 Notably, music publishers utilized copyright law to 
enhance their market power. In 1897, in response to widespread public 
musical performances that offered no compensation to copyright 
owners, Congress enacted an exclusive right of public performance for 
musical compositions.358 To better exploit this public performance right, 
 
 349. See GEOFFREY P. HULL ET AL., THE MUSIC BUSINESS AND RECORDING INDUSTRY: 
DELIVERING MUSIC IN THE 21ST CENTURY 171–73 (3d ed. 2011) (differentiating periods of high 
concentration from those of high entry); see also Reebee Garofalo, From Music Publishing to MP3: 
Music and Industry in the Twentieth Century, 17 AM. MUSIC 318, 319 (1999) (noting several stages 
of structural evolution in the music industry).  
 350. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; see CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 168 n.3 
(10th ed. 2016) (“Congress first expressly added musical compositions to the list of protected 
subject matter in 1831.”); MARIA A. PALLANTE, COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE: A 
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 16 (2015), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/music 
licensingstudy/copyright-and-the-music-marketplace.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YB7-XCBB] (“[I]n 
1831, Congress amended the law to provide expressly that musical works were subject to federal 
copyright protection.”). 
 351. Garofalo, supra note 349, at 319; see also PETER TSCHMUCK, CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION 
IN THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 10 (2d ed. 2012). 
 352. Garofalo, supra note 349, at 319; see TSCHMUCK, supra note 351, at 10 (“At the heart of 
the music industry during the last third of the nineteenth century were music publishers.”). 
 353. See Garofalo, supra note 349, at 321–22 (noting that, before consolidation, the music 
“industry . . . had been spread throughout major cities across the United States”). 
 354. Id. at 321. 
 355. Id. at 322. 
 356. Id.; see also TSCHMUCK, supra note 351, at 43. 
 357. PALLANTE, supra note 350, at 26. 
 358. Bernard Korman & I. Fred Koenigsberg, Performing Rights in Music and Performing 
Rights Societies, 33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 332, 336 (1986); see PALLANTE, supra note 350, at 
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music publishers formed the American Society of Composers, Authors, 
and Publishers (“ASCAP”) in 1914 to coordinate the collection of 
royalties for public performances of their copyrighted musical 
compositions.359 Additionally, to take advantage of the advent of 
recorded music, music publishers pushed through legislation to require 
“mechanical” royalties for the manufacture of records, cylinders, and 
piano rolls containing their copyrighted musical compositions.360  
As the industry shifted from sheet music to recorded music, 
patents contributed to initial industry entry as well as subsequent 
cycles of consolidation and fragmentation. As with the film industry, 
technological advancements and patents were essential to the 
formation of the music industry. Thomas Edison unveiled his “talking 
machine” in 1877 and patented it in 1878,361 thus ushering in the era of 
recorded sound.362 As the primary asset of value in the industry shifted 
from sheet music to recorded music, record companies rose to 
prominence.363 While exclusive rights encouraged Edison’s company 
and other early competitors to enter the recorded music industry, 
patents soon threatened to stymie the industry’s development.364 This 
led several large players to pool their patents, thereby facilitating 
oligopolistic control of the industry and blocking entry.365 Indeed, 
“[s]mall companies that tried to find their way into the business were 
flooded with patent lawsuits and soon disappeared from the market.”366 
In the early twentieth century, large recording companies shored up 
their market dominance; in the 1910s, the two largest industry players, 
U.S. Victor and British Gramophone, divided the world into various 
regions to focus their operations.367 Later, the expiration of the original 
talking-machine patents allowed new companies (introducing different 
musical genres) to enter the record industry,368 thereby ushering in a 
new period of fragmentation.  
 
17 (“In 1897, Congress expanded the rights of music owners to include the exclusive right to 
publicly perform their works.”). 
 359. Garofalo, supra note 349, at 322; see also TSCHMUCK, supra note 351, at 43–44. Notably, 
the dominance of copyright in the music industry helped to reinforce the tradition of European-
notated music in favor of other musical forms based on rhythm or improvisation. Garofalo, supra 
note 349, at 323. 
 360. Id. at 322. 
 361. TSCHMUCK, supra note 351, at 11 & n.5. 
 362. Garofalo, supra note 349, at 323–24. 
 363. Id. at 319.  
 364. Id. at 325. 
 365. Id.  
 366. TSCHMUCK, supra note 351, at 7. 
 367. Garofalo, supra note 349, at 326. 
 368. Id. at 328. 
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In addition to promoting initial entry, intellectual property 
rights—particularly copyrights—have also promoted and continue to 
promote upstream entry by creative artists. The music industry value 
chain encompasses “upstream” functions such as songwriting and 
recording and “downstream” functions such as marketing and 
distribution of recorded music. Here it is useful to distinguish between 
two kinds of upstream creative functions, each with its own associated 
copyright: songwriters who compose musical composition and recording 
artists who record musical performances.369 As noted earlier, the 
barriers to obtaining a copyright are very low given that copyright 
features a low threshold for protection, requires no application, and 
attaches simply upon fixing some expression in a tangible medium.370 
As such, copyright facilitates relatively low-cost entry to the music 
industry for both kinds of upstream creative talent.  
First, copyright promotes the entry of songwriters, who typically 
assign a portion of their rights to music publishers in exchange for up-
front payments and royalties.371 Songwriters and publishers rely on 
performing rights organizations such as ASCAP and Broadcast Music 
Inc. (“BMI”) to collect royalties for public performances of their 
copyrighted works.372 Notably, government action against ASCAP and 
BMI in 1941 led to a more equitable method of revenue distribution that 
“turned performance royalties into a viable revenue stream for an 
expanded group of composers.”373 Furthermore, many performer-
songwriters sought to “retain their copyrights and . . . establish their 
own publishing firms, instead of assigning the rights to their labels,”374 
thereby facilitating market entry of not only composers but also 
publishing firms. The lure of copyright incentives can be quite 
compelling; according to one observer, “[Buddy] Holly’s [song]writing 
career was thus spurred by the Copyright Act’s incentive structure and 
an attempt to make himself more marketable.”375 Shifting to the 
contemporary landscape, songwriters received at least $4.1 billion in 
public performance royalties from 2010 to 2014.376 In a recent survey, 
while musicians earned only twelve percent of their revenues directly 
 
 369. Of course, the same artist could perform both of these functions, an in the case of singer-
songwriters. 
 370. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 371. PALLANTE, supra note 350, at 19; Peter DiCola, Money from Music: Survey Evidence on 
Musicians’ Revenue and Lessons About Copyright Incentives, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 301, 306 (2013). 
 372. PALLANTE, supra note 350, at 20. 
 373. Shourin Sen, The Denial of a General Performance Right in Sound Recordings: A Policy 
That Facilitates Our Democratic Civil Society, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 233, 244–45 (2007). 
 374. Id. at 249. 
 375. Id. at 252. 
 376. Hughes & Merges, supra note 69, at 532–33.  
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from copyrights, composers in the top income bracket generated sixty-
eight percent of their revenue directly from copyrights.377 In addition to 
public performance royalties, songwriters (and publishers) also receive 
mechanical royalties (based on reproduction of musical works in 
phonorecords and other physical formats) and synchronization royalties 
(for use of musical works in commercials, video games, and other 
“timed” formats).378 
Second, copyright also promotes the entry of recording artists. 
The shift from sheet music to recorded music culminating in the 1940s 
and 1950s enhanced incentives for singers and musicians who recorded 
their performances.379 For example, performer-songwriters no longer 
had to sell musical compositions to publishers to get paid; they could 
earn “a considerable revenue stream” by simply recording songs they 
composed.380 Recording artists typically transfer their sound recording 
copyrights to labels and receive compensation from record company 
contracts.381 In so doing, they receive a share of revenues from sales of 
physical and digital singles and albums, sound recording 
synchronization royalties, and digital performance royalties.382 
Ultimately, copyright finances entry and facilitates dissemination for 
upstream musical artists, even if they lack significant resources.383  
Of course, it is important not to overstate the copyright 
incentives provided to composers and recording artists. This Article 
argues not that copyright drives the professional choices of these 
individuals but that it can provide a marginal incentive to encourage 
entry into the music industry. As numerous scholars have noted, 
copyright has not fully benefited many artists whose works do not fall 
neatly within the strictures of copyright doctrine.384 Additionally, for 
those working within the copyright system, developments such as 
reduced royalties from the shift to streaming platforms like Spotify 
mean that “many deeply talented songwriters and developing artists 
now question whether a career in music is realistic under the current 
 
 377. DiCola, supra note 371, at 304–05. 
 378. PALLANTE, supra note 350, at 69. 
 379. Sen, supra note 373, at 248. 
 380. Id. 
 381. PALLANTE, supra note 350, at 21; DiCola, supra note 371, at 306. 
 382. PALLANTE, supra note 350, at 69–70. 
 383. Van Houweling, supra note 14, at 1540. 
 384. See, e.g., Sen, supra note 373, at 234 (observing that copyright does not grant an exclusive 
right of public performance to transformative contributions such as John Coltrane’s original 
rendition of “My Favorite Things”); id. at 254–55 (“[M]usicians who are brilliant songwriters, but 
not musically literate, are largely barred from this profession.”); see also K.J. Greene, “Copynorms,” 
Black Cultural Production, and the Debate over African-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 1179, 1200 (2008) (noting how the idea-expression dichotomy excludes styles of 
performance pioneered by African American musicians from copyright protection). 
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regime.”385 Additionally, composers and musicians often assign away 
copyrights (and related royalty streams) in one-sided deals with music 
companies.386 Based on surveys of working musicians, Peter DiCola 
concludes that “[r]ather than providing marginal incentives to create 
for all musicians at all times, copyright law mostly affects the revenue 
of the highest-income musicians in a direct fashion.”387 Although 
copyright continues to encourage entry by composers and recording 
artists, it is important to place that incentive in context. It is also 
relevant to note that creators of intellectual property assets typically 
value them substantially higher than potential purchasers of those 
assets;388 the perception of high value in a copyrighted work may 
motivate greater entry into the music industry than the actual value of 
the work would ordinarily justify.  
While copyright has contributed to upstream entry, a broad set 
of factors has driven concentration in the downstream marketing and 
distribution of music. After the emergence of commercial radio 
broadcasting in 1920, record sales plummeted.389 Record companies 
responded through consolidation, as when British Gramophone merged 
with the Columbia Graphophone Company to form Electric and Musical 
Industries (“EMI”).390 Furthermore, radio broadcasters absorbed 
recording companies, such as when RCA merged with Victor and CBS 
bought Columbia Records.391 In the 1940s, the emergence of cheaper, 
more durable records and contraction in the repertoire offered by major 
companies spurred the formation of hundreds of small, independent 
labels.392 The rise of television as the dominant national entertainment 
medium hampered network radio broadcasters, but small, local radio 
stations survived.393 Unlike network radio broadcasters that aired live 
musical performances, local stations relied on playing records, thus 
 
 385. PALLANTE, supra note 350. According to industry insiders, the number of full-time 
songwriters in Nashville has decreased by eighty percent since 2001. Id. at 78. 
 386. See Sen, supra note 373, at 241–42 (discussing the reasons why formal copyright filings 
can be misleading); see also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Blues Lives: Promise and Perils of Musical 
Copyright, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 573, 603 (2010) (noting that many blues musicians were 
bound by exploitative “race” recording contracts). 
 387. DiCola, supra note 371, at 343. 
 388. See Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An 
Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2010) (reporting results of an experimental study showing 
that creators of intellectual property “valu[e] their work more than twice as highly as potential 
buyers do”).  
 389. TSCHMUCK, supra note 351, at 54; Garofalo, supra note 349, at 328. 
 390. Garofalo, supra note 349, at 329. 
 391. Id. Around this time, the Great Depression drove consolidation in the European music 
industry. TSCHMUCK, supra note 351, at 72. 
 392. Garofalo, supra note 349, at 335. 
 393. Id. at 335–36. 
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solidifying partnerships with record companies.394 The willingness of 
local stations to experiment with new music and the emergence of 
independent labels set the stage for the explosion of rock ’n’ roll.395 
While the proliferation of “indie” labels initially fragmented the 
industry,396 the music industry soon experienced “merger mania.” In 
one high-profile merger, Warner-Reprise, Elektra-Asylum, and Atlantic 
combined to form Warner Communications.397 CBS vertically 
integrated to combine all stages of production and distribution, 
spanning recording, artistic development, marketing, and retail sales, 
and EMI acquired a similar group of holdings.398  
According to one observer, “[T]he development of the music 
industry from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s was characterized by a 
growing market and a simultaneous market concentration.”399 By the 
late 1970s, five international firms accounted for more than seventy 
percent of global recorded music sales.400 Starting in the 1980s, 
multinational entertainment companies came to dominate the music 
industry, driving global consolidation.401 The runaway success of 
Michael Jackson’s Thriller in the 1980s helped transition the big labels 
to a strategy of reaping “greater rewards from fewer artists.”402 
Additionally, the industry experienced a CD “boom” from 1984 to 
2000.403 Music companies began leveraging music into a variety of 
revenue streams spanning record sales, advertising, movie tie-ins, and 
internet streaming.404 Another wave of merger mania started in the 
1980s,405 including the acquisitions of large music companies by even 
larger multinational companies.406 For instance, in 1998, various 
combinations culminated in the creation of Universal Music Group, 
 
 394. Id. at 336. 
 395. Id. at 337 
 396. TSCHMUCK, supra note 351, at 104. 
 397. Garofalo, supra note 349, at 337. 
 398. Id. at 338. 
 399. TSCHMUCK, supra note 351, at 133. 
 400. Garofalo, supra note 349, at 339. 
 401. See id. at 342 (“Like all capitalist enterprises, the transnational music industry tends 
toward expansion and concentration.”). For a history of the contemporary popular music industry, 
see STEVE KNOPPER, APPETITE FOR SELF-DESTRUCTION: THE SPECTACULAR CRASH OF THE RECORD 
INDUSTRY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2009). 
 402. Garofalo, supra note 349, at 343; see also KNOPPER, supra note 401, at 10 (discussing the 
transformative impact of Michael Jackson’s Thriller). 
 403. KNOPPER, supra note 401, at 43. 
 404. Patrick Burkart, Loose Integration in the Popular Music Industry, 28 POPULAR MUSIC & 
SOC’Y 489, 492 (2005); Garofalo, supra note 349, at 343–44. 
 405. Garofalo, supra note 349, at 346. 
 406. Id.; see KNOPPER, supra note 401, at 47 (discussing Bertelsmann’s 1986 purchase of RCA 
records from General Electric). 
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which controlled MCA, Universal, Geffen, A&M, Motown, Island, 
Mercury, London, and Interscope.407 
More recently, several factors408—including widespread 
copyright infringement—have driven further consolidation in the music 
industry. Since Napster’s introduction in 1999, annual U.S. music 
spending, adjusted for inflation, has decreased by two-thirds.409 
Napster and subsequent file-sharing websites, such as Limewire, 
Kazaa, and Grokster, facilitated widespread piracy and continued to 
depress revenues.410 From a peak in 2000, when the major labels sold 
more than 785 million albums, revenues decreased significantly due to 
internet piracy and the shift from high-profit CDs to low-profit digital 
singles.411 From 2002 to 2007, the total music market decreased forty 
percent.412 Revenue pressure has motivated consolidation, and 
following 2004’s merger between Sony and BMG, a “Big Four” 
(Universal, Sony-BMG, EMI, and Warner Music) dominated the 
industry. Additionally, copyright infringement contributed to the most 
significant recent consolidating event in the music industry: EMI’s 
absorption by two competitors. Due partly to EMI’s decreasing revenues 
from piracy, in 2011, Universal Music Group announced that it would 
buy EMI’s recorded music arm, and Sony/ATV pledged to buy EMI’s 
music publishing business.413 
Additionally, record companies have consolidated to leverage 
larger copyright estates against downstream distributors like iTunes 
and Spotify. The introduction of Apple’s iPod in 2001 and iTunes in 
2003 ushered in a drastic change to the music business model based on 
internet distribution.414 While record companies briefly experimented 
 
 407. Garofalo, supra note 349, at 348. 
 408. Competitive pressures from other media, particularly video games and DVDs, and 
decreasing consumer spending helped motivate another wave of consolidation in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. Burkart, supra note 404, at 491. 
 409. DANA SCHERER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43984, MONEY FOR SOMETHING: MUSIC 
LICENSING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (2016).  
 410. Joshua R. Wueller, Mergers of Majors: Applying the Failing Firm Doctrine in the Recorded 
Music Industry, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 589, 596 (2013). 
 411. Steve Knopper, How the Universal-EMI Deal Will Change the Music Industry, ROLLING 
STONE (Nov. 23, 2011), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/how-the-universal-emi-
deal-will-change-the-music-industry-90781 [https://perma.cc/Q4LE-7CH7]. 
 412. BRIAN SOUTHALL, THE RISE & FALL OF EMI RECORDS 193 (2009). 
 413. See Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, EMI To Be Split Between Universal and Sony, FIN.  
TIMES (Nov. 11, 2011), https://www.ft.com/content/f5721134-0c86-11e1-88c6-00144feabdc0 
[https://perma.cc/GK8B-JYYZ] (detailing the finalized bid for EMI’s publishing business); 
Knopper, supra note 411 (noting that the EMI-Universal merger would leave only three major 
music labels); Wueller, supra note 410, at 597–604 (discussing the various stages of the EMI-
Universal merger). 
 414. See KNOPPER, supra note 401, at 178. 
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with their own proprietary music portals, they were not successful,415 
and they essentially outsourced digital music distribution to the likes 
of iTunes,416 Amazon,417 and Spotify. Such digital distributors have 
amassed significant leverage,418 thus weakening the major labels419 and 
effectuating a “dramatic shift in power from content owners to 
distributors.”420 In response, the major labels have leveraged their most 
important asset: their libraries of copyrighted songs and associated 
market power. The rise of digital distribution has helped fuel 
consolidation among the majors, which seek greater negotiating power 
with distributors like iTunes.421 Tellingly, industry actors cited the need 
to enhance leverage with Apple as one of the motivations behind EMI’s 
2011 acquisition by Universal and Sony/ATV.422 
In other ways, as well, copyright law has helped solidify the 
market power of music industry incumbents and block entry.423 As 
noted, in 1998, Congress enacted the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act, which extended copyright terms.424 While Disney and 
other movie studios lobbied for the Act,425 it also received support from 
the descendants of Tin Pan Alley composers, who stood to lose 
considerable revenues upon expiration of their parents’ and 
grandparents’ copyrights.426 Additionally, copyright law has explicitly 
erected barriers to entry to one kind of music distribution: online 
 
 415. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, YouTube, UGC, and Digital Music: Competing Business and 
Cultural Models in the Internet Age, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 431, 449–50 (2010). 
 416. Burkart, supra note 404, at 496. 
 417. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Copyright Without Creators, 9 REV. L. & ECON. 389, 392 (2013); 
Ryan Hibbert, What Is Indie Rock?, 28 POPULAR MUSIC & SOC’Y 55, 75 (2005). 
 418. See Holly Kruse, Local Identity and Independent Music Scenes, Online and Off, 33 
POPULAR MUSIC & SOC’Y 625, 635 (2010) (noting “many music listeners may be turning to 
gatekeepers, like iTunes’s, Amazon’s, or other online commercial behemoths’” suggestions for what 
music to buy based on their past purchases). 
 419. See Wueller, supra note 410, at 589 (“[N]early every aspect of the music industry has 
transitioned to the digital realm, which has largely eliminated artists’ reliance on the 
tangible . . . capabilities of [major record companies].”). 
 420. Rob Budden, Media: Dealing with Digital Darwinism, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2012), 
https://www.ft.com/content/295de284-1e01-11e2-8e1d-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/KHQ8-
SGE5]. 
 421. Press Release, Moody’s Investors Service, Music Industry Consolidation Should Help 
Major Labels Grow Their Digital Revenue (May 21, 2013), https://www.moodys.com/ 
research/Moodys-Music-industry-consolidation-should-help-major-labels-grow-their—PR_273725 
[https://perma.cc/5D87-GWKR]. 
 422. Budden, supra note 420. 
 423. It is also important to acknowledge areas where copyright has promoted entry by new 
distributors. For example, copyright law maintains a statutory mandatory licensing scheme that 
allows cable television providers access to copyrighted television content. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (2012). 
 424. Pub. L. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827 (1998). 
 425. See supra notes 333–336 and accompanying text. 
 426. Posner, supra note 111, at 145. 
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radio.427 While copyrighted musical compositions have long been subject 
to a general exclusive right of public performance, copyrighted sound 
recordings are not.428 Therefore, when a radio station plays a song, the 
composer receives a royalty, but the recording artist does not. The 
emergence of online radio threatened traditional radio broadcasters, 
which lobbied Congress to reform copyright law to impede the entry of 
online competitors. Their efforts resulted in the Digital Performance 
Right in Sound Recording Act of 1995 (“DPRA”), which establishes an 
exclusive right of public performance for digital transmission of sound 
recordings.429 In effect, this severely burdens prospective online radio 
providers by creating an additional public performance royalty they 
have to pay. According to Randal Picker, “[T]he DPRA looks like an 
unholy alliance between music creators and analog broadcasters to 
limit competition from digital broadcasters by creating substantial 
entry barriers for them, all with the corresponding consequence of 
insulating record-company market power.”430 Ultimately “[a]nalog 
radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in 
radio and diversity.”431 In this fashion, legislative reforms have helped 
copyright block entry and promote concentration in downstream music 
distribution. 
While copyright helps promote initial and upstream entry, it has 
also played a role in industry trends toward subsequent and 
downstream concentration. Upon EMI’s acquisition in 2011, Universal’s 
market share expanded from approximately twenty-seven percent of 
worldwide music sales to thirty-six percent, compared to Sony’s twenty-
three percent and Warner’s fifteen percent,432 and these “Big Three” 
accounted for eighty-eight percent of revenues in the U.S. music 
industry.433 According to the 2012 census, the top four firms in 
“integrated record production/distribution” accounted for 86.6 percent 
of all revenues,434 which reflects a high degree of concentration. Turning 
 
 427. See Picker, supra note 329, at 424 (noting that adopted policies “favor over-the-air radio”). 
 428. See id. at 459 (citing RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940)); see also 
PALLANTE, supra note 350, at 18 (defining the distinction between musical works and sound 
recordings). 
 429. Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995). 
 430. Picker, supra note 329, at 458–59. 
 431. Id. at 461; see also PALLANTE, supra note 350, at 88 (“[C]opyright owners and digital 
streaming services together urge that current law gives terrestrial radio unwarranted competitive 
advantage over new, innovative entrants.”). 
 432. Knopper, supra note 411. 
 433. Ed Christman, Universal Music Still Top Dog in 2012, BILLBOARDBIZ (Jan. 3, 2013), 
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/1510504/universal-music-still-market-top-dog-in-2012 
[https://perma.cc/K32R-8XV5]. 
 434. Establishment & Firm Size: Concentration by Largest Firms for the U.S.: 2012 , U.S. 
CENSUS, AM. FACTFINDER (Jan. 8, 2016), https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/ 
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to music publishing, the three major players—Sony ATV Music 
Publishing, Warner/Chappell Music, and Universal Music Publishing 
Group—control sixty percent of the market.435 The downstream music 
industry appears to be significantly concentrated. 
3. Book Publishing 
As with other IP-intensive industries, copyright has contributed 
to both initial and upstream entry as well as subsequent and 
downstream consolidation in the publishing industry. Consistent with 
other creative industries, the publishing industry features a value chain 
spanning upstream creators (such as authors who write new books) and 
downstream development, marketing, and distribution. Regarding 
upstream entry, copyright provides incentives for authors to generate 
new expressive works and enter the publishing market.436 Based on a 
classic economic conception of copyright, exclusive rights ensure that 
“authors find it intellectually and financially profitable to write.”437 
William Landes and Richard Posner, in their influential account of 
copyright, also make the straightforward assertion that copyright 
“provid[es] incentives to create the work in the first place.”438 Of course, 
it remains the case that authors derive many nonpecuniary benefits 
from writing that also encourage creation, such as expressive 
satisfaction and prestige.439 As in other areas, the argument of this 
Article is not that copyright provides the exclusive incentive to enter a 
market but that it provides an important marginal incentive to do so. 
While some individuals would still produce books in the absence of 
copyright, exclusive rights further stimulate such upstream creation.440 
In similar fashion, copyright is also essential to the initial 
formation and entry of publishing firms. Copyright provides an 
incentive not only for authors to write but also for publishers to 
 
productview.xhtml [https://perma.cc/4BUA-8BVB]. This category corresponds to NAICS industry 
code 512220. Id. 
 435. PALLANTE, supra note 350, at 19. 
 436. Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: 
A Reply to Professor Breyer, 21 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 1, 2 (1971). 
 437. Id. at 4. 
 438. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989). 
 439. See id. at 331 (noting benefits such as self-promotion, the reinforcement of prestige, and 
recognition). 
 440. It bears noting, however, that the absence of exclusive rights may actually increase 
expressive creation where those creations draw from other texts (which otherwise would be 
copyrighted). Id. at 332. 
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publish.441 Historically, publishers led the fight for laws establishing 
exclusive rights on expressive works.442 Early copyright statutes in 
Venice and France granted exclusive rights to printers, not authors.443 
In modern times, copyright facilitates entry by publishers by enabling 
a vertically disintegrated value chain in which publishers provide high-
level editing and intellectual property management without having to 
own costly presses and actually print books.444  
Interestingly, copyright—or the perception of copyright—played 
an important role in the early success of Random House, a venerable 
publishing firm that subsequently evolved into industry powerhouse 
Penguin Random House. Random House was founded in 1925, and 
while it initially reprinted classic works of literature, it soon broadened 
its publishing activities.445 In the 1930s, Random House achieved 
international notoriety for successfully defending the U.S. publication 
of James Joyce’s Ulysses in court.446 Ulysses was critical to Random 
House’s early success,447 but the U.S. copyright status of this English-
language foreign text was unclear at the time.448 Bennet Cerf, the head 
of Random House, clearly recognized the importance of exclusive rights. 
In the wake of widespread piracy of prior publications of Ulysses, Cerf 
emphasized “the importance of having as much copyrighted material in 
our edition as is humanly possible, in order to combat possible pirated 
editions which will undoubtedly come along to vex us all.”449 Upon first 
publication, Cerf deposited two copies with the Register of Copyrights 
and submitted an affidavit of U.S. manufacture, and a claim of 
copyright was registered for the Random House edition of Ulysses.450 
Although technically lacking copyright protection because of 
 
 441. Tyerman, supra note 436, at 2; see also Landes & Posner, supra 438, at 328 (noting that 
in the absence of copyright, “the author and publisher will not be able to recover their costs of 
creating the work”). 
 442. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 292 (1970). 
 443. Id. 
 444. Cf. Barnett, supra note 32. My thanks to Justin Hughes for this observation. 
 445. About Us, PENGUIN RANDOM HOUSE, http://www.penguinrandomhouse.biz/about/history 
(last visited April 2, 2019) [https://perma.cc/FBW3-WWJX]. 
 446. Id. 
 447. ROBERT L. BERNSTEIN, SPEAKING FREELY: MY LIFE IN PUBLISHING AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
52–53 (2016). 
 448. See Robert Spoo, Note, Copyright Protectionism and Its Discontents: The Case of James 
Joyce’s Ulysses in America, 108 YALE L.J. 633, 656 (1998) (highlighting potential challenges to the 
copyright status of Ulysses, indicating a legal case could be made that the work exists in the public 
domain). 
 449. Letter from Bennett Cerf to Paul Leon (Oct. 20, 1933), in THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
V. ONE BOOK ENTITLED “ULYSSES” BY JAMES JOYCE: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY — A 50-YEAR 
RETROSPECTIVE 278–79 (Michael Moscato & Leslie LeBlanc eds., 1984).  
 450. Spoo, supra note 448, at 654. 
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noncompliance with certain formalities,451 Random House’s U.S. edition 
of Ulysses enjoyed a “courtesy copyright” based on fear of litigation, 
industry norms, and appeal to public morals.452 This exclusivity was 
crucial to the early success of an important new entrant in the 
publishing industry. 
While copyright promotes upstream entry by authors and initial 
entry by publishing firms, it has also played a role in subsequent, 
downstream consolidation. Of course, copyright is just one of many 
forces that have shaped the book publishing industry, which is highly 
complex and dynamic. The industry is comprised of several segments, 
and this Section focuses on “trade books,” which are books intended for 
a general audience.453 This segment includes works of both fiction (e.g., 
romance, thrillers, and children’s books) and nonfiction (e.g., history 
and cookbooks) and is distinguished from other segments such as 
academic, professional, technical, and reference books.454 Through a 
long history of mergers and acquisitions, trade book publishing is now 
dominated by a Big Five: Penguin Random House, HarperCollins, 
Simon & Schuster, Hachette, and Macmillan.  
Mergers and acquisitions dominate the history of book 
publishing.455 HarperCollins draws its origins from the 1817 founding 
of J. and J. Harper, which eventually became Harper & Brothers and 
then Harper & Row.456 Hachette’s American roots begin with the 
founding of Little, Brown and Company in 1837.457 Following the Civil 
War, a generalized expansion in publishing led to glutted markets and 
a series of mergers.458 Established in the 1920s, Penguin, a leading 
British publishing house, came to acquire multiple imprints from 
formerly independent publishers, such as Viking, Putnam, and 
 
 451. Id. at 636. 
 452. See id. at 656–59 (discussing the history of “courtesy copyrights” and its application to 
Ulysses). 
 453. Valerie Peterson, What are Trade Books in Publishing?, BALANCE CAREERS (Feb. 23, 
2017), https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-trade-publishing-2800076 [https://perma.cc/A83S-
BMWQ]; see also Breyer, supra note 442, at 293 (“Tradebooks include the novels and popular 
nonfiction that ordinarily spring to mind when copyright is discussed.”). 
 454. Peterson, supra note 453. 
 455. For an overview of the early history of publishing in the United States, see Elizabeth 
Long, The Cultural Meaning of Concentration in Publishing, 1 BOOK RES. Q. 3, 6 (1985) 
(“[H]istorically informed discussions of the industry reveal that publishing has always been a 
commercial as well as literary endeavor . . . .”). 
 456. Valerie Peterson, The Big 5 Trade Book Publishers, BALANCE CAREERS (Dec. 31, 2018), 
https://www.thebalancecareers.com/the-big-five-trade-book-publishers-2800047 [https://perma.cc/ 
WG3X-PE2Q]. 
 457. Id. 
 458. Long, supra note 455, at 6. 
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Dutton.459 Simon and Schuster was founded in 1924, and it has been 
variously owned by Marshall Field, Gulf + Western, Viacom, and CBS 
Corporation.460 By 1930, “a few large publishing companies had begun 
to dominate the market to a limited degree.”461 By 1950, one observer 
noted that “publication of books in this country is concentrated in a 
relatively few houses.”462 
In the 1960s, with the emergence of publishing as a “big 
business,” mergers abounded. In short succession, Random House 
bought Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.; the Crowell-Collier Publishing Company 
acquired the Macmillan Company; and Henry Holt & Co., Rinehart & 
Co., and the John C. Winston Company merged.463 In 1968, Time 
Warner acquired Little, Brown and Company, and this combination 
was eventually absorbed by Hachette Book Group.464 Between 1965 and 
1985, several independently owned mainstream trade publishers went 
public, merged with other publishers, or were acquired by large 
corporate conglomerates.465 Consolidation continued in subsequent 
decades, and between November 1985 and November 1986 alone, there 
were fifty-seven major publishing acquisitions.466 In 1987, News Corp. 
acquired Harper & Row, and in 1990, it acquired William Collins & 
Sons to form HarperCollins.467 In the 2000s, Hachette, which is owned 
by a French media conglomerate, expanded rapidly into English-
language books, buying Hodder Headline and Warner Books.468 From 
the early 1960s, concentration in the book publishing industry 
increased so that by 2006, the six largest U.S. trade book publishers 
accounted for ninety percent of total sales.469 
Toward the latter end of the twentieth century, consolidation 
among book publishers was in part a response to downstream 
 
 459. Peter Osnos, A New Era for Books: The Random House-Penguin Merger Is Just the Start, 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 8, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/11/a-new-era-for-
books-the-random-house-penguin-merger-is-just-the-start/264604 [https://perma.cc/VTX4-X9JL]. 
 460. Peterson, supra note 456. 
 461. Long, supra note 455, at 6. 
 462. CHARLES F. BOUND, A BANKER LOOKS AT BOOK PUBLISHING 8 (1950). 
 463. Philip Benjamin, Publishers of Books Are Turning to Mergers, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1960, 
at F1. 
 464. Company History, HACHETTE BOOK GROUP, https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/ 
company-history (last visited Feb. 28, 2019) [https://perma.cc/E3LK-5YH8].  
 465. Long, supra note 455, at 4. 
 466. Robert E. Baensch, Consolidation in Publishing and Allied Industries, BOOK RES. Q., 
Winter 1988–89, at 7. 
 467. Operating Companies: Harper Collins Publishers, NEWS CORP, https://newscorp.com/ 
business/harper-collins/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2019) [https://perma.cc/RA6E-HCUN]. 
 468. Ben Hall, Books: Consolidation Is the Big Story, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2009), 
https://www.ft.com/content/79c84068-957c-11de-90e0-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/2A6N-
WYE8]. 
 469. A. ARIS & J. BUGHIN, MANAGING MEDIA COMPANIES 84 tbl.5.1 (2009). 
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consolidation in book distribution. Historically, thousands of 
independent, local bookstores dominated book distribution, where they 
tailored their inventories to particular tastes.470 However, even by the 
late 1940s, book distribution was relatively concentrated.471 Over 
several decades, book distribution became increasingly consolidated in 
chains such as B. Dalton and Waldenbooks,472 and by the late 1980s, 
the ten largest bookstore chains accounted for fifty-seven percent of 
total annual retail sales. Eventually, local and midsize bookstores were 
supplanted by national superstores like Barnes & Noble and Borders,473 
which eventually merged with and acquired each other.474 Starting in 
the mid-1990s, Amazon created a new online supply chain and 
substantially discounted books,475 thus gaining a tremendous 
competitive advantage. Consolidation among physical booksellers thus 
spurred a round of consolidation among publishers in the 1990s.476 
The emergence of e-books has further motivated coordination 
and concentration among publishers, who seek to leverage their 
portfolios of copyrighted works to enhance bargaining power against 
downstream digital distributors, particularly Amazon. In 2007, Amazon 
introduced a sea change in book distribution by introducing the Kindle, 
which initiated the rise of e-books.477 Amazon conscientiously undercut 
prevailing prices for physical books, thus building demand for e-books 
and relying on Kindle sales for profits.478 By 2009, Amazon commanded 
a ninety percent market share in e-books and a similarly dominant 
position in e-book readers.479 That same year, Arnaud Nourry, head of 
Hachette (then the number two publisher) called consolidation among 
publishers the best way to “stand up” to Amazon, Google, and other 
dominant retailers.480 Notably, to counter the power of downstream 
 
 470. Osnos, supra note 459. 
 471. Long, supra note 455, at 7. Unlike later eras, at this time department stores played a 
prominent role in book distribution. Id.  
 472. Id. at 4. 
 473. Osnos, supra note 459. 
 474. Baensch, supra note 466, at 10 (describing Barnes & Noble’s 1987 acquisition of B. Dalton 
Booksellers). 
 475. Osnos, supra note 459. 
 476. Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 766 (2017). 
 477. Id. at 757.  
 478. Waller & Sag, supra note 46, at 2238. 
 479. United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 649, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 791 F.3d 
290 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 480. Hall, supra note 468; see Jack Shafer, Mergers Alone Won’t Save Book Industry, REUTERS 
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industry [https://perma.cc/VYY8-55WM]. Four of the Big Five (HarperCollins, Simon & Schuster, 
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distributors, publishers have sought to leverage their most valuable 
asset: their portfolios of copyrighted works. In response to Amazon’s 
price cuts on e-books, five major publishers, along with Apple, agreed 
to adopt a system where publishers would establish the retail price of 
e-books and provide Apple with a thirty percent commission for each e-
book sold.481 The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) ultimately brought 
suit; the five publishers signed consent decrees barring them from 
restricting e-book retailers’ ability to set prices, and Apple was found 
liable under Section 1 of the Sherman Act for unreasonably restraining 
trade.482 In addition to colluding, publishers have also sought to 
increase their leverage against Amazon through mergers and 
acquisitions to amass even larger portfolios of copyrighted works.483 In 
2013, Penguin merged with Random House, producing a combined 
group that controls approximately twenty-five percent of the English-
language publishing market.484 Commentators observed that the 
merger provided the combination with “unmatched leverage against 
Amazon.com.”485 Furthermore, it may spur additional mergers.486 
The present publishing landscape is comprised of a few 
conglomerates spanning numerous divisions, imprints, and publishing 
lines.487 For instance, the new Penguin Random House conglomerate 
encompasses Anchor, Ballantine, Crown, Doubleday, Dutton, Knopf, 
Pantheon, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, Viking, Jonathan Cape, Fawcett, 
Grosset & Dunlap, and Jeremy P. Tarcher.488 Many of these formerly 
independent firms are now mere “imprints” at the large publishing 
house used to brand different lines of books. Thus, while copyright may 
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 486. Id. At the time, there was speculation that News Corp., which owns HarperCollins, would 
acquire Simon & Schuster, which was owned by CBS. Budden, supra note 420. 
 487. See The Big Five US Trade Book Publishers, ALMOSSAWI (June 20, 2016), 
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have promoted the initial entry of publishing houses, subsequent 
mergers and acquisitions have led to significant consolidation. 
Following the Penguin-Random House merger, the remaining four 
publishers scrambled to increase in size. Commentators observe that 
the book publishing industry features considerable concentration, 
driven in substantial part by mergers and acquisitions.489  
In addition to protecting and facilitating the transfer of assets 
that incumbents seek to amass in mergers and acquisitions, copyright 
also contributes to consolidation by erecting formidable barriers to 
entry against potential new publishers. As Stephen Breyer noted in an 
influential article,  
Copyright may also injure the public by allowing publishers selling different books to 
restrict competition within the industry. . . . [T]he power to accumulate these exclusive 
licenses to publish may . . . inhibit such competition. This power may, for example, allow 
a few publishers to build “stables” of popular writers. . . . If, as a result, new entry becomes 
difficult, well-established publishers may find that they have obtained the power to raise 
their prices and to resist authors’ demand for higher royalties.490  
Shifting away from trade books, Breyer’s historical study suggests that 
the high profits in the college text publishing sector indicate a possible 
“entry barrier” problem.491 Ultimately, copyright is one of several 
factors contributing to concentration in book publishing, where, in 
2012, the four largest players accounted for 40.6 percent of all 
revenues.492  
C. Caveats and Qualifications 
Although varied in their unique characteristics, the six IP-
intensive industries profiled here all exhibit a similar pattern in the 
effects of patents and copyrights on industry structure. It is of course 
important to emphasize the idiosyncratic nature of these disparate 
fields and the importance of both IP and non-IP factors in shaping 
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industry structure. For example, in biopharmaceuticals, declining 
productivity and patent expirations have helped drive concentration. In 
the agricultural biotechnology, seed, and agrochemical industry, 
current consolidation in many ways reflects the concentrated nature of 
the chemicals industry that absorbed it. The software industry has 
responded to a variety of technological shocks—from the unbundling of 
software from hardware to the development of the personal computer 
to the emergence of the internet—with both fragmentation and 
consolidation. Unique legal developments, such as judicial rulings 
separating film exhibition from production and distribution and 
Reagan-era deregulation, have significantly impacted the structure of 
the film industry. The music and book publishing industries have 
consolidated in significant (though not exclusive) part in response to the 
power of internet-based distribution and copyright infringement. The 
diversity of evolutionary processes among these industries, however, 
should not elide a striking commonality: patents and copyrights have 
played important roles in early, upstream entry and subsequent, 
downstream concentration. 
As noted above, the goal of this Article is to reveal a general 
pattern of how intellectual property rights help shape industry 
structure, but of course exceptions to this pattern exist. For example, in 
the agricultural biotechnology and film industries, patents promoted 
the entry of new firms, which then rather quickly sought to wield 
intellectual property rights against other potential new entrants.493 In 
short, exclusive rights can deter entry and shore up concentration even 
in very young industries. Additionally, as explored more thoroughly in 
the next Part, exclusive rights play multiple roles in shaping industry 
structure, from directly enabling entry or exclusion to more subtly 
influencing firm behavior in ways that promote fragmentation or 
concentration.494  
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge the structural 
heterogeneity and dynamism of each of these fields. This Article has 
emphasized the contribution of intellectual property rights to the entry 
of small upstream entities and the consolidation of large downstream 
incumbents, but entities of all sizes operate throughout the value chain. 
Indeed, the characterization of the software industry as comprised of 
“boulders, pebbles, and sand”495 is an apt description for most 
innovative industries. In the biopharmaceutical industry, independent 
contract research firms conduct clinical trials and perform other 
 
 493. See supra Sections II.A.2, II.B.1.  
 494. See infra Section III.C. 
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functions related to downstream drug development.496 Furthermore, 
“indie” film studios, record labels,497 and publishers498 all contribute to 
the downstream marketing and distribution of movies, music, and 
books. Additionally, it is important to note that the large corporations 
that dominate IP commercialization can exhibit significant internal 
heterogeneity. Consolidated industries may not be as “consolidated” as 
initially perceived.499 Within a single company, multiple sources of 
creativity and autonomous decision points can approximate an 
innovation ecosystem comprised of formally separate entities. For 
instance, the global media conglomerates that dominate movie 
production and distribution are far-flung empires comprised of dozens 
of different subsidiaries, units, and divisions. Several decades ago in the 
music industry, large record labels typically had one critical artists and 
repertoire (“A&R”) executive, such as Mitch Miller at CBS, who made 
enterprise-defining decisions over which artists to sign and what 
repertoire to produce.500 However, recent consolidation has also created 
more internal plurality, with many more decision nodes within global 
music companies.501 For instance, in the 1990s, Polygram alone had 
over fifty local subsidiaries, many of them with separate A&R divisions 
for different genres.502 Ultimately, while downstream IP 
commercialization remains quite concentrated, it is important to 
acknowledge internal heterogeneity within large industry players.  
 III. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN SHAPING INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
These empirical accounts shed new light on the long-standing 
debate over the role of intellectual property rights in shaping industry 
structure. Recall that scholars have long argued that exclusive rights 
create barriers to entry and exacerbate concentration, while more 
recent scholarship emphasizes that patents and copyrights promote 
company formation, market entry, and industry fragmentation.503 
Drawing on the forgoing accounts, this Part argues that exclusive rights 
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contribute to both fragmentation and concentration in different 
contexts. In particular, it adds the illuminating (and overlapping) 
considerations of time and the value chain. Regarding time, it argues 
that patents and copyrights facilitate the initial entry of new firms but 
that over time industry incumbents often absorb those entrants and use 
exclusive rights to inhibit entry, thus reconcentrating the field. 
Regarding the value chain, it argues that exclusive rights most 
prominently promote entry in upstream fields engaged in initial 
creation while tending to deter entry and shore up concentration toward 
the downstream end of the value chain focused on commercialization. 
Furthermore, it contends that patents and copyrights play multiple 
roles in shaping industry structure, from causal agents that directly 
impact structure to instruments that more subtly motivate and 
facilitate firm behavior leading to fragmentation or concentration.  
A. Time: Initial Entry, Subsequent Consolidation 
Early on, patents and copyrights facilitate initial company 
formation and industry entry, but incumbents later leverage large 
intellectual property estates to acquire competitors (in part for their 
patent and copyright portfolios), and the accumulation of exclusive 
rights in an industry over time raises barriers to entry. As indicated 
above, this dynamic is evident in the biopharmaceutical industry.504 
Patents are essential to the formation of new biotechnology firms and 
pharmaceutical companies due to the high cost and uncertainty of 
research and development.505 Following the initial entry of 
biotechnology firms, many global pharmaceutical companies, 
leveraging vast patent portfolios, vertically integrated and acquired 
such firms,506 thus increasing industry consolidation.507 Furthermore, 
global pharmaceutical companies have also acquired numerous 
formerly independent pharmaceutical companies that were once new 
entrants.508 Notably, the “patent cliff” and the desire to acquire 
profitable patented assets significantly motivated such mergers and 
acquisitions.509 In this fashion, patents contribute to both initial entry 
and subsequent consolidation. 
 
504. See supra Section II.A.1. 
 505. See Cockburn, supra note 89, at 15.  
 506. See Lee, supra note 39, at 1455–66 (arguing that vertical integration is prevalent in 
patent-intensive industries like the biopharmaceutical industry). 
 507. In this fashion, patents seem to support natural business cycles of early fragmentation 
and later consolidation. Cf. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 95, at 6 (noting, in 1991, the 
inevitable consolidation of dedicated biotechnology companies). 
 508. See supra notes 123–138 and accompanying text. 
 509. See supra Section II.A. 
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A similar dynamic prevails in the agricultural biotechnology, 
seed, and agrochemical industry. As with medical biotechnology, 
patents were critical to the formation of agricultural biotechnology 
companies in the 1980s.510 Additionally, changes in patent law and the 
lure of plant patents promoted the initial entry of chemical companies 
into the agricultural biotechnology industry.511 Once large chemical 
conglomerates like Monsanto entered the agricultural field, they 
quickly acquired large numbers of small firms and cultivated 
significant intellectual property portfolios, thus shoring up barriers to 
entry for new entities.512 The Big Six (now Big Four) agrochemical 
companies cross-licensed patents among each other and benefited from 
a broad patent thicket that inhibited new entry.513 In some ways, these 
developments suggest the emergence of an industrial anticommons514 
over time that stymied both product development and new firm entry. 
In the early days of the agricultural biotechnology industry, the relative 
dearth of patents limited their ability to block new entry; however, as 
the industry matured and patents proliferated, their entry-denying 
effects increased. 
The phenomenon of exclusive rights contributing to initial entry 
and subsequent consolidation also applies to segments of the software 
industry. While the software industry as a whole is more than a half-
century old, technological shifts have continuously created new 
segments, such as operating systems for personal computers, web 
browsers, security, and cloud computing. A familiar pattern is for many 
new entrants to participate early in a segment, which over time 
coalesces around a small number of players. Intellectual property rights 
contribute to both processes. Although the early software industry 
experienced robust growth and entry prior to widespread patenting, 
scholars like Ronald Mann, focusing on later periods, have argued that 
patents are critical to software startups, thus facilitating market entry 
and industry fragmentation.515 In this context, however, it may be 
necessary to modify the “exclusive rights promote initial entry” thesis. 
As Mann’s empirical work reveals, patents are most relevant not for the 
earliest-stage startups but for later-stage startups nearing 
commercialization.516 Here, patents may not motivate the initial entry 
 
 510. See supra notes 97, 154–155. 
 511. See supra notes 162–190 and accompanying text. 
 512. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 513. Howard, supra note 156, at 2492; Kalaitzandonakes et al., supra note 157, at 20. 
 514. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698–701 (1998). 
 515. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 14, at 967–68. 
 516. Id. at 985. 
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of startups so much as sustain those startups that survive to 
commercialization. Tellingly, however, mature segments of the 
software industry feature a small number of firms with greater rates of 
patenting.517 Large patent portfolios provide defensive leverage and 
facilitate cross-licensing, advantages that new entrants cannot afford. 
Furthermore, patents on technical standards tend to lock in incumbents 
and lock out competing platforms. For a variety of reasons, most 
segments are dominated by a small number of incumbents that have 
acquired many former new entrants. 
Shifting to a different set of industries, intellectual property 
rights have also contributed to initial entry and subsequent 
consolidation in creative fields. Ironically, patents covering motion 
picture and sound recording technologies were critical to the entry of 
firms that formed the early film and music industries.518 Once there, 
these firms utilized patents to restrict entry by potential competitors. 
For example, Edison’s MPPC asserted exclusive rights against potential 
new entrants in the film industry,519 and several large players in the 
early music recording industry pooled their patents to maintain an 
oligopoly.520 Copyrights were essential to the entry and viability of new 
publishing houses,521 and a similar narrative applies to new film studios 
and record labels. 
Over time, the drive to exploit and aggregate copyrights has 
contributed to industry concentration in copyright-intensive fields. 
Movie studios, recording companies, and major publishers (many of 
which are parts of the same international conglomerates) amass huge 
copyright estates in films, scripts, musical compositions, sound 
recordings, and books. The proprietary nature of vast libraries of 
valuable content raises entry costs for potential new distributors. 
Additionally, the desire to shore up revenues in light of massive piracy 
has motivated consolidation in the music industry. In the music and 
publishing industries, major players have consolidated to leverage 
larger copyright estates against downstream digital distributors like 
iTunes and Amazon. While copyright is not driving such consolidation 
per se, it helps facilitate corporate strategies of stockpiling proprietary 
content to enhance competitive position. The film and music industries 
have coordinated to reform copyright law to extend exclusive rights, 
 
 517. Allison et al., supra note 193, at 1606. 
 518. See supra notes 262–268, 361–363 and accompanying text. 
 519. Edidin, supra note 262. 
 520. Garofalo, supra note 349, at 325; see also TSCHMUCK, supra note 351, at 14. 
 521. See supra notes 441–452 and accompanying text. 
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which further raises barriers to entry and promotes industry 
consolidation.  
B. Value Chain: Upstream Fragmentation, Downstream Concentration 
The value chain offers another axis on which to differentiate the 
effects of intellectual property rights on industry structure. This Article 
argues that patents and copyrights most prominently promote entry 
toward the upstream end of the value chain focused on initially creating 
an intellectual asset, such as a biologic drug or a movie. However, 
patents and copyrights have a greater tendency to block entry toward 
the downstream end of the value chain focused on commercialization, 
marketing, and distribution. While there is some overlap between this 
phenomenon and the dynamic of initial entry/subsequent concentration 
described above, they are analytically distinct. In short, exclusive rights 
contribute to upstream fragmentation and downstream concentration.  
The upstream/downstream distinction is evident in the role of 
patents in medical and agricultural biotechnology. Patents are critical 
for the entry of new, upstream biotech firms developing biologic drugs 
or drug precursors.522 Such firms, however, typically lack the size, 
resources, and expertise to conduct downstream clinical trials, 
marketing, and distribution.523 Such capabilities fall within the realm 
of large pharmaceutical firms, which amass significant patent portfolios 
in part to mitigate risk and subsidize numerous failures on the way to 
commercializing a few blockbuster drugs.524 These size efficiencies, 
undergirded by large patent portfolios, serve as a significant barrier to 
entry for potential competitors in the downstream commercialization of 
drugs. Patents are thus critical for both the entry of new upstream firms 
and the exclusion of potential downstream competitors. The fact that 
downstream pharmaceutical firms are increasingly vertically 
integrating with upstream biotech firms only corroborates this thesis, 
as large patent estates (and the revenues that they generate) are crucial 
to such consolidation. An analogous dynamic obtains in the agricultural 
biotechnology, seed, and agrochemical industry. There as well, patents 
facilitate the entry of upstream agricultural biotech firms, which rely 
on exclusive rights for startup formation and to attract capital.525 
However, patents are also critical to consolidation in downstream 
commercialization among the Big Four, which cross-license transgenic 
 
 522. Cockburn, supra note 89, at 15. 
 523. See supra Section II.A. 
 524. Id. 
 525. SEED GIANTS, supra note 14, at 5; Wright & Pardey, supra note 155, at 20. 
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gene patents among themselves and benefit from a broad patent thicket 
that excludes potential competitors.526 
Patents also promote upstream entry and downstream 
concentration in the software industry. Patents are important for some 
software startups as they transition toward commercialization, thus 
enhancing fragmentation toward the upstream end of the value chain 
focused on writing code.527 However, downstream development, 
marketing, and distribution are highly capital-intensive activities 
better suited for large firms. These “established software firms are 
increasingly relying on software patents to . . . prevent competitors 
from entering or competing in a market segment.”528 Thus, downstream 
commercialization of software tends to be dominated by patent-
intensive incumbents like Microsoft. Verticality influences how 
intellectual property rights impact industry structure in a different way 
as well. The software industry features relatively high concentration in 
certain “backbone” products, such as operating systems, which leverage 
standardization and network effects. But it features greater 
fragmentation in ancillary products, such as applications, that run on 
such backbones.529 For instance, while Microsoft Windows occupies a 
dominant position in the operating system market, numerous 
companies produce applications that run on that platform.530 
Intellectual property rights controlling industry standards thus 
promote concentration at the platform level531 and can facilitate the 
participation of numerous application-level firms. 
Turning to traditional content industries, copyrights also 
contribute to both upstream entry and downstream concentration. 
Unlike the historic studio system of “Old Hollywood,” the contemporary 
movie industry is vertically disintegrated toward the upstream end of 
the value chain focused on movie production. There, ad hoc assemblages 
of independent producers, directors, and talent, ultimately bound by 
copyrights and contracts, engage in one-off “spot production” to produce 
films.532 Scripts (protected by copyright) facilitate entry by a wide range 
of independent creators and serve as the kernels around which 
 
 526. Howard, supra note 156, at 2492; Kalaitzandonakes et al., supra note 157, at 20. 
 527. Mann, supra note 14, at 967–68. 
 528. SLAUGHTER, supra note 219, at 73. 
 529. Merges, supra note 256, at 6–8. 
 530. Id. 
 531. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1901–02 (2002) (“Because one or more members of the [standard-setting 
organization] likely owns a patent covering the standard, that company will effectively control the 
standard; its patent gives it the right to enjoin anyone else from using the standard.”). 
 532. CAVES, supra note 268, at 92; cf. HESMONDHALGH, supra note 269, at 22 (noting the 
prevalance of ad hoc production by “independents” in cultural industries). 
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numerous entities organize to produce motion pictures. However, 
downstream studios wielding significant size and infrastructure 
grounded in vast copyright portfolios provide financing, marketing, and 
distribution.533 The size, infrastructure, and intellectual property 
estates of these large downstream distributors shore up barriers to 
entry, thus promoting concentration. While new entrants in digital 
distribution have increased both the number of players and sources of 
content, the copyright-protected libraries of the major studios still raise 
costs of entry.  
Copyrights also help drive upstream entry and downstream 
concentration in the music and book publishing industries. As discussed 
above, the low cost, low threshold for protection, and absence of a 
registration requirement render obtaining a copyright extremely easy, 
which reduces barriers to entry for independent songwriters, recording 
artists, and authors.534 Such entry promotes fragmentation in the 
upstream production of creative content. Perhaps the exemplar of 
upstream fragmentation arises in the book publishing industry, where 
the ease of obtaining copyright protection and the low cost of internet 
distribution have facilitated self-publication by numerous independent 
authors.535 For the vast majority of commercially valuable creative 
content, however, development, marketing, and distribution are 
capital-intensive processes handled by large corporate entities. These 
downstream incumbents leverage (and continually seek to expand) vast 
copyright portfolios, thus contributing to industry consolidation. In the 
music industry, for example, major companies have merged with and 
acquired each other to expand copyright portfolios and market power to 
counter decreased IP-related revenues from piracy.536 In book 
publishing, major players have responded to the downstream leverage 
of Amazon with mergers and acquisitions, thus shoring up their market 
power by amassing ever-larger copyright estates.537 In sum, intellectual 
property rights play important roles in upstream fragmentation and 
downstream concentration. 
 
 533. Schatz, supra note 268, at 16. 
 534. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text. 
 535. See Kachka, supra note 488 (noting rise of self-publishing amidst industry consolidation); 
see also Ciabattari, supra note 484 (same). 
 536. See supra notes 408–413 and accompanying text. 
 537. See supra notes 477–485 and accompanying text. 
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C. Beyond Causation: The Multiples Roles of Intellectual Property 
Rights in Shaping Industry Structure 
In addition to showing how exclusive rights contribute to both 
fragmentation and concentration, this Article also reveals the multiple 
roles that intellectual property rights play in shaping industry 
structure. Prevailing theoretical debates538 address the role of exclusive 
rights as direct causes of fragmentation or concentration. And as these 
empirical profiles have shown, patents and copyrights can directly 
impact industry structure. For instance, patents are important to the 
viability of mature startups in the software industry,539 and they create 
formidable barriers to entry when asserted by incumbents in the 
agricultural biotechnology, seed, and agrochemical industry.540 
However, one of this Article’s contributions is to reveal a host of 
subtle, indirect ways that patents and copyrights contribute to industry 
structure beyond proximately causing fragmentation or concentration. 
For example, declining scientific productivity in the biopharmaceutical 
industry has led incumbents to acquire other firms for their patented 
assets.541 In such a scenario, it is not quite precise to characterize 
patents as a “cause” of industry concentration, though the fact that a 
firm’s innovative assets are patented is important to its value as an 
acquisition target. In many cases, the mere status of patents and 
copyrights as valuable assets that firms seek to accumulate contributes 
to concentration, particularly in mature, downstream industry 
segments. For instance, the drive to acquire patented and copyrighted 
technological and expressive works has helped motivate numerous 
mergers and acquisitions in fields as diverse as biopharmaceuticals, 
agricultural biotechnology, and film production and distribution, and 
 
 538. See supra Part I.  
 539. See supra Section II.A.3.  
 540. See supra Section II.A.2. In making these causal claims, this Article focuses on the 
primary effects of patents and copyrights in the current business and economic landscape. 
However, one way to investigate causation is to posit a counterfactual world without patents and 
copyrights and consider how industry structure would differ from the status quo. This Article 
acknowledges that eliminating exclusive rights could give rise to secondary effects with very 
different implications for industry structure. For example, consistent with this Article’s argument, 
the elimination of patents and copyrights could lead to significant entry of new drug distributors 
(akin to generic entry) and movie distributors given that these entrants could appropriate 
innovative creations for little to no cost. But it is also possible that the absence of patents and 
copyrights could lead to even more concentrated industries. For instance, in the absence of 
exclusive rights, innovative biopharmaceutical and movie companies could instead pursue trade 
secrecy, vertical integration, and tight controls on drug distribution and movie exhibition to 
prevent uncompensated appropriation. The infrastructure and resources needed to keep nonrival 
assets away from potential free riders might necessitate even larger incumbents and result in even 
more concentrated industries. 
 541. See supra Section II.A.1.  
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this in turn increases industry concentration. Furthermore, beyond 
motivating merger and acquisition activity, the accumulation of large 
numbers of patents and copyrights mitigates risk and enhances 
freedom to operate for incumbents, thereby providing them with a 
comparative advantage relative to potential new entrants. For example, 
large libraries of copyrighted films owned by Disney and Warner Bros. 
generate income for those companies and create barriers to entry for 
traditional and streaming distributors. In such a scenario, it is not clear 
that exclusive rights are the “cause” of concentration in a direct sense, 
but they do play a supporting role in such concentration. Finally, 
further illustrating the myriad effects of exclusive rights on industry 
structure, both the presence of intellectual property rights (e.g., by 
creating thickets) and the absence of those rights (e.g., by imperiling 
revenues and motivating mergers and acquisitions) can contribute to 
industry consolidation. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS, PRESCRIPTIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The industrial dynamics explored in this Article raise several 
important implications, normative considerations, and additional 
questions for further study.  
A. Implications 
First, this Article sheds new light on the intersection of 
intellectual property rights and private ordering. Scholarly accounts of 
private ordering have highlighted its ability to compensate for the 
shortcomings of patents and copyrights. In this salutary narrative, 
industry players reduce transaction costs and enhance efficiency by, for 
instance, voluntarily committing assets to the public domain, asserting 
Creative Commons licenses,542 or forming collective rights 
organizations.543 While these activities are largely beneficial, this 
Article shows that industry players also employ private ordering and 
intellectual property rights for self-serving gain, often to the detriment 
of social welfare.544 For instance, large agricultural biotechnology, seed, 
and agrochemical companies have cross-licensed patents among 
 
 542. Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 183–
84 (2007).  
 543. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996). 
 544. Cf. Lemley, supra note 262, at 237 (“[W]e are currently (and mistakenly) conditioned to 
think of private property and private ordering as efficient in and of themselves, rather than as 
efficient only in the context of robust market competition.”). 
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themselves while creating broad thickets that exclude potential 
entrants.545 Similarly, software companies amass huge portfolios that 
deter new entry.546 In the movie and music industries, the early patent 
pools that benefitted industry incumbents also restricted entry and 
competition.547 Of course, it is not surprising that businesses deploy 
patents and copyrights in ways that advance their strategic objectives. 
It is notable, however, that incumbents are using instruments designed 
to promote technical and creative progress548 in ways that promote 
industry concentration, which may undermine that policy goal. 
Second, while this Article has jointly considered patents and 
copyrights to illustrate their commonalities, it is important to 
distinguish between the differential impacts of patents and copyrights 
on industry structure. While both types of exclusive rights can promote 
entry by small entities, patents require significant time and expense to 
procure whereas copyrights are available immediately at basically no 
cost. Thus, it is far easier for a songwriter to get a copyright on her 
musical composition than for a software startup to obtain a patent on 
its key technology. Indeed, while Ronald Mann has stressed the 
importance of patents for promoting the entry of software firms, he 
notes that the earliest-stage startups do not bother with patents 
because of the daunting nature of small-firm litigation, management 
focus on other matters, and the limited value of exclusivity for pre-
revenue companies.549 In addition to their high cost, the significant time 
involved in prosecuting patents (averaging about two years550) inhibits 
their ability to facilitate entry. Alternatively, the immediacy of 
obtaining copyrights enhances their ability to promote market entry by 
small entities and individuals who cannot wait to commercialize 
creative properties. In sum, copyrights are a more accessible vehicle for 
promoting market entry relative to patents for small, resource-poor 
entities. 
Going further, even in newly developing industries, patents have 
significant potential to block entry, while such potential is more limited 
for copyrights. While this Article has emphasized the entry-promoting 
function of patents in nascent industries and industry segments, 
 
 545. See supra Section II.B. 
 546. See supra Section II.C. 
 547. See supra Sections II.C, II.D. 
 548. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 549. Mann, supra note 14, at 981–85. 
 550. See Visualization Center: Traditional Total Pendency, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/corda/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml?CTNAVID=1004 (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7CC8-RTJ4] (reporting a traditional total pendency of 23.8 months 
for January 2019). 
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patents can certainly deter entry into these fields as well. The scope of 
patents is governed by claims, which often cover much more 
technological “real estate” than what a patentee actually invented.551 
Furthermore, patents confer a general right to exclude others from 
making a technology even if an infringer independently invents it.552 
Alternatively, copyrights only cover the expressive work itself (and 
substantially similar variations),553 and they only prohibit copying of 
the protected work.554 Even in a young industry, it is possible for a broad 
patent to significantly inhibit entry. For example, a broad patent 
awarded in 1992 to Agracetus covering all forms of genetically 
engineered cotton caused significant controversy and raised concerns 
that “[s]ome smaller companies could even be forced out of business if 
they have to pay licensing fees for use of the patented technologies.”555 
And as noted above, early patents held by Edison’s MPPC barred 
potential entry by competing startups in the movie industry.556 
Copyrights are narrower in that they only cover the protected material 
and close variations and do not prohibit independent creation. 
Therefore, at a schematic level, the ability of an individual copyright to 
exclude new entrants is more limited compared to an individual 
patent.557 
B. Normative Analysis and Prescriptions 
Although this Article’s primary aim is to describe the various 
effects of intellectual property rights on industry structure, some 
preliminary normative considerations are in order. The empirical 
profiles presented here raise concerns about the concentrated nature of 
downstream industries that commercialize intellectual property as well 
as the prevalence of vertical integration in certain innovative fields. Of 
course, the optimal structure for promoting innovation in any given 
industry is uncertain and is likely to depend on the particularities of 
 
 551. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim 
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1743–46 (2009) (discussing the concept of “peripheral 
claiming” and the difficulty in defining boundaries of patent claims). 
 552. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
 553. Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 554. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 555. Richard Stone, Sweeping Patents Put Biotech Companies on the Warpath, 268 SCIENCE 
656, 656 (1995). 
 556. See supra notes 262–266 and accompanying text. 
 557. From the perspective of substitutability, however, even narrow copyrights can confer 
significant power. For instance, consumers may not regard other talking animals, superheroes, 
and science-fiction characters to be adequate substitutes for Mickey Mouse, Iron Man, and Darth 
Vadar. 
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specific fields.558 That being said, while consolidation may shore up 
salutary incentives to innovate,559 such concentration raises classic 
antitrust concerns over harms to competition, decreased consumer 
choice, and higher prices. Furthermore, such concentration raises 
special considerations in the context of IP-intensive industries, for it 
may dampen innovation560 and harm democratic deliberation.561 
Additionally, the high degree of vertical integration in some IP-
intensive areas is cause for alarm, especially in light of renewed 
awareness of the dangers of such industrial organization.562  
Although a comprehensive account of antitrust approaches to 
industry concentration lies beyond the scope of this Article,563 a few 
thoughts are in order. The extent to which antitrust intervention is 
warranted in any given case depends largely on the normative aims and 
ideological commitments of antitrust law, which are contested and 
evolving. For instance, the Chicago school of antitrust, which has 
largely dominated since the 1970s, has prioritized efficiency, consumer 
welfare, and competitive prices as the overarching aims of antitrust 
law.564 Thus, for example, if Bayer’s acquisition of Monsanto does not 
lead to higher prices, the impetus for antitrust intervention is 
mitigated. Indeed, this emphasis on consumer welfare and price may 
help explain antitrust authorities’ general reluctance to prevent 
 
 558. See McGowan, supra note 48, at 732–33 (“The impact of competition on innovation 
furthermore depends on many firm and industry-specific factors that complicate the task of 
making such predictions.” (quoting Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating 
Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 569, 576 (1995))); see also Joseph Kattan, Antitrust Considerations in Innovation-Driven 
Markets, 21 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 115, 117 (1995):  
There is not yet a universally accepted consensus as to the kind of market structure 
that best facilitates innovation, although many believe that a moderately concentrated 
structure—with the top four firms holding perhaps a fifty percent aggregate market 
share—is likely to be the most fertile ground for innovation.  
But see Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation and Antitrust, 4 HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 1, 3 (1989) (arguing that firms in fragmented, innovative industries, such as microelectronics 
and biotechnology, should be largely exempt from antitrust law). 
 559. See id. at 17 (arguing that horizontal linkages among firms can compensate for 
deficiencies in firms’ ability to appropriate the rewards of innovation). 
 560. Tim Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement If Innovation Mattered 
Most, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 313, 315 (2012) (“[I]t is clear that high barriers to entry in a given 
industry, whether maintained by a monopoly or an oligopoly, can discourage product innovation 
by new firms.”). 
 561. Talbott, supra note 268, at 11.  
 562. Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1962 (2018). 
 563. For a particularly lucid account of the intersection of innovation, industry structure, and 
antitrust, see McGowan, supra note 48. A broader treatment of the antitrust implications of 
consolidation in IP-intensive industries appears in Lee, supra note 82. 
 564. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 932 
(1979) (“The Chicago school has largely prevailed with respect to its basic point: that the proper 
lens for viewing antitrust problems is price theory.”). 
Lee_ PAGE (Do Not Delete) 5/31/2019 2:12 PM 
2019] RECONCEPTUALIZING THE ROLE OF IP 1277 
significant consolidation in IP-intensive industries. But scholars have 
posited other aims of antitrust law, such as protecting small firms565 
and competitive structures featuring many players,566 and wide 
consensus has emerged that promoting innovation is also a legitimate 
aim of antitrust law.567 Even within the current landscape that focuses 
on efficiency, scholars have challenged the Chicago school’s rather 
laissez-faire approach to vertical integration.568 While vertical 
integration can optimize commercialization of innovative products,569 
contemporary antitrust scholarship has advocated for greater scrutiny 
of vertical mergers,570 which can harm competition when one or both 
merging parties operate in imperfectly competitive markets.571 Notably, 
the ills of horizontal and vertical consolidation can work in tandem, as 
input and customer foreclosure arising from vertical integration is more 
likely to be problematic in concentrated markets with few players.572 
Even within the accepted view that innovation is an important 
aim of antitrust law, complexities still remain. First, as noted above, 
identifying instances of “problematic” industry concentration is difficult 
given that no consensus exists regarding the optimal industry structure 
for fostering innovation.573 One key inquiry is whether such 
concentration is likely to create dominant monopoly power or lead to 
 
 565. McGowan, supra note 48, at 750–52. 
 566. Khan, supra note 476. 
 567. E.g., Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 
801 (2002); Khan, supra note 476, at 721–22. 
 568. Posner, supra note 564, at 927; Salop, supra note 562, at 1963; see also Lee, supra note 
39, at 1497 (“Chicago school scholars dismissed the perceived dangers of leverage by reasoning 
that there was only a single monopoly profit available to an integrated entity; accordingly, they 
concluded that vertical integration must be motivated by efficiency and not a desire to extend a 
monopoly.”). 
 569. Jorde & Teece, supra note 558, at 21 (explaining that the needs of today’s innovators are 
more extensive than what is embedded in the price of a product, and thus, vertical mergers help 
with coordination between components); Salop, supra note 562, at 1980 (discussing the efficiency 
benefits of vertical mergers). 
 570. See Lee, supra note 39, at 1497–99 (discussing the weaknesses of the Chicago school’s 
approach to vertical integration and suggesting how courts should evaluate vertical mergers under 
the antitrust laws); Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-
Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 518 (1995) (explaining how vertical mergers can be 
used to evade price control regulations and engage in price discrimination); Salop, supra note 562, 
at 1963 (“[I]n our modern market system, vigorous vertical merger enforcement is a necessity, 
particularly in markets where economies of scale and network effects lead to barriers to entry and 
durable market power.”). 
 571. Salop, supra note 562, at 1972; see Khan, supra note 476, at 792–94 (discussing how the 
current approach to antitrust enforcement does not account for anticompetitive harms that can 
arise from vertical integration). 
 572. See Salop, supra note 562, at 1967 (explaining the issues surrounding foreclosure and 
vertical mergers in the context of the Brown Shoe case). 
 573. See supra note 558 and accompanying text. 
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collusion.574 That being said, the DOJ and the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) have recognized that competition often spurs 
innovation and that mergers can lead to a reduction in innovation.575 
Second, within an innovation framework, the antitrust implications of 
patents and copyrights are not limited to “classic” cases involving 
refusals to license intellectual property or placing conditions on such 
licenses.576 Such cases, which have attracted significant scholarly 
attention,577 primarily fall under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which 
prohibits improper practices related to monopolization.578 Beyond that 
factual predicate, however, IP-intensive companies are frequently the 
targets of mergers and acquisitions that may raise antitrust concerns 
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.579 For example, the FTC brought 
suit against Roche based on perceived harms to innovation competition 
related to Roche’s acquisition of Genentech.580 Third, most of the 
antitrust scholarship and case law on innovation tends to focus on R&D-
intensive and patent-intensive industries like pharmaceuticals.581 
Antitrust theory and doctrine are less well developed regarding creative 
industries such as films, music, and literature.582 However, antitrust 
doctrine should take seriously the prospect that industry concentration 
in these fields may inhibit the development of innovative cultural 
products. Fourth, if antitrust authorities determine that intervention is 
warranted for a proposed merger or acquisition, they will have to choose 
among a variety of potential remedies. So-called behavioral remedies 
that require a particular kind of conduct through consent decrees may 
be ineffectual and require significant monitoring.583 Therefore, 
 
 574. See Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust 
and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 914 (2001) (“Antitrust is concerned primarily 
with cartels and the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power by unacceptable means.”). 
 575. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 23 
(2010). 
 576. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 567, at 771–72 (providing an example of the conflict between 
patent and antitrust cases). 
 577. E.g., id.; Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Innovation: Where We Are and Where We 
Should Be Going, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 749 (2011); McGowan, supra note 48. 
 578. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  
 579. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012); cf. Baker, supra note 44, at 592 (noting the role of antitrust law in 
challenging horizontal mergers that may reduce the number of innovators in a market).  
 580. Kattan, supra note 558, at 118–19. 
 581. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 567. 
 582. There is, however, a voluminous literature on the antitrust dimensions of media 
consolidation, especially as it relates to the production and generation of news and democratic 
discourse. See, e.g., Howard A. Shelanski, Antitrust Law as Mass Media Regulation: Can Merger 
Standards Protect the Public Interest?, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 371 (2006); Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. 
Grunes, Toward a Better Competition Policy for the Media: The Challenge of Developing Antitrust 
Policies that Support the Media Sector’s Unique Role in Our Democracy, 42 CONN. L. REV. 101 
(2009). 
 583. Salop, supra note 562, at 1992. 
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structural remedies such as mandated divestures of certain lines of 
business are more appropriate.584 Thus, for instance, the DOJ 
conditioned Bayer’s 2018 takeover of Monsanto on the sale of $9 billion 
of agricultural assets to rival BASF.585 In the view of antitrust 
regulators, this divesture was necessary to maintain a competitive 
landscape. At the extreme, courts could enjoin certain mergers and 
acquisitions from being consummated.586 
While antitrust is an important tool to address undue industry 
consolidation, changes to patent and copyright law itself may also be 
helpful.587 This analysis, however, reveals a cautionary tale, for 
policymakers must be cognizant of unintended consequences when 
attempting to modify intellectual property rights due to their varied 
impacts on industry structure. Extending the previous discussion, 
policymakers may regard concentration in downstream markets as 
problematic enough to warrant intervention. However, attempts to 
narrow patents rights, which would mitigate the market power of large 
industry incumbents, can also prevent new entities from forming and 
competing against such incumbents. The Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
which ruled that isolated DNA is not patentable subject matter,588 was 
lauded by many as enhancing access to Myriad’s previously patented 
genetic diagnostic tests for breast and ovarian cancer.589 Myriad had 
utilized its patents to enjoy a virtual monopoly on such testing in the 
United States, and the Court’s decision ushered in new competition.590 
However, this and other decisions narrowing patentable subject 
matter591 raise concerns that small biotech firms may not be able to 
 
 584. Id. at 1992–93. 
 585. David McLaughlin et al., Bayer Wins U.S. Approval for Monsanto After Two-Year Quest, 
BLOOMBERG (May 29, 2018, 10:48 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-29/ 
bayer-wins-u-s-nod-for-monsanto-nearing-end-of-two-year-quest [https://perma.cc/T8FZ-UF8Q]. 
 586. Salop, supra note 562, at 1993. 
 587. Cf. Hovenkamp, supra note 577, at 750 (“[I]t is not the purpose of antitrust to fix defects 
in other regulatory regimes, particularly when those regimes are federal.”). 
 588. 569 U.S. 576, 580 (2013). 
 589. Peter Lee, The Supreme Court’s Myriad Effects on Scientific Research: Definitional 
Fluidity and the Legal Construction of Nature, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1077 (describing the Myriad 
litigation and its implications for access to clinical genetic diagnostic tests). 
 590. See Editorial, Myriad Diagnostic Concerns, 31 NATURE BIOTECH. 571 (2013), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/nbt.2638 [https://perma.cc/F969-M465] (“Ambry Genetics, Bio-
Reference Laboratories, Pathway Genomics and Gene by Gene all announced lower-priced 
BRCA1/BRCA2 tests within 24 hours of the ruling.”). Myriad, however, quickly brought suit 
against several of the new competitors. Lee, supra note 589, at 1087. 
 591. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 73 (2012) 
(holding that a method to enhance the therapeutic efficacy of a drug does not comprise patentable 
subject matter); Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
Lee_ PAGE (Do Not Delete) 5/31/2019 2:12 PM 
1280 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:4:1197 
form and attract capital, thus hampering industry entry and, 
ultimately, competition. Weakening intellectual property rights can 
harm both large incumbents and new entrants that would otherwise 
compete against them, thus rendering the net social impact of such 
changes indeterminate.  
In the copyright sphere, concerns that rights holders exercise 
undue control over creative works have motivated proposals to 
introduce a new system of formalities, including requirements to 
register, provide notice of, record transfers of, and renew copyrights.592 
Such a proposal would likely lead to greater access to copyrighted 
works, thus diminishing the market power of large, downstream 
industry incumbents. However, it may disproportionately impact 
independent, upstream creators, such as screenwriters, composers, 
musicians, and authors, who lack the legal sophistication to register 
their copyrights,593 thus imperiling their entry into creative fields. 
While measures to mitigate (or strengthen) intellectual property rights 
may ultimately be warranted, legal and policy decisionmakers should 
consider the varied impacts of such interventions on small, upstream 
creators and large, downstream incumbents. 
This analysis suggests that policymakers should focus less on 
wholesale changes to patents and copyrights (which may produce 
undesirable and unintended consequences) and instead pursue more 
granular modifications to intellectual property regimes that explicitly 
consider the identity of rights holders and how they are likely to use 
exclusive rights. In particular, this Article proposes that policymakers 
modify intellectual property law in light of the differential effects of 
exclusive rights when wielded by new entrants versus large 
incumbents. Not all patents and copyrights contribute equally to social 
welfare. For instance, the first patent for a startup is more likely to 
promote investment, market entry, and competition (and its attendant 
social benefits), while the thousandth patent for a large incumbent is 
more likely to contribute to barriers to entry (and its attendant social 
ills). This analysis suggests promoting patent ownership by early-stage, 
smaller entities while creating greater obstacles for obtaining 
additional patents for established companies with large portfolios. This 
could be achieved by calibrating patent fees, which include fees for 
 
(holding that a method for diagnosing fetal abnormalities using cell-free fetal DNA does not 
comprise patentable subject matter).  
 592. See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 549, 555 
(2004) (proposing a new system of formalities in which noncompliance would subject copyrighted 
works to a default license). 
 593. See id. at 558 (acknowledging that some authors will mistakenly not comply with 
formalities). 
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obtaining and maintaining patents.594 For example, the USPTO could 
dramatically increase patent fees depending on the number of patents 
that an applicant already owns. In this manner, a startup would pay 
significantly less for its first patent than an incumbent would pay for 
its thousandth. By a similar logic, patent fees could be radically lower 
for smaller entities compared to larger ones, a rationale already 
reflected in the patent system’s discounted fees for small and micro 
entities.595 This would be particularly helpful given that cost is the most 
cited reason why technology startups do not obtain patents.596 This 
proposal could extend to copyrights as well. While copyrights are 
currently obtained for a price of essentially zero, Congress could 
increase the cost of obtaining and enforcing copyrights for large entities 
relative to small ones.  
These proposals to modify patent and copyright law would have 
to counter gaming strategies wherein large companies create small 
shell companies to obtain intellectual property rights at a discount or 
small companies transfer their rights to large incumbents on the 
secondary market. Again, the principal aim of this Article is descriptive 
and conceptual rather than prescriptive, and such a proposal would 
need further elaboration. However, given the welfare benefits of a small 
number of exclusive rights wielded by small entities and the welfare 
costs of broad intellectual property portfolios wielded by incumbents, 
such calibration is worth considering.  
C. Future Directions 
Broadening our perspective, this Article’s observations suggest 
greater attention to the role of intellectual property rights in shaping 
industry structure. As noted, traditional patent and copyright 
scholarship has focused on the role of exclusive rights in providing 
incentives to create and develop new technological and expressive 
works.597 This is a valuable and challenging line of inquiry, which has 
explored both the static effects of exclusive rights on the availability 
and price of patented and copyrighted goods598 as well as the dynamic 
effects of exclusive rights on cumulative innovation.599 As this Article 
 
 594. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect 
Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 67, 
78 (2013).  
 595. 37 C.F.R. § 1.16 (2018); Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Agenda for U.S. Patent Law, 55 
HOUS. L. REV. 321, 348–50 (2017). 
 596. Graham et al., supra note 60, at 1310. 
 597. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
 598. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 29, at 996. 
 599. See, e.g., Merges & Nelson, supra note 49, at 842–44. 
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has shown, however, intellectual property rights can also significantly 
impact innovation by influencing the structure of innovative industries. 
While some scholars have richly pursued this line of inquiry,600 more 
attention to the structural implications of patents and copyrights is 
warranted.  
Along these lines, the theoretical contributions of this Article 
define a framework for further empirical examination of the effects of 
intellectual property rights on industry structure. This Article has 
relied on empirical evidence to argue that patents and copyrights play 
particularly important roles in early and upstream entry as well as 
subsequent and downstream consolidation in innovative industries. 
These are testable hypotheses, and this Article calls for further 
empirical examinations to elucidate and quantify these phenomena 
across a diverse set of industries.  
Finally, this Article illustrates that patents and copyrights 
operate in dynamic, constantly evolving industries that are subject to 
myriad forces beyond intellectual property rights themselves. This 
Article has focused on the long-standing scholarly debate over whether 
exclusive rights promote industry fragmentation or concentration. The 
empirical profiles presented throughout this Article, however, reveal a 
host of non-IP forces that also determine the structure of IP-intensive 
industries. In subsequent work, I will further explore such forces, which 
include non-IP barriers to entry, economies of scale and scope, 
competitive considerations, and investor pressures.601 Notably, such 
forces tend to push IP-intensive industries toward concentration, 
particularly toward the downstream end of the value chain focused on 
commercialization.602 Such consolidation in technological and creative 
fields raises normative concerns over harms to competition, access, and 
innovation.603 While it is important to understand the complex ways in 
which intellectual property rights impact industry structure, it is also 
important to contextualize these effects within the broader economic 
and business forces that shape innovative fields.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has shed new light on the long-standing debate over 
the effects of intellectual property rights on industry structure. An 
influential body of theory holds that intellectual property rights 
 
 600. See, e.g., Arora & Merges, supra note 36; Barnett, supra note 32; Burk, supra note 294.  
 601. See Lee, supra note 82. 
 602. Id. 
 603. See supra notes 573–575 and accompanying text. 
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promote industry concentration by allowing rights holders to 
internalize the benefits of innovation and exclude potential new 
entrants. Conversely, recent scholarship has argued that intellectual 
property rights promote industry fragmentation by facilitating new 
entity formation and market entry. This Article has argued that 
exclusive rights contribute to both fragmentation and concentration, 
depending on context.  
This Article has introduced two novel distinctions to clarify 
these effects. First, it has distinguished along time, arguing that 
patents and copyrights promote the initial entry of new firms but that 
industry incumbents wielding significant intellectual property estates 
often absorb those new entrants and erect barriers to entry, thus 
enhancing subsequent concentration. Second, it has distinguished 
along the value chain, arguing that patents and copyrights promote 
entry by upstream creators but facilitate concentration by downstream 
firms focused on commercializing technological and creative goods. 
Additionally, this Article has revealed that patents and copyrights both 
directly impact industry structure and play important supporting roles 
in enabling fragmentation and concentration.  
These findings provide legal and policy decisionmakers with a 
more robust understanding of the nuanced ways that intellectual 
property rights operate in real-world industrial contexts. While 
antitrust has an important role to play in mitigating undue 
concentration, identifying the optimal industry structure for promoting 
innovation is a daunting task. These findings also suggest exercising 
caution before attempting wholesale modifications to intellectual 
property rights given their varied (and opposing) effects on industry 
structure across time and the value chain. Furthermore, they suggest 
calibrating the acquisition, maintenance, and enforcement of these 
rights depending on the size of the rights holder and how it is likely to 
use those rights. Finally, while it is important to understand the 
contribution of intellectual property rights to industry structure, this 
empirical examination reveals a broader array of economic and 
strategic forces that shape highly innovative fields and warrant further 
study. 
